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Lorenzo v. SEC 
 
Ruling Below: Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
 
Overview: Francis Lorenzo, an investment banker, was charged with securities fraud after he sent 
potential investors emails containing false statements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit ruled that Lorenzo had not violated Rule 10b-5(b) because his boss had 
actually made the misleading statements, but it also held that Lorenzo had violated Rule 10b-5(a) 
by engaging in a fraudulent scheme.  
 
Issue: Whether a misstatement claim that does not meet the elements set forth in Janus Capital 
Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders can be repackaged and pursued as a fraudulent-scheme 
claim. 
Francis V. LORENZO, Petitioner 
v. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISION, Respondent  
 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
 
Decided on September 29, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge:  
 
The Securities and Exchange 
Commission found that Francis Lorenzo sent 
email messages to investors containing 
misrepresentations about key features of a 
securities offering. The Commission 
determined that Lorenzo’s conduct violated 
various securities-fraud provisions. We 
uphold the Commission’s findings that the 
statements in Lorenzo’s emails were false or 
misleading and that he possessed the 
requisite intent. 
 
We cannot sustain, however, the 
Commission’s determination that Lorenzo’s 
conduct violated one of the provisions he was 
found to have infringed: Rule 10b-5(b). That 
rule bars the making of materially false 
statements in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities. We conclude that Lorenzo 
did not “make” the false statements at issue 
for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b) because 
Lorenzo’s boss, and not Lorenzo himself, 
retained “ultimate authority” over the 
statements. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First 
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 
(2011).  
 
 While Lorenzo’s boss, and not 
Lorenzo, thus was the “maker” of the false 
statements under Rule 10b-5(b), Lorenzo 
played an active role in perpetrating the fraud 
by folding the statements into emails he sent 
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directly to investors in his capacity as director 
of investment banking, and by doing so with 
an intent to deceive. Lorenzo’s conduct 
therefore infringed the other securities-fraud 
provisions he was charged with violating. But 
because the Commission’s choice of 
sanctions to impose against Lorenzo turned 
in some measure on its misimpression that his 
conduct violated Rule 10b-5(b), we set aside 
the sanctions and remand the matter to enable 
the Commission to reassess the appropriate 
penalties. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 In February 2009, Francis Lorenzo 
became the director of investment banking at 
Charles Vista, LLC. Charles Vista was a 
registered broker-dealer owned by Gregg 
Lorenzo, no relation to Francis. (For clarity 
of reference, we will refer to Francis Lorenzo 
as “Lorenzo” and will use Gregg Lorenzo’s 
first name when referring to him.) 
 
Charles Vista’s biggest client, and 
Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at 
the time, was a start-up company named 
Waste2Energy Holdings, Inc. (W2E). W2E 
claimed to have developed a “gasification” 
technology that could generate electricity by 
converting solid waste to gas. W2E’s 
business model relied on the technology’s 
living up to its potential. If it failed to do so, 
the great majority of W2E’s assets—the 
“intangibles,” in balance-sheet lingo—would 
have to be written off entirely.  
 
W2E’s conversion technology never 
materialized. In September 2009, W2E 
sought to escape financial ruin by offering up 
to $15 million in convertible debentures. 
(Debentures are “debt secured only by the 
debtor’s earning power, not by a lien on any 
specific asset.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
486 (10th ed. 2014)). Charles Vista would 
serve as the exclusive placement agent for 
W2E’s debenture offering.  
 
W2E’s most recent SEC filing at the 
time, its June 3, 2009 Form 8-K (used to 
notify investors of certain specified events), 
contained no indication of any possible 
devaluation of the company’s intangible 
assets. Rather, the form stated that W2E’s 
intangibles were worth just over $10 million 
as of the end of 2008. On September 9, 2009, 
W2E issued a Private Placement 
Memorandum as a guidebook for potential 
investors in the debentures. That guidebook, 
like the June 2009 Form 8-K, included no 
mention of any devaluation of the company’s 
intangibles. 
 
Following a lengthy audit, however, 
W2E changed its public tune. On October 1, 
2009, the company filed an amended Form 8-
K in which it reported a total “impairment” of 
its intangible assets because “management 
made a determination that the value of the 
assets acquired were of no value.” J.A. 703. 
As of March 31, 2009, W2E now clarified, its 
gasification technology should have been 
valued at zero, and its total assets at only 
$370,552. On the same day it filed its 
amended Form 8-K, October 1, 2009, W2E 
also filed a quarterly Form 10-Q in which it 
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valued its total assets at $660,408 as of June 
30, 2009.  
 
Later on October 1, Lorenzo’s 
secretary alerted him (via email) about 
W2E’s amended Form 8-K filing. The next 
day, Lorenzo emailed all Charles Vista 
brokers links to both of W2E’s October 1 
filings. On October 5, he received an email 
from W2E’s Chief Financial Officer 
explaining the reasons for “[t]he accumulated 
deficit we have reported.” Id. at 740. The 
CFO reiterated that W2E had written off “all 
of our intangible assets . . . of about $11 
million” due to “our assessment of the value 
of what those asset[s] are worth today.” Id. 
 
On October 14, Lorenzo separately 
emailed two potential investors “several key 
points” about W2E’s pending debenture 
offering. Id. at 794, 796. His emails, 
however, omitted any mention of the 
wholesale devaluation of W2E’s intangibles. 
On the contrary, Lorenzo’s emails assured 
both recipients that the offering came with “3 
layers of protection: (I) [W2E] has over $10 
mm in confirmed assets; (II) [W2E] has 
purchase orders and LOI’s for over $43 mm 
in orders; (III) Charles Vista has agreed to 
raise additional monies to repay these 
Debenture holders (if necessary).” Id. One of 
Lorenzo’s messages said it had been sent 
“[a]t the request of Gregg Lorenzo,” id. at 
796, and the other stated it had been sent “[a]t 
the request of Adam Spero [a broker with 
Charles Vista] and Gregg Lorenzo,” id. at 
794. In both messages, Lorenzo urged the 
recipients to “[p]lease call [him] with any 
questions.” Id. at 794, 796. And he signed 
both messages with his name and title as 
“Vice President – Investment Banking.” Id. 
 
B. 
 
On February 15, 2013, the 
Commission commenced cease-and-desist 
proceedings against Lorenzo, Gregg 
Lorenzo, and Charles Vista. It charged each 
with violating three securities-fraud 
provisions: (i) Section 17(a)(1) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 
77q(a)(1); (ii) Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; and 
(iii) Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Gregg Lorenzo and 
Charles Vista settled the charges against 
them, but the claims against Lorenzo 
proceeded to resolution before the agency. 
 
An administrative law judge 
concluded that Lorenzo had “willfully 
violated the antifraud provisions of the 
Securities and Exchange Acts by his material 
misrepresentations and omissions concerning 
W2E in the emails.” Gregg C. Lorenzo, 
Francis V. Lorenzo, and Charles Vista, LLC, 
SEC Release No. 544, 107 SEC Docket 5934, 
2013 WL 6858820, at *7 (Dec. 31, 2013). 
The ALJ deemed “[t]he falsity of the 
representations in the emails . . . staggering” 
and Lorenzo’s mental state with respect to 
those misstatements at least “reckless.” Id. 
As a result, the ALJ ordered Lorenzo to: (i) 
cease and desist from violating each 
securities-fraud provision giving rise to the 
charges against him; (ii) forever refrain from 
participating in the securities industry in 
several enumerated respects; and (iii) pay a 
civil monetary penalty of $15,000. Id. at *10. 
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Lorenzo petitioned the Commission 
for review. Following “an independent 
review of the record,” the full Commission 
sustained the ALJ’s decision, including her 
“imposition of an industry-wide bar, a cease-
and-desist order, and a $15,000 civil 
penalty.” Francis V. Lorenzo, SEC Release 
No. 9762, 111 SEC Docket 1761, 2015 WL 
1927763, at *1 (Apr. 29, 2015) (Lorenzo). 
The Commission found that Lorenzo “knew 
each of [the emails’ key statements] was false 
and/or misleading when he sent them.” Id. It 
concluded that the sanctions were “in the 
public interest to deter Lorenzo and others in 
similar positions from committing future 
violations.” Id. at *17. The Commission later 
denied Lorenzo’s motion for reconsideration. 
 
Lorenzo filed a timely petition for 
review in this court. He challenges only the 
Commission’s imposition of an industry-
wide bar and a $15,000 civil penalty, not the 
cease-and-desist order.  
 
II. 
 
We first consider Lorenzo’s 
challenges to the Commission’s findings that 
the relevant statements in his email messages 
were false or misleading and were made with 
the requisite mental state. The three pertinent 
statements are the three “layers of protection” 
enumerated in both of Lorenzo’s October 14, 
2009, email messages to potential investors 
about the debenture offering. Lorenzo 
challenges he Commission’s determination 
that two of the three statements were false or 
misleading, and he also challenges the 
Commission’s conclusion that he possessed 
the requisite intent with respect to all three of 
the statements. 
 
With regard to his intent, establishing 
a violation of Section 17(a)(1) of the 
Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act, or Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 “requires 
proof of scienter.” Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc. 
v. SEC, 512 F.3d 634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
That standard in turn requires demonstrating 
“an intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.” Id. (quoting SEC v. Steadman, 967 
F.2d 636, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). The scienter 
requirement can be satisfied by a showing of 
“[e]xtreme recklessness,” which exists when 
“the danger was so obvious that the actor was 
aware of it and consciously disregarded it.” 
Id.  
 
The question whether Lorenzo acted 
with scienter, like the question whether the 
statements were false or misleading, is a 
question of fact. Id. at 639. The 
Commission’s “factual findings are 
conclusive if supported by substantial 
evidence.” Seghers v. SEC, 548 F.3d 129, 
132 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Although “[s]ubstantial 
evidence is more than a mere scintilla,” 
Kornman v. SEC, 592 F.3d 173, 184 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), we have repeatedly described the 
standard as a “very deferential” one, e.g., 
Siegel v. SEC, 592 F.3d 147, 155 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); Dolphin & Bradbury, 512 F.3d at 639; 
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 801 F.2d 
1415, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Applying that 
standard here, we conclude that the 
Commission’s findings as to falsity and 
scienter are supported by substantial 
evidence with regard to each of the three 
pertinent statements in Lorenzo’s emails. 
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A. 
 
The first of the three statements at 
issue advised potential investors that the 
“Company has over $10 mm in confirmed 
assets.” J.A. 794, 796. Lorenzo does not 
directly dispute the falsity of that statement. 
Nor could he: by the time Lorenzo sent the 
October 14, 2009, email messages containing 
that statement, W2E had entirely written off 
its intangibles and disclosed that its 
remaining assets were worth far less than $1 
million. And Lorenzo himself testified that 
W2E “would be lucky to get a million” for its 
intangibles after they had been marked down. 
Id. at 128. 
 
As to the question of scienter, 
Lorenzo contends that, when he sent the 
emails, he held a good-faith belief that W2E 
had over $10 million in confirmed assets. The 
Commission concluded otherwise, and its 
finding of scienter is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
 
One of Lorenzo’s chief duties 
involved conducting due diligence on his 
clients, including reviewing their financial 
statements and public SEC filings. During the 
relevant time, W2E was Lorenzo’s sole 
investment-banking client. He knew that 
W2E’s financial situation was “horrible from 
the beginning” and that its gas-conversion 
technology had not worked as planned. Id. at 
124. He also knew that he stood to gain seven 
to nine percent of any funds he raised from 
the debenture offering.  
 
The record shows that, when Lorenzo 
viewed W2E’s June 2009 Form 8-K, he 
disbelieved the Form’s valuation of the 
company’s intangible assets at $10 million. 
He agreed that the intangibles were a “dead 
asset” that would be “hugely discounted,” id. 
at 127-28, and that W2E would be “lucky [to] 
get a million dollars for that asset,” id. at 128-
29. He also thought it significant that the $10 
million valuation had not been audited, 
because without such scrutiny, “there is way 
too much risk for investors.” Id. at 126. He 
acknowledged that he had warned Gregg 
Lorenzo as early as April 2009 to refrain from 
collateralizing a debenture offering with 
W2E’s intangibles, because those assets 
“provided no protection” to investors. Id. at 
159. Lorenzo understood that, if a default 
occurred, “clients would not be able to recoup 
their money based on a liquidation of this 
asset.” Id. He instead viewed the debenture 
offering as a “toxic convertible debt spiral.” 
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *5.  
 
Evidence concerning Lorenzo’s state 
of mind can also be gleaned from his actions 
in helping prepare Charles Vista’s Private 
Placement Memorandum for the debenture 
offering. On August 26, 2009, he asked 
W2E’s principals to value the company’s 
intangibles at $10 million in the upcoming 
Memorandum. He received no response. He 
broached the subject again on September 1, 
this time leaving the intangibles’ value blank, 
because he “w[asn’t] sure what [it] was worth 
anymore.” J.A. 135, 739. The final 
Memorandum assigned no concrete value to 
W2E’s intangibles; it instead divulged that 
the company had experienced “significant 
operating losses” and did “not expect to be 
profitable for at least the foreseeable future.” 
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *3.  
 249 
In its October 1 SEC filings, W2E 
publicly disclosed the wholesale write-off of 
its intangibles. It did so in a tri-column chart 
entitled “Goodwill and Technology,” and it 
followed that numerical presentation with a 
textual explanation for the mark-down. 
Lorenzo acknowledged that he read the 
amended Form 8-K on October 1 (although, 
according to him, “[p]robably not as closely 
as I should have”). J.A. 140. And he received 
an email from W2E’s CFO on October 5 
succinctly contextualizing the massive 
devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets. 
 
The evidence therefore supports 
concluding that, at least by October 5, 
Lorenzo knew that W2E’s intangibles were 
valueless. He gave testimony on the issue as 
follows: “Q. So it is fair to say . . . that on 
October 5, 200[9], you were aware that the 
$10 million asset had been written off by 
[W2E]. Correct? A. Okay. I will agree to that. 
That’s correct. Q. That is a fair statement? A. 
Yes.” Id. at 151. That admission is difficult to 
reconcile with Lorenzo’s statement that he 
“unintentional[ly] miss[ed]” the import of the 
October 5 email. Id. at 148. The Commission 
justifiably credited his more inculpatory 
rendition of events, especially in light of his 
broader, scienter-related concession: “Q. 
[D]id you know that those statements were 
inaccurate and misleading? A. Yes. Q. You 
knew at the time? A. At the time? I can’t sit 
here and say that I didn’t know.” Id. at 158.  
 
According to the Commission, “[t]hat 
Lorenzo could have looked at [W2E’s] 
filings, which was his job, and missed what 
was one of the most pertinent facts in them—
the valuation of the company’s assets—is 
either untrue or extreme recklessness.” 
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *9. The 
Commission considered it “at least extremely 
reckless” for Lorenzo to have sent email 
messages claiming that W2E had over $10 
million in “confirmed” assets, given his 
“longstanding concern about the legitimacy” 
of those assets. Id. We perceive no basis for 
setting aside the Commission’s conclusions 
as unsupported by substantial evidence. 
 
In resisting that conclusion, Lorenzo 
relies in part on a $14 million valuation of 
W2E’s assets in a W2E research report 
emailed by Charles Vista’s Chief 
Compliance Officer to the firm’s brokers on 
the same day Lorenzo sent his pertinent 
emails (October 14, 2009). The Commission 
sensibly reasoned that “the mere fact that, for 
whatever unknown reason, a compliance 
officer sent an inaccurate research report 
internally to the firm’s brokers is neither 
analogous to, nor an excuse for, Lorenzo’s 
knowingly sending misleading emails to 
prospective investors.” Id. at *9 n.23. 
 
B. 
 
The second contested statement is the 
assertion in Lorenzo’s emails that “[t]he 
Company has purchase orders and LOI’s for 
over $43 mm in orders.” J.A. 794, 796. He 
maintains that the Commission erred in 
deeming that statement false or misleading. 
He notes that, at one point, Charles Vista did 
in fact receive a $43 million letter of intent 
from a potential customer in the Caribbean, 
and that W2E’s CEO “put a lot of 
confidence” in such letters. Id. at 160. But as 
the Commission rightly notes, the Caribbean 
 250 
letter did not obligate its drafter to do 
anything, and the transaction proceeded no 
further. By the time Lorenzo sent his emails 
on October 14, 2009, W2E had no 
outstanding purchase orders. Lorenzo’s 
emails nonetheless assured the recipients that 
W2E had over $43 million in “purchase 
orders and LOI’s.” The Commission thus 
was fully justified in finding that statement 
false or misleading. See Lorenzo, 2015 WL 
1927763, at *6.  
 
Lorenzo also disputes the 
Commission’s finding of scienter concerning 
the extent of W2E’s anticipated cash flow. 
Asked whether he knew at the time that the 
$43 million figure was misleading, Lorenzo 
testified as follows: “I can’t say that with a 
hundred percent because they did have LOI’s 
for 43 million.” J.A. 160. As his other 
testimony revealed, however, Lorenzo 
understood that W2E’s sole letter of intent 
was “non-binding,” a mere potentiality that 
the company “hoped would materialize.” Id. 
at 162. And by September 2009, he “didn’t 
think that the 43 million LOI was ever going 
to turn into purchases.” Id. at 164. Lorenzo 
testified repeatedly to that effect. See id. at 
163-64 (“Q. And by September 2009 you 
didn’t think it was ever going to come 
through, right? A. . . . That is correct.”); id. at 
164 (“Q. So sometime in September you lost 
confidence that this 43 million was ever 
going to happen? A. Yes.”). 
 
The clear implication of the statement 
in Lorenzo’s email messages was that W2E 
anticipated a $43 million influx of capital 
from past and future orders. Yet the record 
reveals grave doubts on Lorenzo’s part that 
“$43 mm in orders” (or any orders) would 
actually occur. Substantial evidence therefore 
supports the Commission’s finding of 
scienter as to that statement. 
 
C. 
 
The third statement at issue is the 
assertion in Lorenzo’s email messages that 
“Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional 
monies to repay these Debenture holders (if 
necessary).” Id. at 794, 796. Lorenzo disputes 
the Commission’s conclusion that the 
statement was false or misleading. He 
contends that Gregg Lorenzo could have 
made such an agreement for Charles Vista, 
had done so on prior occasions for debenture 
holders, and had allegedly met with 
additional brokers about raising funds for 
W2E. The Commission permissibly regarded 
those assertions as “establish[ing] only the 
theoretical possibility that Charles Vista 
could have raised additional money to repay 
investors, not that it had agreed to do so (as 
Lorenzo’s emails claimed).” Lorenzo, 2015 
WL 1927763, at *7. 
 
With regard to scienter, Lorenzo 
observes that the Commission included no 
specific citations to the record in support of 
its finding. It is true that, although the 
Commission quoted the evidentiary record at 
length, it did not cite the particular page 
numbers on which certain arguments and 
quotations appeared. But we “uphold a 
decision of less than ideal clarity if the 
agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-
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Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). 
That standard is readily satisfied here. 
 
Lorenzo allowed, at least in hindsight, 
that ‘‘you can interpret this [statement] as 
being misleading.’’ J.A. 167. Moreover, 
according to his own testimony, at the time 
he sent the emails, he did not believe Charles 
Vista could raise enough money to repay 
debenture holders. For instance, he testified 
that, as of October 2009, ‘‘it is accurate to say 
that Charles Vista would not have the buying 
power or the resources to properly fund 
[W2E] in order to repay the debentures.’’ Id. 
at 172. Given Lorenzo’s knowledge that 
Charles Vista could not have repaid 
debenture holders, the Commission could 
certainly conclude that Lorenzo believed that 
no such agreement existed. As a result, 
substantial evidence supports the 
Commission’s finding that Lorenzo acted 
with scienter with regard to the assurance to 
investors that Charles Vista had made such a 
promise. 
 
III. 
 
The Commission found that 
Lorenzo’s actions in connection with his 
email messages violated Section (17)(a)(1) of 
the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act, as implemented by the 
Commission’s Rule 10b-5. The Rule contains 
three subsections, and the Commission 
concluded that Lorenzo had violated all three.  
 
We now consider Lorenzo’s 
argument that he did not ‘‘make’’ the 
relevant statements within the meaning of the 
express terms of one of Rule 10b-5’s 
subsections, Rule 10b-5(b). We agree with 
Lorenzo that, under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First 
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 131 S.Ct. 
2296, 180 L.Ed.2d 166 (2011), he did not 
‘‘make’’ the statements at issue for purposes 
of Rule 10b-5(b). Even so, we conclude that 
his status as a non-‘‘maker’’ of the statements 
under Rule 10b-5(b) does not vitiate the 
Commission’s conclusion that his actions 
violated the other subsections of Rule 10b-5, 
as well as Section 17(a)(1). 
 
A. 
 
 Under Rule 10b-5(b), it is unlawful 
to ‘‘make any untrue statement of a material 
fact TTT in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.’’ 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5(b). In Janus, the Supreme Court explained 
what it means to ‘‘make’’ a statement within 
the meaning of that prohibition:  
For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a 
statement is the person or entity with ultimate 
authority over the statement, including its 
content and whether and how to 
communicate it. Without control, a person or 
entity can merely suggest what to say, not 
‘‘make’’ a statement in its own right. One 
who prepares or publishes a statement on 
behalf of another is not its maker.  
 
564 U.S. at 142, 131 S.Ct. 2296. ‘‘[I]n the 
ordinary case,’’ the Court continued, 
‘‘attribution within a statement or implicit 
from surrounding circumstances is strong 
evidence that a statement was made by—and 
only by—the party to whom it is attributed.’’ 
Id. at 142-43. 
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The Janus Court held that an 
investment adviser that had assisted in 
preparing a mutual fund’s prospectuses did 
not ‘‘make’’ the statements contained 
therein, because the adviser lacked ‘‘ultimate 
control’’ over the statements’ content and 
dissemination. Id. at 148, 131 S.Ct. 2296. The 
investment adviser had merely 
‘‘participate[d] in the drafting of a false 
statement’’—‘‘an undisclosed act preceding 
the decision of an independent entity to make 
a public statement.” Id. at 145. The Court 
illustrated the operation of its test through the 
following analogy: “Even when a 
speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is 
entirely within the control of the person who 
delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes 
credit—or blame—for what is ultimately 
said.” Id. at 143.  
 
Under the Janus test, a person cannot 
have “made” a statement if he lacked ultimate 
authority over what it said and whether it was 
said, including if he prepared or published it 
on behalf of another. In light of that 
understanding, we find that Lorenzo was not 
the “maker” of the pertinent statements set 
out in the email messages he sent to potential 
investors, even viewing the record in the light 
most favorable to the Commission.  
 
Lorenzo contends that he sent the 
email messages at the behest of his boss, 
Gregg Lorenzo, and that Gregg Lorenzo 
supplied the content of the false statements, 
which Lorenzo copied and pasted into the 
messages before distributing them. As a 
result, Lorenzo contends, Gregg Lorenzo 
(and not Lorenzo himself) was the “maker” 
of the statements under Janus. The 
Commission found otherwise, concluding 
that Lorenzo “was ultimately responsible for 
the emails’ content and dissemination.” 
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *10. We 
cannot sustain the Commission’s conclusion 
that Lorenzo had “ultimate authority” over 
the false statements under Janus. 564 U.S. at 
142. Gregg Lorenzo, and not Lorenzo, 
retained ultimate authority. 
 
Voluminous testimony established 
that Lorenzo transmitted statements devised 
by Gregg Lorenzo at Gregg Lorenzo’s 
direction. For instance, Lorenzo said: “I cut 
and paste[d] an e-mail and sent it to 
[investors],” J.A. 153; “I was asked to send 
these e-mails out by Gregg Lorenzo,” id. at 
156; and “I cut and pasted and sent it,” id. at 
157. He also stated: “I remember getting—
getting the e-mail address from [Gregg 
Lorenzo] and then cut and past[ed] this—this 
thing and sent it,” id. at 199; “[Gregg 
Lorenzo] gave me the e-mail address, I typed 
it into the ‘to’ column and cut and pasted 
this—the content and sent it out,” id.; “My 
boss asked me to send these e-mails out and I 
sent them out,” id. at 200; “[I] sent these 
emails out at the request of my superior,” id. 
at 208; and “I simply was asked to send the 
e-mail out,” id. at 208-09. 
 
In the face of that consistent 
testimony, the Commission anchored its 
conclusion almost entirely in the following 
remark from Lorenzo: “If memory serves 
me—I think I authored it and then it was 
approved by Gregg and Mike [Molinaro, 
Charles Vista’s Chief Compliance Officer].” 
J.A. 155. That assertion, even apart from its 
equivocation, must be read alongside the rest 
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of Lorenzo’s testimony. Immediately before 
and after uttering that line, Lorenzo explained 
that “I cut and paste[d] an e-mail and sent it” 
and “I cut and pasted and sent it.” Id. at 153, 
157. And he consistently testified to the same 
effect throughout. In that light, Lorenzo’s 
remark that he “authored” the emails cannot 
bear the weight given it by the Commission. 
Rather, the statement is fully consistent with 
Lorenzo’s repeated account that, while he 
produced the email messages for final 
distribution from himself to the investors—
and in that sense “authored” the messages—
he populated the messages with content sent 
by Gregg Lorenzo. 
 
In the line of testimony on which the 
Commission relies, moreover, Lorenzo stated 
that, before he sent the messages, they were 
“approved” by Gregg Lorenzo. That 
observation reinforces Gregg Lorenzo’s 
ultimate authority over the substance and 
distribution of the emails: Gregg Lorenzo 
asked Lorenzo to send the emails, supplied 
the central content, and approved the 
messages for distribution. To be sure, 
Lorenzo played an active role in perpetrating 
the fraud by producing the emails containing 
the false statements and sending them from 
his account in his capacity as director of 
investment banking (and doing so with 
scienter). But under the test set forth in Janus, 
Gregg Lorenzo, and not Lorenzo, was “the 
maker” of the false statements in the emails. 
564 U.S. at 142. 
 
The Commission’s remaining 
observations do not alter our conclusion. For 
instance, the Commission noted that Lorenzo 
“put his own name and direct phone number 
at the end of the emails, and he sent the 
emails from his own account.” Lorenzo, 2015 
WL 1927763, at *10. That sort of signature 
line, however, can often exist when one 
person sends an email that “publishes a 
statement on behalf of another,” with the 
latter person retaining “ultimate authority 
over the statement.” Janus, 564 U.S. at 142. 
 
The Commission also referenced 
Lorenzo’s testimony that “he did not recall 
ever discussing either of the emails or their 
subject matter with Gregg Lorenzo.” 
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *10. That 
comment, however, is consistent with the 
understanding that Lorenzo played a minimal 
role in devising the emails’ false statements. 
And although the email messages said that 
the Investment Banking Division—which 
Lorenzo headed—was “summariz[ing] 
several key points” about the debenture 
offering, J.A. 794, 796, the content of those 
points evidently had been supplied by Gregg 
Lorenzo. The emails, moreover, began by 
stating that they were being sent at Gregg 
Lorenzo’s request. Lorenzo testified 
elsewhere that Gregg Lorenzo had remarked, 
“I want this [to] come from our investment 
banking division. Can you send this out for 
me?” Id. at 217. 
 
Under the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Janus, in short, Lorenzo cannot be 
considered to have been “the maker” of the 
statements in question for purposes of Rule 
10b-5(b)—i.e., “the person . . . with ultimate 
authority” over them. 564 U.S. at 142. That 
person was Gregg Lorenzo, and not (or not 
also) Lorenzo. 
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B.  
 
Lorenzo next argues that, if he was 
not “the maker” of the false statements at 
issue within the meaning of Rule 10b5(b), his 
conduct necessarily also falls outside the 
prohibitions of Exchange Act Section 10(b), 
Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), and Securities Act 
Section 17(a)(1). The Commission concluded 
otherwise, incorporating by reference its 
reasoning in John P. Flannery & James D. 
Hopkins, SEC Release No. 3981, 110 SEC 
Docket 2463, 2014 WL 7145625 (Dec. 15, 
2014), vacated, Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2015) (rejecting the Commission’s 
key factual determinations on substantial-
evidence grounds). The Commission 
determined that, “[i]ndependently of whether 
Lorenzo’s involvement in the emails 
amounted to ‘making’ the misstatements for 
purposes of Rule 10b-5(b), he knowingly sent 
materially misleading language from his own 
email account to prospective investors,” 
thereby violating those other provisions. 
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *11.  
 
We sustain the Commission’s 
conclusion to that effect. At least in the 
circumstances of this case, in which Lorenzo 
produced email messages containing false 
statements and sent them directly to potential 
investors expressly in his capacity as head of 
the Investment Banking Division—and did 
so with scienter—he can be found to have 
infringed Section 10(b), Rules 10b-5(a) and 
(c), and Section 17(a)(1), regardless of 
whether he was the “maker” of the false 
statements for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b).  
 
1. Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), along with 
Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1)—all unlike Rule 
10b-5(b)—do not speak in terms of an 
individual’s “making” a false statement. 
Indeed, “[t]o make any . . . statement” was the 
critical language construed in Janus: what the 
Court described as the “phrase at issue.” 564 
U.S. at 142 (alteration in original) (quoting 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)). That language 
appears in Rule 10b-5(b), but not in the other 
provisions Lorenzo was found to have 
violated. 
 
In particular, Rule 10b-5(a) prohibits 
“employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b5(a). And Rule 10b-5(c) bars 
“engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.” Id. § 240.10b-5(c). Consequently, 
Rule 10b-5(b) “specifies the making of an 
untrue statement of a material fact and the 
omission to state a material fact. The first and 
third subparagraphs are not so restricted.” 
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972).  
 
Nor are Securities Act Section 
17(a)(1) and Exchange Act Section 10(b). 
Section 17(a)(1) makes it unlawful “to 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud” in offering or selling a security. 15 
U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1). And Section 10(b) 
forbids “us[ing] or employ[ing] . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance” in contravention of rules 
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prescribed by the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 
78j(b). 
 
Here, Lorenzo, acting with scienter 
(i.e., an intent to deceive or defraud, or 
extreme recklessness to that effect), produced 
email messages containing three false 
statements about a pending offering, sent the 
messages directly to potential investors, and 
encouraged them to contact him personally 
with any questions. Although Lorenzo does 
not qualify as the “maker” of those 
statements under Janus because he lacked 
ultimate authority over their content and 
dissemination, his own active “role in 
producing and sending the emails constituted 
employing a deceptive ‘device,’ ‘act,’ or 
‘artifice to defraud’ for purposes of liability 
under Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), 
and Section 17(a)(1).” Lorenzo, 2015 WL 
1927763, at *11. 
 
Lorenzo’s conduct fits comfortably 
within the ordinary understanding of those 
terms. Indeed, he presents no argument that 
his actions fail to satisfy the statutory and 
regulatory language. He does not examine—
or even reference—the text of those 
provisions in arguing that they should be 
deemed not to apply to his conduct. 
 
Lorenzo does not contend before us, 
for instance, that he simply passed along 
information supplied by Gregg Lorenzo 
without pausing to think about the truth or 
falsity of what he was sending to investors. If 
those were the facts, he might attempt to 
argue that he cannot be considered to have 
“employed” any fraudulent device or artifice, 
or “engaged” in any fraudulent or deceitful 
act, within the meaning of Rules 10b-5(a) and 
(c), and of Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1). But 
while Lorenzo argued before the 
Commission that he produced and sent the 
emails at Gregg Lorenzo’s request without 
giving them thought, the Commission found 
“implausible” any suggestion that he merely 
passed along the messages in his own name 
without thinking about their content. 
Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, at *9. Lorenzo 
does not challenge that finding here. 
 
We therefore consider the case on the 
understanding that Lorenzo, having taken 
stock of the emails’ content and having 
formed the requisite intent to deceive, 
conveyed materially false information to 
prospective investors about a pending 
securities offering backed by the weight of 
his office as director of investment banking. 
On that understanding, the language of 
Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1), and of Rules 
10b5(a) and (c), readily encompasses 
Lorenzo’s actions. 
 
2. Instead of presenting any argument 
that his conduct falls outside the language of 
those provisions, Lorenzo asserts that, if he 
could be found to have violated the 
provisions, the decision in Janus would 
effectively be rendered meaningless. See 
SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). He notes the Janus Court’s 
interest in interpreting the term “make” in a 
manner that would avoid undermining the 
Court’s previous holding that private actions 
under Rule 10b5 cannot be premised on 
conceptions of secondary (i.e., aiding-and-
abetting) liability. See Janus, 564 U.S. at 143 
(discussing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. 
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First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164 (1994)). 
 
As the Court explained in Janus, 
whereas the Commission can bring actions 
under Rule 10b-5 based on an aiding-and-
abetting theory, private parties—after 
Central Bank—cannot. Id. The Janus Court 
reasoned that a “broader reading of ‘make,’” 
encompassing “persons or entities without 
ultimate control over the content of a 
statement,” could mean that “aiders and 
abettors would be almost nonexistent.” Id. 
That result, the Court believed, would have 
undercut an implicit understanding from 
Central Bank: that “there must be some 
distinction between those who are primarily 
liable . . . and those who are secondarily 
liable.” Id. at 143 n.6. The same 
considerations, Lorenzo contends, should 
weigh in favor of concluding that his conduct 
did not violate Section 10(b), Rules 10b-5(a) 
and (c), and Section 17(a)(1). We are 
unpersuaded. 
 
To the extent the Janus Court’s 
concerns about aiding-and-abetting liability 
in private actions under Rule 10b-5(b) should 
inform our interpretation of those other four 
provisions, the conduct at issue in Janus 
materially differs from Lorenzo’s actions in 
this case. Janus involved an investment 
adviser that initially drafted false statements 
which an independent entity subsequently 
decided to disseminate to investors in its own 
name. The investment adviser’s role in 
originally devising the statements was 
unknown to the investors who ultimately 
received them. The Court thus described the 
investment adviser’s conduct as “an 
undisclosed act preceding the decision of an 
independent entity to make a public 
statement.” 564 U.S. at 145.  
 
In this case, by contrast, Lorenzo’s 
role was not “undisclosed” to investors. The 
recipients were fully alerted to his 
involvement: Lorenzo sent the emails from 
his account and under his name, in his 
capacity as director of investment banking at 
Charles Vista. While Gregg Lorenzo 
supplied the content of the false statements 
for inclusion in Lorenzo’s email messages, 
Lorenzo effectively vouched for the emails’ 
contents and put his reputation on the line by 
listing his personal phone number and 
inviting the recipients to “call with any 
questions.” J.A. 794, 796. Nor did the 
dissemination of the false statements to 
investors result only from the separate 
“decision of an independent entity.” Janus, 
564 U.S. at 145. Lorenzo himself 
communicated with investors, directly 
emailing them misstatements about the 
debenture offering. 
 
Unlike in Janus, therefore, the 
recipients of Lorenzo’s emails were not 
exposed to the false information only through 
the intervening act of “another person.” Id. 
For the same reasons, Lorenzo’s conduct also 
differs from the actions considered in 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
There, the Supreme Court held that parties 
who allegedly played a role in a scheme to 
make false statements to investors could not 
be held liable in a private action under Rule 
10b-5. The Court explained that the parties’ 
acts “were not disclosed to the investing 
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public” and they “had no role” in 
“disseminating” the misstatements in 
question. Id. at 155, 161. Lorenzo, unlike the 
defendants in Janus and Stoneridge, 
transmitted misinformation directly to 
investors, and his involvement was 
transparent to them. 
 
As a result, insofar as the Janus Court 
declined to bring the investment adviser’s 
actions in that case within the fold of Rule 
10b-5 because doing so might reach too many 
persons fairly considered to be aiders and 
abettors, the same is not true of Lorenzo’s 
distinct conduct in this case. The Court’s 
concern that “aiders and abettors would be 
almost nonexistent” if a private action under 
Rule 10b-5 reached “an undisclosed act 
preceding the decision of an independent 
entity to make a public statement,” Janus, 
564 U.S. at 143, 145, need not obtain in the 
case of a person’s self-attributed 
communications sent directly to investors 
(and backed by scienter). Lorenzo’s actions 
thus can form the basis of a violation of Rules 
10b-5(a) and (c) (as well as Sections 10(b) 
and 17(a)(1)) while still leaving ample room 
for “distinction between those who are 
primarily liable . . . and those who are 
secondarily liable.” Id. at 143 n.6; see 
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166 (“[T]he implied 
right of action in § 10(b) continues to cover 
secondary actors who commit primary 
violations.” (citing Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 
191)). 
 
3. Lorenzo intimates more broadly 
that actions involving false statements must 
fit within Rule 10b-5(b) and cannot be 
brought separately under Rules 10b-5(a) or 
(c) (or Section 17(a)(1)). We know of no 
blanket reason, however, to treat the various 
provisions as occupying mutually exclusive 
territory, such that false-statement cases must 
reside exclusively within the province of 
Rule 10b-5(b). And any suggestion that the 
coverage of Rule 10b-5(b) must be distinct 
from that of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) 
presumably would mean that each of the 
latter two provisions likewise must occupy 
entirely separate ground from one another. In 
our view, however, the provisions’ coverage 
may overlap in certain respects. 
 
Significantly, the Supreme Court 
recently described Rule 10b-5 in a manner 
confirming that conduct potentially subject to 
Rule 10b-5(b)’s bar against making false 
statements can also fall within Rule 10b-
5(a)’s more general prohibition against 
employing fraudulent devices: the Court 
explained that “Rule 10b-5 . . . forbids the use 
of any ‘device, scheme, or artifice to defraud’ 
(including the making of any ‘untrue 
statement of material fact’ or any similar 
‘omi[ssion]’).” Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. 
Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1063 (2014) 
(emphasis added). 
 
The Court has also held that, although 
Section 14 of the Exchange Act establishes “a 
complex regulatory scheme covering proxy 
solicitations,” the inapplicability of Section 
14 to false statements in proxy materials does 
not preclude the application of Rule 10b-5 to 
the same statements. SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 
393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969). “The fact that there 
may well be some overlap is neither unusual 
nor unfortunate,” the Court explained. Id. 
Here, correspondingly, Rules 10b-5(a) and 
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(c), as well as Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1), 
may encompass certain conduct involving the 
dissemination of false statements even if the 
same conduct lies beyond the reach of Rule 
10b-5(b). 
 
In accordance with that 
understanding, a number of decisions have 
held that securities-fraud allegations 
involving misstatements can give rise to 
liability under related provisions even if the 
conduct in question does not amount to 
“making” a statement under Janus. See, e.g., 
SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 783 
F.3d 786, 795-96 (11th Cir. 2015); SEC v. 
Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 
2014); SEC v. Benger, 931 F. Supp. 2d 904, 
905-06 (N.D. Ill. 2013); SEC v. Familant, 
910 F. Supp. 2d 83, 93-95 (D.D.C. 2012); 
SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464-65 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). We reach the same 
conclusion here with respect to the role 
played by Lorenzo in disseminating the false 
statements in his email messages to investors. 
 
4. Our dissenting colleague would 
find that Lorenzo’s actions did not violate 
Rules 10b-5(a) or (c), or Sections 10(b) or 
17(a)(1). He advances two reasons for 
reaching that conclusion, each of which, in 
our respectful view, is misconceived. 
 
a. The dissent’s central submission is 
that Lorenzo acted without any intent to 
deceive or defraud. As our colleague sees 
things, Lorenzo simply transmitted false 
statements supplied by Gregg Lorenzo 
without giving any thought to their content. 
See infra at 1, 6 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
And Lorenzo ostensibly paid no attention to 
the content of the statements he sent even 
though: he included the statements in 
messages he produced for distribution from 
his own email account; he sent the statements 
in his name and capacity as investment 
banking director; and he encouraged the 
recipients to contact him personally with 
questions about the content. Under our 
colleague’s understanding, that is, Lorenzo 
offered to answer any questions about his 
emails even though he had supposedly paid 
no attention to what they said. 
 
In adopting that understanding, the 
dissent relies on a finding by the ALJ that 
Lorenzo sent the emails without thinking 
about their contents. But the Commission, as 
we have noted, rejected the ALJ’s conclusion 
to that effect as “implausible” in the 
circumstances. Lorenzo, 2015 WL 1927763, 
at *9. In our colleague’s view, the court 
should accept the ALJ’s finding, 
notwithstanding the Commission’s rejection 
of it, because the ALJ could assess Lorenzo’s 
credibility as a witness. 
 
The dissent’s (and ALJ’s) factual 
understanding, however, is contradicted by 
Lorenzo’s own account of his mental state to 
this court. Lorenzo raises no challenge to the 
Commission’s rejection of any notion that he 
paid no heed to his messages’ content. What 
is more, his argument on the issue of scienter 
rests on his affirmative contemplation— 
indeed, his ratification—of the content of his 
emails. 
 
Unlike in his arguments before the 
ALJ and Commission, Lorenzo, in this court, 
does not take the position that he simply 
 259 
passed along statements supplied by Gregg 
Lorenzo without thinking about them. Such a 
suggestion appears nowhere in his briefing. 
To the contrary, he argues that, “[a]t the time 
the email was sent [he] believed the 
statements to be true and he did not act with 
scienter.” Pet’r Reply Br. 6 (emphasis 
added). He further asserts that he “had a good 
faith belief in the veracity of the statements 
contained in the email that was drafted by 
Gregg Lorenzo.” Pet’r Opening Br. 18 
(emphasis added); id. at 22 (“Petitioner had a 
good faith belief in the accuracy of the 
statements contained in the email.”). He then 
attempts to explain why he could have 
believed the truth of the materially 
misleading statements contained in his email 
messages, arguments that we have already 
rejected in affirming the Commission’s 
findings of scienter. See supra Part II. 
 
For present purposes, what matters is 
that a person cannot have “believed 
statements to be true” at the time he sent 
them, or possessed a “good faith belief in 
their veracity,” if he had given no thought to 
their content in the first place. In that light, 
our dissenting colleague relies on an account 
of Lorenzo’s state of mind that stands in 
opposition to Lorenzo’s account to us of his 
own state of mind. (As for our colleague’s 
theory that Lorenzo could have formed a 
belief about the statements’ truthfulness 
without even reading them, based purely on 
his trust of Gregg Lorenzo, see infra at 7 n.1 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), even if we 
assume that theory were viable as a 
conceptual matter, Lorenzo’s arguments to us 
about his belief in the statements’ truth rest 
solely on their content, not on any trust-
without-verifying level of confidence in 
Gregg Lorenzo’s veracity. Indeed, he 
testified that, at least as of November 2009, 
“there is no way on God’s green earth [he] 
thought Gregg Lorenzo was an honest guy.” 
J.A. 176.) 
 
Perhaps Lorenzo concluded he could 
not overcome the Commission’s assessment 
that it would be implausible to suppose he 
had blinded himself to the statements’ 
content before sending them to investors and 
offering to answer any questions about them. 
Or perhaps he determined that, insofar as he 
did so, he would have difficulty denying that 
he had acted with extreme recklessness—and 
therefore with scienter—in any event. 
Regardless, Lorenzo now takes the position 
that he took stock of the content of the 
statements, so much so that he formed a 
belief as to their truthfulness. And we are in 
no position to embrace an understanding of 
Lorenzo’s mental state that is disclaimed by 
Lorenzo himself.  
 
To be clear, the point here is not that 
Lorenzo failed to preserve an argument about 
scienter. Lorenzo devoted considerable 
attention to the issue of scienter in his 
briefing. But Lorenzo’s arguments on the 
issue contain no suggestion that he sent his 
emails without giving thought to their 
contents. He instead contends he did think 
about the contents (and reasonably believed 
them to be truthful). In those circumstances, 
we do not so much defer to the Commission’s 
assessment of Lorenzo’s state of mind over 
the ALJ’s finding that Lorenzo gave no 
thought to his emails’ content. Rather, we 
accede to Lorenzo’s account of his own 
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mental state, which is incompatible with the 
finding of the ALJ. 
 
But what if Lorenzo in fact had 
sought to argue to us, in concert with the 
ALJ’s finding, that he gave no thought to the 
content of his email messages when sending 
them? In that event—which, again, is not the 
situation we face—the issue for us would 
have been whether the Commission’s 
contrary conclusion is supported by 
substantial evidence, not whether the 
Commission or the ALJ has the better of the 
dispute between them on the matter. See, e.g., 
Kay v. FCC, 396 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); Swan Creek Communications, Inc. v. 
FCC, 39 F.3d 1217, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951). 
 
The Commission’s finding meets the 
deferential, substantial-evidence standard. 
After all, Lorenzo’s emails marked the only 
time he communicated directly with 
prospective investors, the emails concerned a 
securities offering by his sole investment 
banking client, the emails said he would 
personally answer questions about their 
content, and the emails carried his 
professional imprimatur as director of 
investment banking—all of which support 
the Commission’s rejection of the idea that 
Lorenzo simply sent his emails without 
taking any stock of what they said. 
 
b. Even accepting that Lorenzo 
thought about the statements in his emails 
and sent them with an intent to deceive, the 
dissent would still conclude that Lorenzo’s 
conduct falls outside the ambit of Rules 10b-
5(a) and (c), and Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1). 
See infra at 9 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
Our colleague grounds that conclusion in his 
agreement with the proposition put forward 
by certain other courts of appeals to the effect 
that “scheme liability”—i.e., the conduct 
prohibited by Rules 10b-5(a) and (c)—
requires something more than false or 
misleading statements. See Pub. Pension 
Fund Grp. v. KV Pharma. Co., 679 F.3d 972, 
987 (8th Cir. 2012); WPP Luxembourg 
Gamma Three Sari v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 
F.3d 1039, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2011); Lentell 
v. Merill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d 
Cir. 2005).  
 
Our colleague appears to read those 
decisions’ embrace of that proposition to rest 
on the need to maintain a distinction between 
primary liability and secondary liability 
under Rule 10b-5. We have described the 
Janus Court’s reliance on that concern and 
explained our conclusion that it does not 
carry the day in the specific circumstances of 
Lorenzo’s conduct. See supra Part III.B.2.  
 
Moreover, we do not read the 
referenced courts of appeals’ decisions to rest 
on concerns about preserving a distinction 
between primary and secondary liability. 
None of those decisions discusses (or 
mentions) the concepts of primary and 
secondary liability or any need to maintain a 
separation between them. Indeed, two of the 
three decisions postdate Janus, yet neither 
cites Janus, much less invokes Janus’s 
concerns with construing the scope of Rule 
10b-5(b) in a manner that would encompass 
too many aiders-and-abettors. 
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In addition, it is far from clear that the 
rule articulated by those decisions could 
suitably be grounded in concerns with 
preserving a distinction between primary and 
secondary liability. According to the 
decisions, a “defendant may only be liable as 
part of a fraudulent scheme based upon 
misrepresentations and omissions under 
Rules 10b-5(a) or (c) when the scheme also 
encompasses conduct beyond those 
misrepresentations or omissions.” WPP 
Luxembourg, 655 F.3d at 1057; see KV 
Pharma., 679 F.3d at 987; Lentell, 396 F.3d 
at 177. That understanding would be 
overinclusive if the objective in fact were to 
assure that aiders-and-abettors are not held 
primarily liable under those provisions. 
 
Consider, for instance, the facts of 
WPP Luxembourg. There, the plaintiffs 
alleged sufficient facts to make out a claim of 
materially misleading omissions under Rule 
10b5(b). 655 F.3d at 1051. There was no 
question that the defendants faced primary 
(not secondary) liability if the facts as 
pleaded were proved. Id. Yet the court held 
that the defendants could not be liable under 
Rules 10b-5(a) or (c) because there were no 
allegations against them apart from 
misstatements or omissions. Id. at 1057-58. 
The court’s requirement that plaintiffs prove 
more than misstatements thus barred liability 
under those provisions even though there 
could have been no concerns about blurring 
the distinction between primary and 
secondary liability. Perhaps it is unsurprising, 
then, that, while Lorenzo relies on the 
importance of maintaining the primary-
secondary liability distinction, he makes no 
reference to WPP Luxembourg or the other 
two decisions in his briefing 
 
For those reasons, we disagree with 
our dissenting colleague’s suggestion that our 
holding conflicts with those decisions with 
regard to the primary-secondary liability 
distinction. See infra at 9 (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). We do not understand those 
decisions to turn on that distinction. 
 
Those decisions do generally state, 
however, that Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) require 
something more than misstatements. But they 
did not have occasion to elaborate on that 
understanding to any significant extent—
including, importantly for purposes of this 
case, whether the same interpretation would 
extend to Section 17(a)(1). Insofar as those 
courts of appeals would find Lorenzo’s 
actions to lie beyond the reach of those 
provisions, we read the provisions 
differently. Lorenzo’s particular conduct, as 
we have explained, fits comfortably within 
the language of Rules 10b5(a) and (c), along 
with that of Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1). 
 
Finally, we briefly respond to our 
dissenting colleague’s belief that there is an 
incongruity in deciding both that Lorenzo 
was not a maker of the false statements under 
Rule 10b-5(b) and that he nonetheless 
employed a fraudulent device and engaged in 
a fraudulent act under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) 
and Section 17(a)(1). See infra at 11 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Those combined 
decisions, in our view, follow naturally from 
the terms of the provisions. Lorenzo was not 
the “maker” of the false statements because 
he lacked ultimate authority over them. Still, 
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he “engaged” in a fraudulent “act” and 
“employed” a fraudulent “device” when, 
with knowledge of the statements’ falsity and 
an intent to deceive, he sent the statements to 
potential investors carrying his stamp of 
approval as investment banking director. One 
can readily imagine persons whose 
ministerial acts in connection with false 
statements would fail to qualify either as 
“making” the statements or as “employing” 
any fraudulent device. Lorenzo, in our view, 
is not such a person. 
 
IV. 
 
Lorenzo’s final challenge concerns 
the sanctions imposed against him. The 
Commission permanently barred Lorenzo 
“from association with any broker, dealer, 
investment adviser, municipal securities 
dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or 
nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization and from participating in an 
offering of penny stocks.” Lorenzo, 2015 WL 
1927763, at *17. The Commission also 
ordered him to pay a $15,000 monetary 
penalty. Lorenzo argues that those penalties 
are arbitrary and capricious for various 
reasons, including that they are 
disproportional to the severity of his 
misconduct and to the sanctions imposed in 
similar cases.  
 
We decline to reach the merits of 
Lorenzo’s challenges. The Commission 
chose the level of sanctions based in part on 
a misimpression that Lorenzo was the 
“maker” of false statements in violation of 
Rule 10b-5(b). Because we have now 
overturned the Commission’s finding of 
liability under Rule 10b-5(b), we vacate the 
sanctions and remand the matter to enable the 
Commission to reconsider the appropriate 
penalties.  
 
We have no assurance that the 
Commission would have imposed the same 
level of penalties in the absence of its finding 
of liability for making false statements under 
Rule 10b-5(b). The Commission expressly 
grounded its sanctions on its perceptions 
about the “egregiousness of Lorenzo’s 
conduct” and the “degree of scienter 
involved,” as well as the need to deter others 
“from engaging in similar misconduct.” Id. at 
*12, *14. But the Commission operated 
under the assumption that Lorenzo devised, 
and had ultimate authority over, the 
substance of the false statements contained in 
the email messages he sent to investors. That 
assumption, as we have concluded, is 
unsupported by the record evidence. The 
Commission in fact specifically based its 
sanctions in some measure on a belief that 
Lorenzo improperly sought to “shift blame” 
by asserting “that he sent the emails at Gregg 
Lorenzo’s direction.” Id. at *13. But as the 
record indicates, that is essentially what 
happened. 
 
Because we “cannot be certain what 
role, if any,” the Commission’s 
misperception that Lorenzo was the “maker” 
of the false statements ultimately played in its 
choice of sanctions, “we must remand” to 
enable it to reassess the appropriate penalties. 
Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 
930 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1991). When 
the Commission does so under a correct 
understanding about the nature of Lorenzo’s 
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misconduct, it can assess “whether the 
sanction is out of line with the agency’s 
decisions in other cases” involving 
comparable misconduct—which, as we have 
observed, is one consideration informing 
review of penalties for arbitrariness and 
capriciousness. Collins v. SEC, 736 F.3d 521, 
526 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 
The Commission, in this regard, notes 
our previous observation that the 
“Commission is not obligated to make its 
sanctions uniform, so we will not compare 
this sanction to those imposed in previous 
cases.” Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d 481, 488 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Butz v. Glover 
Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 186-87 
(1973)). In that vein, we have explained that 
a mere absence of uniformity will not 
necessarily render a particular action 
“unwarranted in law,” id. at 488, or 
“unwarranted as a matter of policy,” 
Kornman, 592 F.3d at 188. But we have 
never declined to compare past-and-present 
Commission sanctions in the context of an 
arbitrary-and-capricious challenge. In fact, 
our decision in Collins clarified that such a 
challenge may be brought to review the 
propriety of the Commission’s choice of 
sanction in a given case as compared with 
sanctions in comparable situations. See 736 
F.3d at 526. 
 
*      *       *       *       * 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we grant 
the petition for review in part, vacate the 
sanctions imposed by the Commission, and 
remand the matter for further consideration.  
 
     So ordered. 
 
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
 
Suppose you work for a securities 
firm. Your boss drafts an email message and 
tells you to send the email on his behalf to 
two clients. You promptly send the emails to 
the two clients without thinking too much 
about the contents of the emails. You note in 
the emails that you are sending the message 
“at the request” of your boss. It turns out, 
however, that the message from your boss to 
the clients is false and defrauds the clients out 
of a total of $15,000. Your boss is then 
sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (as is appropriate) for the 
improper conduct. 
 
What about you? For sending along 
those emails at the direct behest of your boss, 
are you too on the hook for the securities law 
violation of willfully making a false statement 
or willfully engaging in a scheme to defraud?  
 
According to the SEC, the answer is 
yes. And the SEC concludes that your 
behavior – in essence forwarding emails after 
being told to do so by your boss – warrants a 
lifetime suspension from the securities 
profession, on top of a monetary fine. 
 
That is what happened to Frank 
Lorenzo in this case. The good news is that 
the majority opinion vacates the lifetime 
suspension. The bad news is that the majority 
opinion – invoking a standard of deference 
that, as applied here, seems akin to a standard 
of “hold your nose to avoid the stink” – 
upholds much of the SEC’s decision on 
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liability. I would vacate the SEC’s 
conclusions as to both sanctions and liability. 
I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
*       *       * 
 
The SEC initiated an enforcement 
action against Frank Lorenzo and his boss. 
The boss eventually reached a settlement 
agreement with the SEC. Apparently 
thinking he had done little wrong by merely 
sending emails to two clients at the request of 
his boss, Lorenzo did not settle. 
 
The case then proceeded through 
three stages: a trial before an SEC 
administrative law judge, review by the 
Commission itself, and then review by this 
Court. To understand my disagreement with 
the majority opinion, it is necessary to 
describe all three acts in this drama.  
 
Act One: The Administrative Law Judge 
 
The case proceeded to trial before an 
administrative law judge. This was not your 
usual trial. Surprisingly, the SEC did not 
present testimony from Lorenzo’s boss or 
from anyone else at the securities firm where 
Lorenzo worked. Instead, only Lorenzo 
testified about the extent of his involvement 
in drafting and sending the emails. 
 
After hearing Lorenzo’s testimony 
and weighing his credibility, the judge 
concluded that Lorenzo’s boss had “drafted” 
the emails in question and that Lorenzo’s 
boss had “asked” Lorenzo to send the emails 
to two clients. ALJ Op. at 5 (Dec. 31, 2013), 
J.A. 906. The judge also concluded that 
Lorenzo did not read the text of the emails 
and that Lorenzo “sent the emails without 
even thinking about the contents.” Id. at 7, 
J.A. 908; see id. at 9, J.A. 910 (“Had he taken 
a minute to read the text . . .”). Furthermore, 
the judge noted that the emails themselves 
expressly stated that they were being sent at 
“the request” of Lorenzo’s boss. Id. at 5, J.A. 
906.  
 
Those factual findings were very 
favorable to Lorenzo and should have cleared 
Lorenzo of any serious wrongdoing under the 
securities laws. At most, the judge’s factual 
findings may have shown some mild 
negligence on Lorenzo’s part. The judge, 
however, went much further than that. The 
judge somehow concluded that those findings 
of fact demonstrated that Lorenzo willfully 
violated the securities laws – meaning that 
Lorenzo acted with an intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud. (A finding of 
willfulness, as opposed to a finding of 
negligence, matters because it subjects a 
defendant to much higher penalties.) As a 
sanction, the judge not only fined Lorenzo, 
but also imposed a lifetime suspension that 
prevents Lorenzo from ever again working in 
the securities industry. 
 
The administrative law judge’s 
factual findings and legal conclusions do not 
square up. If Lorenzo did not draft the emails, 
did not think about the contents of the emails, 
and sent the emails only at the behest of his 
boss, it is impossible to find that Lorenzo 
acted “willfully.” That is Mens Rea 101. 
Establishing that a defendant acted willfully 
in this context requires proof at least of the 
defendant’s “intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
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defraud.” Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc. v. SEC, 
512 F.3d 634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). How could 
Lorenzo have intentionally deceived the 
clients when he did not draft the emails, did 
not think about the contents of the emails, and 
sent the emails only at his boss’s direction?  
 
The administrative law judge’s 
decision in this case contravenes basic due 
process. A finding that a defendant possessed 
the requisite mens rea is essential to 
preserving individual liberty. See, e.g., 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 
250-51, 263 (1952); see also United States v. 
Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Bluman 
v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 
2011) (three-judge panel). As Justice Jackson 
explained: “The contention that an injury can 
amount to a crime only when inflicted by 
intention is no provincial or transient notion. 
It is as universal and persistent in mature 
systems of law as belief in freedom of the 
human will and a consequent ability and duty 
of the normal individual to choose between 
good and evil. A relation between some 
mental element and punishment for a harmful 
act is almost as instinctive as the child’s 
familiar exculpatory ‘But I didn’t mean to.’” 
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-51 (footnote 
omitted).  
 
The administrative law judge’s 
opinion in this case did not heed those 
bedrock mens rea principles. Given the 
judge’s proLorenzo findings of fact, a legal 
conclusion that Lorenzo “willfully” violated 
the securities laws makes a hash of the term 
“willfully,” and of the deeply rooted principle 
that punishment must correspond to 
blameworthiness based on the defendant’s 
mens rea. 
Act Two: The Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
 
Fast forward to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, which heard the 
appeal of the administrative law judge’s 
decision. Surely the Commission would 
realize that the administrative law judge’s 
factual findings did not support the judge’s 
legal conclusions and sanctions?  
 
And indeed, the Commission did 
come to that realization. But instead of 
vacating the order against Lorenzo, the 
Commission did something quite different 
and quite remarkable. In a Houdini-like 
move, the Commission rewrote the 
administrative law judge’s factual findings to 
make those factual findings correspond to the 
legal conclusion that Lorenzo was guilty and 
deserving of a lifetime suspension.  
 
Recall what the administrative law 
judge found: that Lorenzo’s boss “drafted” 
the emails, that Lorenzo did not think about 
the contents of the emails, and that Lorenzo 
sent the emails only after being asked to do 
so by his boss. ALJ Op. at 5, J.A. 906. The 
judge reached those conclusions only after 
hearing Lorenzo testify and assessing his 
credibility in person.  
 
Without hearing from Lorenzo or any 
other witnesses, the Commission simply 
swept the judge’s factual and credibility 
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findings under the rug. The Commission 
concluded that Lorenzo himself was 
“responsible” for the emails’ contents. In the 
Matter of Francis V. Lorenzo, Securities Act 
Release No. 9762, Exchange Act Release No. 
74836 at 16 (Apr. 29, 2015), J.A. 930. How 
did the Commission magically explain its 
decision to discard the administrative law 
judge’s findings of fact? Easy. In a footnote, 
the Commission said that it did not need to 
“blindly” accept the administrative law 
judge’s factual findings and credibility 
judgments. Id. at 16 n.32, J.A. 930 n.32. 
Voila. 
 
The Commission’s handiwork in this 
case is its own debacle. Faced with 
inconvenient factual findings that would 
make it hard to uphold the sanctions against 
Lorenzo, the Commission – without hearing 
any testimony – simply manufactured a new 
assessment of Lorenzo’s credibility and 
rewrote the judge’s factual findings. So much 
for a fair trial. 
 
Act Three: This Court 
 
Fast forward to this Court. To its 
credit, the majority opinion rightly concludes 
that Lorenzo did not “make” the statements 
in the emails for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b) 
liability. See Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. 
First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 
(2011). And the majority opinion, also to its 
credit, vacates the grossly excessive lifetime 
suspension of Lorenzo and sends the case 
back to the SEC for reconsideration of the 
appropriate penalties. 
 
So far, so good. But applying what it 
calls “very deferential” review, the majority 
opinion upholds the finding of liability 
against Lorenzo under Section 10(b), Rule 
10b-5(a) and (c), and Section 17(a). Maj. Op. 
7, 18-25. The majority opinion does so on the 
ground that Lorenzo willfully engaged in a 
scheme to defraud even though he did not 
“make” the statements in the emails. 
 
I disagree on two alternative and 
independent grounds with the majority 
opinion’s merits analysis. 
 
First, the majority opinion does not 
heed the administrative law judge’s factual 
conclusions, which were based on the judge’s 
in-person assessment of Lorenzo’s testimony 
at trial. Those factual conclusions 
demonstrate that Lorenzo lacked the 
necessary mens rea of willfulness. 
 
To show that Lorenzo willfully 
engaged in a scheme to defraud, the SEC had 
to prove that Lorenzo acted with an intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. But recall 
that, as findings of fact, the administrative 
law judge concluded (after hearing Lorenzo 
testify) that Lorenzo did not draft the emails, 
did not think about the contents of the emails, 
and sent the emails only at the behest of his 
boss. 
 
In light of the administrative law 
judge’s factual findings, how can Lorenzo be 
deemed to have willfully engaged in a 
scheme to defraud? The majority opinion 
says that the facts found by the administrative 
law judge are not the right facts. Instead, in 
reaching its conclusion, the majority opinion 
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relies on the SEC’s alternative facts, which 
the SEC devised on its own without hearing 
from any witnesses. See Maj. Op. 20-21, 26-
29 (adopting the SEC’s view of the facts over 
the administrative law judge’s view). 
 
It is true that, under certain 
circumstances, an agency such as the SEC 
may re-examine and overturn an 
administrative law judge’s factual findings. 
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 
U.S. 474, 492 (1951). But an agency does not 
have carte blanche to rewrite an 
administrative law judge’s factual 
determinations. Rather, an agency must act 
reasonably when it disregards an 
administrative law judge’s factual findings, a 
point the SEC’s attorney expressly 
acknowledged at oral argument. See Tr. of 
Oral Arg. at 28. It is black-letter law, 
therefore, that “a contrary initial decision” by 
an administrative law judge “may undermine 
the support for the agency’s ultimate 
determination.” Ronald M. Levin & Jeffrey 
S. Lubbers, Administrative Law and Process 
101 (6th ed. 2017). And here is the key 
principle that speaks directly to this case: 
“When the case turns on eyewitness 
testimony . . . the initial decision should be 
given considerable weight: the ALJ was able 
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and 
assess their credibility and veracity first 
hand.” Id. 
 
In my view, the majority opinion 
misapplies those blackletter principles. 
Contrary to the majority opinion’s 
acceptance of the SEC’s reconstruction of the 
facts in this case, I would conclude that the 
SEC’s rewriting of the administrative law 
judge’s findings of fact was utterly 
unreasonable and should not be sustained or 
countenanced by this Court. Given that 
Lorenzo was the only relevant witness at trial 
(dwell again on that point for a few moments) 
and given that his credibility was central to 
the case, the SEC had no reasonable basis to 
run roughshod over the administrative law 
judge’s findings of fact and credibility 
assessments. In short, the SEC’s rewriting of 
the findings of fact deserves judicial 
repudiation, not judicial deference or respect. 
 
Instead of deferring to the SEC’s 
creation of an alternative factual record, as 
the majority opinion does, we should 
examine the administrative law judge’s 
underlying findings of fact and ask whether 
those findings suffice to support the 
conclusion that Lorenzo willfully engaged in 
a scheme to defraud. The answer to that 
question, as explained above, is a clear no. 
 
Second, put that aside. Even if I am 
wrong about the first point, the majority 
opinion still suffers from a separate flaw, in 
my view.  
 
The majority opinion creates a circuit 
split by holding that mere misstatements, 
standing alone, may constitute the basis for 
so-called scheme liability under the securities 
laws – that is, willful participation in a 
scheme to defraud – even if the defendant did 
not make the misstatements. No other court 
of appeals has adopted the approach that the 
majority opinion adopts here. Other courts 
have instead concluded that scheme liability 
must be based on conduct that goes beyond a 
defendant’s role in preparing mere 
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misstatements or omissions made by others. 
See, e.g., Public Pension Fund Group v. KV 
Pharmaceutical Co., 679 F.3d 972, 987 (8th 
Cir. 2012); WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three 
Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 
1057 (9th Cir. 2011); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch 
& Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 2005); see 
also SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343-
44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Otherwise, the SEC 
would be able to evade the important 
statutory distinction between primary 
liability and secondary (aiding and abetting) 
liability. After all, if those who aid and abet a 
misstatement are themselves primary 
violators for engaging in a scheme to defraud, 
what would be the point of the distinction 
between primary and secondary liability? 
 
The distinction between primary and 
secondary liability matters, particularly for 
private securities lawsuits. For decades, 
however, the SEC has tried to erase that 
distinction so as to expand the scope of 
primary liability under the securities laws. 
For decades, the Supreme Court has pushed 
back hard against the SEC’s attempts to 
unilaterally rewrite the law. See Janus, 564 
U.S. 135; Stoneridge Investment Partners, 
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148 
(2008); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 
(1994). Still undeterred in the wake of that 
body of Supreme Court precedent, the SEC 
has continued to push the envelope and has 
tried to circumvent those Supreme Court 
decisions. See, e.g., In the Matter of John P. 
Flannery & James D. Hopkins, Release No. 
3981 (Dec. 15, 2014). This case is merely the 
latest example. 
 
I agree with the other courts that have 
rejected the SEC’s persistent efforts to end-
run the Supreme Court. I therefore 
respectfully disagree with the majority 
opinion that Lorenzo’s role in forwarding the 
alleged misstatements made by Lorenzo’s 
boss can be the basis for scheme liability 
against Lorenzo. 
 
Taking a step back on the scheme 
liability point, moreover, think about the 
oddity of the majority opinion’s combined 
legal rulings today. The majority opinion 
emphatically holds that Lorenzo did not 
“make” the statements in the emails. In 
reaching that conclusion, the majority 
opinion accurately says that “Lorenzo 
transmitted statements devised by” 
Lorenzo’s boss at his boss’s “direction.” Maj. 
Op. 16. The majority opinion also correctly 
notes that Lorenzo’s boss “asked Lorenzo to 
send the emails, supplied the central content, 
and approved the messages for distribution.” 
Maj. Op. 17. At the same time, however, the 
majority opinion emphatically holds that 
Lorenzo nonetheless willfully engaged in a 
scheme to defraud solely because of the 
statements made by his boss. That combined 
holding makes little sense (at least to me) 
under the facts of this particular case. Nor 
does it make much sense under the law, 
which is presumably why the other courts of 
appeals have rejected that kind of legal 
jujitsu. In these circumstances, perhaps the 
alleged offender (here, Lorenzo) could have 
been charged with aiding and abetting, if the 
relevant mens rea requirements for aiding 
and abetting liability were met. But Lorenzo 
may not be held liable as a primary violator, 
in my view. 
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*       *       * 
 
Administrative adjudication of 
individual disputes is usually accompanied 
by deferential review from the Article III 
Judiciary. That agency-centric process is in 
some tension with Article III of the 
Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, and the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases. 
See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 227-57 
(2014). That tension is exacerbated when, as 
here, the agency’s political appointees – 
without hearing from any witnesses – 
disregard an administrative law judge’s 
factual findings. That said, the Supreme 
Court has allowed administrative 
adjudication ever since Crowell v. Benson, 
285 U.S. 22 (1932). But the premise of 
Crowell v. Benson is that, putting aside any 
formal constitutional problems with the 
notion of administrative adjudication, the 
administrative adjudication process will at 
least operate with efficiency and with 
fairness to the parties involved. This case, 
among others, casts substantial doubt on that 
premise.  
 
Securities brokers such as Frank 
Lorenzo obviously do not tug at the judicial 
heartstrings. And maybe Lorenzo really is 
guilty of negligence (or worse). But before 
the SEC reaches such a conclusion, Lorenzo 
is entitled to a fair process just like everyone 
else. Cf. United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 
500, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). He has not 
received a fair process in this case.  
 
I hope that the SEC on remand pays 
attention, comes to its senses, and (at a 
minimum) dramatically scales back the 
sanctions in this case. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the majority opinion, I hope 
that the SEC, on its own motion, goes further 
than that: The SEC should vacate the order 
against Lorenzo in its entirety and either end 
this case altogether or (if appropriate and 
permissible) fairly start the process anew 
before the administrative law judge.  
 
I firmly disagree with the majority 
opinion’s decision to sustain the SEC’s 
findings of liability under Section 10(b), Rule 
10b-5(a) and (c), and Section 17(a). I 
respectfully dissent. 
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“Are False Statements Enough to Prove Fraud” 
 
 
The New York Times 
 
Peter J. Henning 
July 3, 2018   
 
Frauds usually start with some type of 
deception that leads victims to hand over 
their money. But what if false statements are 
not enough to prove a person engaged in a 
scheme to defraud? 
The Supreme Court will take up that issue 
this year when it hears an appeal in Lorenzo 
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
the justices’ decision could result in cutting 
back on the scope of Rule 10b-5, the primary 
federal securities fraud prohibition. The 
decision could affect how the S.E.C. pursues 
fraud cases when defendants are accused of 
making false statements to investors. 
Francis V. Lorenzo was the director of 
investment banking at a brokerage firm when 
he sent emails to two potential investors in a 
$15 million convertible debenture offering. 
The company issuing the debt was working 
to generate electricity by converting solid 
waste into gas. A few days before sending the 
emails, Mr. Lorenzo learned that the 
“gasification” technology was not working 
and that the company had written off $11 
million worth of intangible assets related to 
that. 
Mr. Lorenzo’s emails failed to mention the 
accounting change and stated that the 
company had purchase orders for $43 
million. That information came from his boss 
at the brokerage firm, and Mr. Lorenzo 
claimed that he had merely copied and pasted 
it into the emails he sent the investors. The 
S.E.C. accused him of committing a primary 
violation of Rule 10b-5, not just being an 
accomplice to a fraud. The administrative law 
judge assigned to hear the evidence wrote 
that the falsity in the emails was 
“staggering.” 
Rule 10b-5 prohibits three types of 
violations: employing any “device, scheme 
or artifice to defraud”; making a false 
statement or omitting information that 
misleads investors; or engaging in conduct 
that “would operate as a fraud or deceit.” The 
S.E.C. found that Mr. Lorenzo had violated 
all three provisions. It barred him from the 
securities industry and imposed a $15,000 
penalty. 
Mr. Lorenzo took his case to the federal 
appeals court in Washington. The issue was 
whether an earlier Supreme Court 
decision, Janus Capital Group v. First 
Derivative Traders, prevented finding him to 
be a primary violator of Rule 10b-5. In that 
case, the justices held that liability for false 
statements was limited to “the person or 
entity with ultimate authority over the 
statement, including its content and whether 
and how to communicate it.” Mr. Lorenzo 
argued that he could not be held directly 
 271 
responsible because he had just copied and 
pasted the false statements, and that only his 
boss had acted willfully. 
The appeals court agreed that he did not make 
the statement. But it upheld the S.E.C.’s 
sanctions, finding that he had engaged in a 
scheme to defraud. That meant he had 
violated the other two parts of Rule 10b-5. 
Because Mr. Lorenzo “conveyed materially 
false information to prospective investors 
about a pending securities offering backed by 
the weight of his office as director of 
investment banking,” the court said, he 
joined in an effort to defraud investors and 
was liable. 
The problem was that the decision opened a 
back door around the Janus Capital ruling. 
That approach usually does not play well 
with the Supreme Court justices, who have 
not been receptive to efforts to avoid its more 
restrictive readings of Rule 10b-5. In the 
2008 decision in Stoneridge Investment 
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, the justices 
rejected “scheme liability,” which could 
make third parties responsible for helping a 
company file misleading financial statements 
by engaging in sham transactions. The court 
viewed “scheme liability” as an effort to 
avoid its earlier rejection of aiding and 
abetting liability for securities fraud in 
private cases. 
Unlike Janus Capital and Stoneridge, which 
were private cases, the Lorenzo case involves 
the S.E.C.’s trying to protect investors 
through an enforcement action. It is possible 
the court might be more forgiving and allow 
the agency to take a broader approach to the 
law than private litigants can. 
But the Supreme Court has rejected the 
regulator’s broader readings of the securities 
laws over the past two years, at least outside 
the context of insider trading. In Kokesh v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 
decided in June last year, the justices limited 
the period in which the S.E.C. can seek to 
compel a defendant to disgorge ill-gotten 
gains to five years and even questioned 
whether federal District Courts can order that 
remedy. 
On June 21, the Supreme Court found 
in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission that the S.E.C.’s method for 
appointing administrative law judges was 
flawed. The ruling threw into doubt a number 
of recent cases decided by its in-house court 
and caused the agency to stop pending 
administrative proceedings until it can figure 
out how to proceed. 
These decisions are part of a trend in which 
the justices have shown greater skepticism to 
government’s arguments that statutes need to 
be read expansively. In Marinello v. United 
States, decided in March, the court rejected 
the Justice Department’s reading of what 
constitutes obstructing the Internal Revenue 
Service. The department’s view would have 
made a felony out of almost any conduct that 
made the process of collecting taxes more 
difficult. 
Although the S.E.C. can bring cases against 
those who aid another in committing a fraud, 
it prefers to pursue defendants as primary 
violators so it can impose harsher penalties 
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that require proof of a willful violation. It 
would not be a surprise to see the Supreme 
Court read Rule 10b-5 more restrictively in 
Mr. Lorenzo’s case. 
That would mean only those who were 
directly responsible for a misstatement or 
who failed to disclose important information 
would be liable as the primary person 
engaging in fraudulent conduct. That could 
make the agency’s job of policing the 
markets more difficult and could require it to 
pursue future targets as accomplices to 
wrongdoing rather than as the principal bad 
guy. 
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“U.S. Supreme Court Will Consider Narrowing Securities-Fraud Laws” 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Greg Stohr 
June 18, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider 
narrowing the nation’s securities-fraud laws, 
accepting an appeal from an investment 
banker found by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to have duped 
investors about a startup company’s 
financial condition. 
 
The banker, Francisco V. Lorenzo, said the 
SEC didn’t have enough proof to hold him 
liable for taking part in a scheme to defraud 
investors. 
 
A divided federal appeals court said it was 
enough that Lorenzo, who worked at 
Charles Vista LLC, sent two emails 
misrepresenting the financial condition of a 
client, Waste2Energy Holdings Inc. The 
company was seeking to develop a way to 
generate electricity from solid waste, but the 
technology never materialized. 
 
An in-house judge at the SEC concluded the 
emails were “staggering” in their falsity. 
In his appeal, Lorenzo says allegations of 
false statements, without more, aren’t 
enough to hold someone liable for a 
fraudulent scheme. 
 
Lorenzo was also accused of violating 
securities-fraud provisions that specifically 
concern false statements, but the appeals 
court threw those claims out. The panel said 
Lorenzo wasn’t the one who actually made 
false statements, because the emails were 
drafted by Lorenzo’s boss and sent at his 
direction. 
The SEC judge fined Lorenzo $15,000 and 
barred him from the securities industry for 
life. As part of its ruling, the appeals court 
told the SEC to reconsider those penalties. 
 
The case, which the court will hear in the 
nine-month term that starts in October, is 
Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 17-1077. 
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“Lorenzo v. SEC: Will High Court Further Curtail Rule 10b-5?” 
 
Law360 
 
Roger Cooper, Matthew Solomon and Leslie Silverman 
July 18, 2018 
 
Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
a writ of certiorari in Lorenzo v. U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission,[1] a 
case where Francis Lorenzo, a registered 
representative of a broker-dealer, allegedly 
emailed false and misleading statements to 
investors that were originally drafted by his 
boss. After administrative and commission 
findings of liability, a divided panel of the 
D.C. Circuit determined that, while Lorenzo 
was not the “maker” of the statements, he did 
use them to deceive investors, and thereby 
violated the so-called scheme liability 
provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. As 
described in the petitioner’s motion seeking 
certiorari, the case presents the question 
whether, under the court’s 2011 Janus 
Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders 
decision,[2] the scheme liability provisions 
of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) may be used to find 
liability in connection with false or 
misleading statements by persons who are 
not themselves the maker of those statements 
and, thus, not liable under the false-and-
misleading statements provision of Rule 10b-
5(b).[3] The answer to this question could 
have implications for the SEC's Enforcement 
Division, as well as potentially significant 
implications for private securities litigants 
who principally rely on Section 10(b) to bring 
private causes of action sounding in fraud. 
In particular, the court’s decision may well 
bring more clarity to the case law that has 
developed after the Supreme Court held in 
Central Bank of Denver NA v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver NA that private plaintiffs 
may not maintain aiding-and-abetting suits 
brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.[4] Since that decision, a number of courts 
have taken the position that each clause of 
Rule 10b-5 is meant to capture different types 
of conduct, and therefore cases based 
primarily on misstatements or omissions that 
give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5(b) 
cannot also be charged under the scheme 
liability provisions of (a) and (c) of that same 
rule. Because Lorenzo allegedly involved the 
use of a misleading statement by a nonmaker 
under Janus that nevertheless, according to 
the D.C. Circuit majority, amounted to a 
scheme, it provides the court a vehicle, 
should it wish, to impose restrictions on 
scheme liability cases and thus limit claims 
available to private plaintiffs where the fact 
pattern involves the use of a material 
misrepresentation by a nonmaker, but no 
additional deceptive conduct. 
 
The court’s ultimate approach on this appeal 
may turn on whether President Donald 
Trump’s nominee to fill the Kennedy 
vacancy on the court, Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh, is confirmed and, if so, whether 
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he participates in the appeal. Judge 
Kavanaugh penned a strong dissent from 
portions of the underlying D.C. Circuit 
decision. If he is confirmed and recuses 
himself on the basis of having heard the case 
below, any attempt to limit the ability of the 
SEC or private plaintiffs to bring scheme 
liability claims could meet resistance from 
the court’s four more liberal justices, each of 
whom dissented from Janus, potentially 
resulting in a 4-4 split that would in effect 
affirm the D.C. Circuit’s decision below. In 
any event, it is worth pausing to consider the 
issues this appeal presents because the grant 
of certiorari itself suggests that the court may 
be looking for a vehicle to more clearly 
demarcate the line between misstatements 
and scheme liability cases, and possibly even 
to rein in the scope of Rule 10b-5(b) cases 
more broadly, either here or in a future 
appeal. 
 
Primary vs. Secondary Liability 
 
The significance of this case rests on the 
difference between primary (misstatements 
and/or scheme) liability and secondary 
(aiding-and-abetting) liability for securities 
law violations under Rule 10b-5 and its three 
clauses. Following Central Bank’s 
foreclosure of aiding-and-abetting liability, 
private litigation has focused on determining 
what constitutes either a false or misleading 
statement, actionable under Rule 10b-5(b), or 
otherwise deceptive conduct, which may or 
may not include a material misrepresentation, 
actionable under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), 
which broadly prohibit deceptive devices, 
schemes or other similar acts. This case 
highlights two questions relevant to that 
determination. First, who is the “maker” of 
the statement and thus potentially liable 
under Section 10b-5(b)? And, second, is the 
mere use of a false or misleading statement 
by someone who is not himself the “maker” 
sufficiently deceptive on its own to constitute 
scheme liability under Rules 10b-5(a) and 
(c), or is such an attempt to turn mere use into 
a scheme an end-run around 10b-5(b)’s 
primary liability requirements? 
 
Addressing the first question — who 
“makes” a statement under 10b-5(b) — the 
Supreme Court held in Janus that “the maker 
of a statement is the person or entity with 
ultimate authority over the statement, 
including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”[5] On that question, the 
court held that, “in the ordinary case, 
attribution within a statement or implicit 
from surrounding circumstances is strong 
evidence that a statement was made by — and 
only by — the party to whom it is 
attributed.”[6] The second question — what 
conduct is deceptive under 10b-5(a) and (c) 
— has elicited somewhat mixed approaches 
from the federal bench. A number of courts 
have taken the position that each clause of 
Rule 10b-5 is intended to capture different 
types of conduct. Cases primarily based on 
misstatements or omissions that would give 
rise to liability under Rule 10b-5(b) therefore 
cannot also be charged as scheme liability 
under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c) absent additional 
deceptive conduct separate and apart from 
the use of the misstatement itself.[7] The 
commission has (unsurprisingly) taken the 
more expansive view that Rules 10b-5(a) and 
(c) can be used in appropriate circumstances 
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to reach persons who disseminate a false or 
misleading statement made by another.[8] 
 
Lorenzo 
 
The D.C. Circuit took a somewhat surprising 
route in deciding a case implicating both of 
these questions. Lorenzo was the director of 
investment banking at a registered broker-
dealer, Charles Vista LLC.[9] At the 
direction of his boss, Lorenzo sent an email 
to prospective investors lauding a number of 
purported “layers of protection” against 
default — including $10 million in assets — 
of a startup company looking to issue 
debentures.[10] Lorenzo sent the email from 
his account and above his signature block, the 
email identified him as Charles Vista’s head 
of investment banking, and the email finished 
with an invitation to call him if investors had 
questions.[11] The email also included a note 
that it was sent at the request of his boss,[12] 
and Lorenzo later testified that he copied and 
pasted the content from his boss.[13] After a 
hearing, an SEC administrative law judge 
found that Lorenzo understood when he sent 
the email that none of these protections 
existed, that the company had virtually no 
assets to its name, and, as a result, that 
Lorenzo violated all three clauses of Rule 
10b-5.[14] The commission upheld the ALJ’s 
decision.[15] 
 
On appeal from the commission decision, a 
2-1 panel majority of the D.C. Circuit agreed 
that the statements in the email were false or 
misleading and that Lorenzo acted with the 
requisite scienter in sending it.[16] However, 
the court also found that, under Janus, 
Lorenzo was not the maker of the false or 
misleading statements because he sent the 
email “at the behest of his boss” who 
“supplied the content” and “approved” the 
email.[17] As a result, the court held that 
Lorenzo did not violate Rule 10b-5(b).[18] 
Interestingly, the court did not address the 
issue of attribution, instead focusing on the 
notion that Lorenzo’s boss was the one with 
ultimate authority over when and how to 
communicate the email. 
 
The court further held, however, that Lorenzo 
violated 10b-5(a) and (c) by sending the 
email.[19] In other words, Lorenzo’s use of 
the statement to deceive was sufficient to 
invoke the scheme liability provisions of 
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), even though Lorenzo 
was not himself the “maker” of the statement 
under Janus and even though the court 
identified no additional deceptive conduct 
apart from the use of the misstatement itself. 
In reaching that conclusion, the court rejected 
Lorenzo’s argument that, at most, his conduct 
amounted to aiding-and-abetting and not 
primary liability.[20] Instead, the court found 
that because Lorenzo interacted directly with 
investors in supplying the false emails, he 
was primarily liable. The court also found 
that claims involving false statements did not 
need to sit exclusively within 10b-5(b): 
“Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), as well as Sections 
10(b) and 17(a)(1) [of the Securities Act], 
may encompass certain conduct involving the 
dissemination of false statements even if the 
same conduct lies beyond the reach of Rule 
10b-5(b).”[21] 
 
In dissent, Judge Kavanaugh characterized 
the commission’s tactics as decades of trying 
to “circumvent” Supreme Court decisions 
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designed to distinguish primary and 
secondary liability.[22] He criticized the 
shifting interpretations of the record at each 
level of the proceeding, and believed the 
administrative law judge’s factual findings 
did not support the required scienter.[23] He 
also indicated that he would have ruled, in 
accordance with the Second, Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits, that “scheme liability must be 
based on conduct that goes beyond a 
defendant’s role in preparing mere 
misstatements or omissions made by 
others.”[24] 
 
What’s Next? 
 
Lorenzo has asked the Supreme Court to 
answer the question whether a misstatement 
claim “that does not meet the elements set 
forth in Janus can be repackaged and pursued 
as a fraudulent scheme claim.”[25] A number 
of possible outcomes present themselves. 
 
Prior to Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination to 
the court, the most likely outcome in view of 
the court’s recent securities law decisions is 
that a majority would subscribe to his dissent 
and use Lorenzo to clarify what type of 
conduct constitutes deception under scheme 
liability by finding that allegations of conduct 
involving use of a misleading statement alone 
can only give rise potentially to primary 
liability under Rule 10b-5(b) and not the 
scheme liability provisions of Rule 10b-5(a) 
and (c). This approach, which would accord 
with the majority of federal courts to have 
considered the issue, seems the most likely 
given the court’s past concerns — reflected 
in Central Bank, Janus and Stoneridge 
Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta[26] 
— with clearly demarcating the line between 
primary and secondary liability. While such 
an approach would work to cabin private 
actions, it would have less of an impact on 
SEC enforcement actions in this area given 
the commission’s ability to bring aiding-and-
abetting charges against nonmakers who use 
misstatements to deceive, as well as the 
commission’s ability to use Section 17 of the 
Securities Act — to which most courts have 
said Janus does not apply[27] — to capture 
fraud in the offer or sale of securities “by 
means of any untrue statement of a material 
fact.”[28] 
 
Should Judge Kavanaugh be confirmed and 
recuse himself, on the other hand, the 
Supreme Court may well reach a 4-4 
stalemate on the scope of scheme liability, 
which would result in an affirmance of the 
D.C. Circuit’s majority decision. This result 
would leave in place — at least for the 
moment — circuit court precedent that takes 
an expansive view of the scope of 10b-5 
liability, allowing the SEC and private 
plaintiffs to bring primary liability claims 
involving misrepresentations as scheme 
liability claims, even without additional 
deceptive conduct, against someone who is 
not the statement’s “maker.” 
 
One thing to keep an eye out for is whether 
the Supreme Court, either in this appeal or 
perhaps a future appeal, further restricts 
primary liability claims under Rule 10b-5(b) 
by endorsing the D.C. Circuit’s holding that 
only the person or entity with ultimate 
authority over a statement can be a “maker” 
for Janus purposes, without regard to explicit 
attribution within a statement. This reading, 
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while not necessary to answer the question 
presented in Lorenzo, could, if followed by 
the lower courts, dramatically curtail the 
reach of Rule 10b-5 in both private and SEC 
actions, particularly when combined with a 
reversal of the D.C. Circuit on the scope of 
scheme liability. For example, this 
interpretation could affect whether 
investment banks can be held liable for 
statements in issuers’ offering documents. 
While such documents state that they are the 
words of, and only of, the issuer, 
underwriters are often credited on the cover 
of such documents, which some courts have 
held can furnish the necessary attribution 
under Janus.[29] However, under the D.C. 
Circuit’s reading, such attribution is likely 
insufficient to reflect the necessary ultimate 
authority required by Janus.[30] 
 
In sum, the Supreme Court appears likely to 
endorse the more restrictive view of Rule 
10b-5’s scheme liability provisions either in 
this case or, were a recusal to result in a 4-4 
split, a future case on similar facts, to the 
detriment of private plaintiffs. A majority 
conservative court seems unlikely to endorse 
the commission’s and the minority of courts’ 
views that a misstatement alone can be the 
basis for a scheme liability primary violation. 
And, in the likely worst outcome for the SEC 
and private litigants, the court ultimately 
could not only hem in scheme liability claims 
but also take the additional step of expressly 
endorsing the D.C. Circuit’s seeming 
cabining of Janus’ holding on maker liability. 
This latter outcome could significantly 
complicate both SEC enforcement actions 
and private lawsuits against underwriters and 
others similarly situated. Additional clues to 
the court’s leanings should present 
themselves at oral argument in the fall. 
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“Broker Didn’t ‘Make’ False Statements, Appeals Court Says” 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Phyllis Diamond 
September 29, 2017  
 
A divided D.C. Circuit set aside SEC 
sanctions against Charles Vista LLC broker 
Francis Lorenzo for sending out emails that 
misrepresented the key features of a 
securities offering in a start-up alternative 
energy company. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit agreed Sept. 29 with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission that 
the statements in Lorenzo’s emails were false 
or misleading and that he acted with culpable 
intent (Lorenzo v. SEC , 2017 BL 345755, 
D.C. Cir., No. 15-1202, 9/29/17). 
However, Judge Sri Srinivasan said, Lorenzo 
didn’t “make” the misstatements for purposes 
of a 1934 Securities Exchange Act rule that 
bars the making of materially false 
statements in connection with a securities 
transaction. Rather, Lorenzo’s boss, who 
supplied the content of the false statements 
and had “ultimate authority” over them, did. 
Because the commission’s sanctions were at 
least partly based on the “misimpression” 
that Lorenzo’s conduct violated Rule 10b-
5(b) they must be set aside and the case 
remanded. 
Dissenting, Judge Brett Kavanaugh said the 
“good news” is that the court vacated the 
lifetime suspension imposed by the SEC. 
“The bad news,” he said, is that the opinion 
“upholds much of the SEC’s decision on 
liability. I would vacate the SEC’s 
conclusions as to both sanctions and 
liability,” Kavanaugh said. 
The decision sheds light on a six-year old 
U.S. Supreme Court decision on what it 
means to “make” a material misstatement for 
securities fraud purposes. The case “is a 
useful reminder that the `making’ test can 
serve as an important limitation on claims 
brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5,” Denver lawyer Michael MacPhail, Faegre 
Baker Daniels LLP, told Bloomberg BNA. 
Through a spokeswoman, the SEC declined 
to comment. 
Janus Test 
In 2013, the SEC sued Charles Vista, a New 
York-based brokerage firm, and two 
unrelated brokers—Lorenzo and his boss 
Gregg Lorenzo—for allegedly using false 
and unfounded statements to secure 
investments in Waste2Energy Holdings Inc., 
a purported clean energy company. 
An SEC administrative law judge found 
Lorenzo liable for sending investors emails 
that he knew contained false and misleading 
information. She fined him $15,000, ordered 
him to cease and desist from future 
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misconduct, and barred him from the 
industry. The SEC affirmed and Lorenzo 
appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 
Vacating and remanding, the appeals court 
said that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First 
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), a 
person can’t have "`made’ a misstatement if 
he lacked ultimate authority over what it said 
and whether it was said, including if he 
prepared or published it on behalf of 
another.” 
Applying that reasoning to this case, it said 
Lorenzo wasn’t the “maker” of the 
misstatements in the emails he sent potential 
investors. “Voluminous testimony 
established that Lorenzo transmitted 
statements devised by Gregg Lorenzo at 
Gregg Lorenzo’s direction,” the appeals 
court said. 
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Apple, Inc. v. Pepper 
 
Ruling Below: IN RE APPLE IPHONE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017) 
 
Overview: Purchasers of iPhones and iPhone apps argue that Apple monopolized the market for 
the apps by requiring app developers to sell their apps exclusively to Apple’s App Store and 
charging them a 30-percent commission on each sale. The iPhone users contend that, as a result, 
they paid more for the apps than if they had bought them elsewhere. They asked a federal court in 
California to award them, under federal antitrust law, three times the amount that Apple allegedly 
overcharged them. 
 
Issue: Whether consumers may sue anyone who delivers goods to them for antitrust damages, even 
when they seek damages based on prices set by third parties who would be the immediate victims 
of the alleged offense. 
IN RE APPLE IPHONE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Robert Pepper; Stephen H. Schwartz; 
Edward W. Hayter; Eric Terrell, Plaintiffs- Appellants 
v. 
APPLE, INC., Defendant-Appellee  
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on January 12, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:  
 
In their current complaint, Plaintiffs 
allege that they purchased iPhones and 
iPhone applications (“apps”) between 2007 
and 2013, and that Apple has monopolized 
and attempted to monopolize the market for 
iPhone apps. In ruling on Apple’s fourth 
motion to dismiss, the district court held that 
Plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing under 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 
(1977).  
 
We must decide two questions. First, 
we must decide whether Rule 12(g)(2) barred 
the district court from considering on the 
merits Apple’s fourth motion to dismiss, 
brought under Rule 12(b)(6), in which Apple 
contended that Plaintiffs lack statutory 
standing under Illinois Brick. We conclude 
that the district court may have erred in 
considering this motion on the merits, but 
that its error, if any, was harmless. Second, 
we must decide whether Plaintiffs lack 
statutory standing under Illinois Brick. We 
hold that Plaintiffs are direct purchasers from 
Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick 
and therefore have standing. 
 
I. Factual Allegations 
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The following factual narrative is 
drawn from Plaintiffs’ current complaint. 
Because the district court dismissed 
Plaintiffs’ suit under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim, we take as true all plausible 
allegations.  
 
Apple released the iPhone in 2007. 
The iPhone is a “closed system,” meaning 
that Apple controls which apps— such as 
ringtones, instant messaging, Internet, video, 
and the like—can run on an iPhone’s 
software. In 2008, Apple launched the “App 
Store,” an internet site where iPhone users 
can find, purchase, and download iPhone 
apps. Apple has developed some of the apps 
sold in the App Store, but many of the apps 
sold in the store have been developed by 
third-party developers. Apple earns a 
commission on each third-party app 
purchased for use on an iPhone. When a 
customer purchases a third-party iPhone app, 
the payment is submitted to the App Store. Of 
that payment, 30% goes to Apple and 70% 
goes to the developer.  
 
Apple prohibits app developers from 
selling iPhone apps through channels other 
than the App Store, threatening to cut off 
sales by any developer who violates this 
prohibition. Apple discourages iPhone 
owners from downloading unapproved apps, 
threatening to void iPhone warranties if they 
do so. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
The procedural history of this case is 
complex. We describe as much of the history 
as is necessary to resolve the procedural 
question before us. Four named plaintiffs 
filed a putative antitrust class action 
complaint (“Complaint 1”) against Apple on 
December 29, 2011. Counts I and II of 
Complaint 1 alleged monopolization and 
attempted monopolization of the iPhone app 
market by Apple. Count III alleged a 
conspiracy between Apple and AT&T 
Mobility, LLC (“ATTM”) to monopolize the 
voice and data services market for iPhones. 
Plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased 
iPhones, but did not allege that they had ever 
purchased, or attempted to purchase, iPhone 
apps. On March 2, 2012, Apple moved to 
dismiss the entire complaint under Rule 
12(b)(7) for failure to join ATTM as a 
defendant. This motion to dismiss was 
mooted when the district court consolidated 
the action with another action.  
 
Seven named plaintiffs, including the 
original four plaintiffs, then filed a 
consolidated putative class action complaint 
(“Complaint 2”) against Apple on March 21, 
2012. The allegations in Complaint 2 were 
essentially the same as those in Complaint 1, 
and the same three Counts were alleged. 
None of the named plaintiffs alleged that they 
had bought, or attempted to buy, an iPhone 
app. ATTM was not added as a defendant. On 
April 16, 2012, Apple moved again to 
dismiss the entire complaint under Rule 
12(b)(7) for failure to join ATTM as a 
defendant. In the alternative, it moved to 
dismiss Count III under Rule 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim for conspiracy 
between Apple and ATTM. The district court 
granted without prejudice the motion to 
dismiss the entire complaint, even though 
Counts I and II alleged no wrongdoing by 
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ATTM. The court specifically ordered 
Plaintiffs either to add ATTM as a defendant 
or to forgo Count III. It denied without 
prejudice Apple’s motion to dismiss Count 
III under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that, in 
the absence of ATTM, the motion was 
premature. 
 
Plaintiffs filed an amended 
consolidated complaint (“Complaint 3”) on 
September 28, 2012. Complaint 3 was 
essentially the same as Complaint 2, except 
that Count III was now labeled as “Preserved 
for Appeal.” None of the named plaintiffs 
alleged that they had ever purchased, or 
sought to purchase, iPhone apps, and ATTM 
was not named as a defendant. On November 
2, 2012, Apple moved under Rule 12(f) to 
strike Claim III on the ground that ATTM had 
still not been named as a defendant. As part 
of the same motion, Apple moved to dismiss 
Counts I and II under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack 
of Article III standing, and under Rule 
12(b)(6) for lack of statutory standing under 
Illinois Brick. This was the first time Apple 
had moved to dismiss Counts I and II. 
Relying on Rule 12(g)(2), Plaintiffs opposed 
Apple’s motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) on the ground that Apple had not 
moved to dismiss these claims under Rule 
12(b)(6) in its two previous motions under 
Rule 12. 
 
The district court granted the Rule 
12(f) motion to strike Count III. The district 
court also granted the Rule 12(b)(1) motion 
to dismiss Counts I and II for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, holding that Plaintiffs 
lacked Article III standing to bring those 
counts because Plaintiff failed to allege that 
they had purchased or attempted to purchase 
an iPhone app. The court declined to rule on 
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under 
Illinois Brick, concluding that, in the absence 
of an alleged Article III injury, any ruling 
would be advisory. The district court 
dismissed with leave to amend. 
 
Plaintiffs filed a second amended 
consolidated complaint (“Complaint 4”) on 
September 5, 2013. Complaint 4 alleged only 
the iPhone app monopolization claims, which 
had been Counts I and II of all of the earlier 
complaints. For the first time, Plaintiffs 
alleged that they had purchased iPhone apps, 
thereby alleging sufficient injury under 
Article III to support Counts I and II. 
Complaint 4 added the following allegation 
specifically addressed to statutory standing 
under Illinois Brick 
 
When an iPhone customer buys an 
app from Apple, it pays the full purchase 
price, including Apple’s 30% commission, 
directly to Apple. . . . Apple sells the apps (or, 
more recently, licenses for the apps) directly 
to the customer, collects the entire purchase 
price, and pays the developers after the sale. 
The developers at no time directly sell the 
apps or licenses to iPhone customers or 
collect payments from the customers.  
 
On September 30, 2013, Apple filed a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 
contending that Plaintiffs lacked statutory 
standing under Illinois Brick. The district 
court agreed and dismissed Complaint 4 with 
prejudice. Plaintiffs timely appealed. 
 
III. Standard of Review 
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We review de novo alleged errors of 
law in interpreting Rule 12. See Whittlestone, 
Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 
(9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo 
dismissals for failure to state a claim under 
Rule 12(b)(6). Carlin v. DairyAmerica, Inc., 
705 F.3d 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
Plaintiffs make three arguments on 
appeal, of which we need to reach only two. 
First, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 12(g)(2) 
barred Apple from raising its Illinois Brick 
statutory standing defense in its fourth Rule 
12 motion to dismiss, and that the district 
court erred in deciding the motion on the 
merits. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the 
district court erred in characterizing them as 
indirect purchasers from Apple, and therefore 
without statutory standing under Illinois 
Brick. We address these two arguments in 
turn. 
 
A. Late-filed Motions to Dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) 
 
Rule 12(g)(2) provides, “Except as 
provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that 
makes a motion under this rule must not make 
another motion under this rule raising a 
defense or objection that was available to the 
party but omitted from its earlier motion.” 
The consequence of omitting a defense from 
an earlier motion under Rule 12 depends on 
type of defense omitted. A defendant who 
omits a defense under Rules 12(b)(2)-(5)—
lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, 
insufficient process, and insufficient service 
of process—entirely waives that defense. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(A). A defendant who 
omits a defense under Rule 12(b)(6)—failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted—does not waive that defense. Rule 
12(g)(2) provides that a defendant who fails 
to assert a failure-to-state-a-claim defense in 
a pre-answer Rule 12 motion cannot assert 
that defense in a later pre-answer motion 
under Rule 12(b)(6), but the defense may be 
asserted in other ways. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(h)(2). 
 
Our sister circuits disagree about the 
proper interpretation and application of Rule 
12(g)(2). The Seventh Circuit has held that 
Rule 12(g)(2) does not foreclose a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when there has 
been a previous motion to dismiss under Rule 
12. See Ennenga v. Starns, 677 F.3d 766, 773 
(7th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 12(g)(2) does not 
prohibit a new Rule 12(b)(6) argument from 
being raised in a successive motion.”). The 
Seventh Circuit misunderstands Rule 12, 
reading Rule 12(h)(1) to provide the only 
sanction for failure to raise a Rule 12 defense 
in a prior motion under the Rule. It is true that 
Rule 12(h)(1) singles out several Rule 12 
defenses for an especially severe sanction. If 
a defense under Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) is not 
asserted in the first Rule 12 motion to 
dismiss, Rule 12(h)(1) tells us that the 
defense is entirely waived. But Rule 12(h)(2) 
provides a less severe sanction for failure to 
assert a defense under Rule 12(b)(6). If a 
failure-to-state-a-claim defense under Rule 
12(b)(6) was not asserted in the first motion 
to dismiss under Rule 12, Rule 12(h)(2) tells 
us that it can be raised, but only in a pleading 
under Rule 7, in a post-answer motion under 
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Rule 12(c), or at trial. See, e.g., English v. 
Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1091 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(correctly describing the operation of the 
rule). 
 
The Third and Tenth Circuits have 
read Rule 12 correctly, but have been very 
forgiving of a district court’s failure to follow 
Rule 12(g)(2). See Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat. 
Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 321–22 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“So long as the district court accepts all of 
the allegations in the complaint as true, the 
result is the same as if the defendant had filed 
an answer admitting these allegations and 
then filed a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, which Rule 12(h)(2)(B) 
expressly permits.”); Albers v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty., Colo., 771 F.3d 
697, 704 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[W]hether the 
district court dismissed the complaint based 
on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or rule 12(c) 
makes no difference for purposes of our 
review. Therefore, any procedural error that 
may have been been committed would be 
harmless and does not prevent us from 
reaching the merits of the district court’s 
decision.”).  
 
We agree with the approach of the 
Third and Tenth Circuits. We read Rule 
12(g)(2) in light of the general policy of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expressed 
in Rule 1. That rule directs that the Federal 
Rules “be construed, administered, and 
employed by the court and the parties to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and 
proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Denying late-
filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions and relegating 
defendants to the three procedural avenues 
specified in Rule 12(h)(2) can produce 
unnecessary and costly delays, contrary to the 
direction of Rule 1. 
 
District courts in this circuit and 
others are well aware of this. For example, as 
the late Judge Pfaelzer recently wrote:  
 
Rule 12(g) is designed to avoid 
repetitive motion practice, delay, and ambush 
tactics. If the Court were to evade the merits 
of Defendants’ . . . defenses here, Defendants 
would be required to file answers within 14 
days of this Order. They would presumably 
assert [the same defenses] in those answers. 
Defendants would then file Rule 12(c) 
motions, the parties would repeat the briefing 
they have already undertaken, and the Court 
would have to address the same questions in 
several months. That is not the intended 
effect of Rule 12(g), and the result would be 
in contradiction of Rule 1’s mandate[.]  
 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Countrywide Fin. 
Corp., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 
2011) (citations omitted); see also Banko v. 
Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 2013 WL 
6623913, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013) 
(internal quotations omitted) (“Although 
Rule 12(g) technically prohibits successive 
motions to dismiss that raise arguments that 
could have been made in a prior motion . . . 
courts faced with a successive motion often 
exercise their discretion to consider the new 
arguments in the interests of judicial 
economy.”); Davidson v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., No. 09-CV-2694-IEG JMA, 
2011 WL 1157569, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 
2011) (internal quotations omitted) (“Rule 
12(g) applies to situations in which a party 
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files successive motions under Rule 12 for 
the sole purpose of delay[.]”); Doe v. White, 
No. 08-1287, 2010 WL 323510, at *2 (C.D. 
Ill. Jan. 20, 2010) (citing the “substantial 
amount of case law which provides that 
successive Rule 12(b)(6) motions may be 
considered where they have not been filed for 
the purpose of delay, where entertaining the 
motion would expedite the case, and where 
the motion would narrow the issues 
involved.”). Moore’s Federal Practice 
endorses this approach. See 2-12 Moore’s 
Federal Practice - Civil § 12.23 (“[B]ecause 
[a 12(b)(6) defense] is so basic and was not 
waived, [a district] court might properly 
entertain a second motion if it were 
convinced it was not interposed for delay and 
that addressing it would expedite disposition 
of the case on the merits.”). 
 
Recognizing the practical wisdom of 
these district courts, and of the Third and 
Tenth Circuits, we conclude that, as a 
reviewing court, we should generally be 
forgiving of a district court’s ruling on the 
merits of a late-filed Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
With that in mind, we turn to the case now 
before us 
 
Apple’s first two motions to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(7), directed to Complaints 
1 and 2, were designed to force Plaintiffs to 
add ATTM as a necessary and indispensable 
party under Rule 19. These were appropriate 
motions, given that Count III alleged a 
conspiracy between Apple and ATTM to 
monopolize voice and data services, and 
given that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged 
Article III injury to make that claim. After 
Plaintiffs filed Complaint 3, which had been 
amended to recognize the success of Apple’s 
motions under Rule 12(b)(7), Apple moved 
again to dismiss. It now moved for the first 
time to dismiss Counts I and II, relying on 
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, including for failure to allege 
injury sufficient for Article III standing, may 
be made at any time. See F. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). Apple’s earlier Rule 
12 motions to dismiss thus in no way 
foreclosed its late-filed motion to dismiss 
Counts I and II for lack of Article III 
standing. The district court granted Apple’s 
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. It refused to 
decide Apple’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for lack of statutory standing on the 
ground that, in the absence of an Article III 
case or controversy, a ruling on the motion 
would be an advisory opinion. 
 
Complaint 4 realleged Counts I and 
II, and finally alleged, for the first time, that 
Plaintiffs had purchased iPhone apps. That is, 
Complaint 4 finally alleged sufficient injury 
to confer Article III standing to support 
Counts I and II. Apple moved to dismiss for 
the fourth time, this time only under Rule 
12(b)(6) for lack of statutory standing under 
Illinois Brick. 
 
Apple’s motions to dismiss for lack of 
standing under Rule 12(b)(6), made in its 
third and fourth motions to dismiss under 
Rule 12, may not have been late-filed within 
the meaning of Rule 12(g)(2). Indeed, there 
is an argument that Apple’s motion to dismiss 
Complaint 3 under Rule 12(b)(6), made as 
part of its third Rule 12 motion to dismiss, 
was not late but premature. At that point, 
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Plaintiffs had not alleged injury sufficient to 
confer subject matter jurisdiction over 
Counts I and II. For that reason, the district 
court properly refused to rule on Apple’s 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding that, in the 
absence of an allegation of Article III 
standing, any ruling would be advisory. See 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 
U.S. 83 (1998). The district court was willing 
to decide Apple’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for lack of statutory standing only 
when Plaintiffs finally alleged, in Complaint 
4, sufficient injury to confer Article III 
standing to bring the challenged counts. 
 
Even if we assume arguendo that 
Apple’s motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), made in its fourth Rule 12 motion, 
was late, any error by the district court in 
considering the motion on the merits was 
harmless. First, the four motions to dismiss, 
culminating in the motion to dismiss 
Complaint 4 under Rule 12(b)(6), do not 
appear to have been filed for any strategically 
abusive purpose. Apple promptly moved to 
dismiss each of Plaintiffs’ four complaints. 
Apple’s first two motions to dismiss were 
made on March 2 and April 16, 2012, 
immediately after the filing of Plaintiffs’ first 
two complaints. Plaintiffs filed Complaint 3 
on September 28, 2012. Apple moved to 
dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on 
November 2, 2012. Plaintiffs filed Complaint 
4 on September 5, 2013. Apple moved to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on September 
30, 2013. We recognize that Apple could 
have moved, along with its motion to dismiss 
for failure to join ATTM under Rule 
12(b)(7), to dismiss Counts I and I for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1). If that motion had been made and 
granted, Plaintiffs would likelyhave amended 
their complaint earlier to allege purchases of 
iPhone apps. But we see no harm to Plaintiffs 
caused by Apple’s delay in making its Rule 
12(b)(1) motion. Second, resort to any of the 
three default alternatives specified in Rule 
12(h)(2)—a pleading under Rule 7(a), a post-
answer motion to dismiss on the pleadings 
under Rule 12(c), or a defense asserted at 
trial—would have substantially delayed 
resolution of the Illinois Brick statutory 
standing question, and would have done so 
for no apparent purpose. The district court’s 
decision on the merits of Apple’s Rule 
12(b)(6) motion materially expedited the 
district court’s disposition of the case, which 
was a benefit to both parties. 
 
We therefore conclude that any error 
committed by the district court in ruling on 
Apple’s motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) for lack of statutory standing under 
Illinois Brick, if indeed there was error, was 
harmless. We now turn to the merits of the 
district court’s decision. 
 
B. Standing Under Illinois Brick 
 
1. The Direct-Purchaser Rule 
 
Under § 4 of the Clayton Act, “any 
person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in 
the antitrust laws may sue . . . and shall 
recover threefold the damages by him 
sustained[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 
Notwithstanding the statutory term “any 
person,” the Supreme Court has limited those 
who may sue for antitrust damages. The 
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general rule is that only “the overcharged 
direct purchaser, and not others in the chain 
of manufacture or distribution,” has standing 
to sue. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 
720, 729 (1977).  
 
The rule originated in Hanover Shoe 
v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 392 U.S. 481 
(1968). Hanover, a shoe manufacturer, 
alleged that the United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation had used its monopoly over 
shoe-manufacturing machinery to lease 
machines to Hanover at supracompetitive 
rates. Id. at 483–84. United argued that 
Hanover had no legally cognizable injury 
under the antitrust laws because it had passed 
any illegal overcharge on to its customers. Id. 
at 491. The Court rejected United’s 
“defensive” use of the passon theory. For 
purposes of antitrust damages, the Court 
held, the direct purchaser is injured by the full 
amount of the overcharge irrespective of who 
ultimately bears the cost of that injury. Id. at 
494.  
 
The Court gave two reasons for its 
holding. First, the dollar figures necessary to 
demonstrate that an intermediary has avoided 
economic injury by passing an overcharge 
onto his customers were, the Court found, 
“virtually unascertainable.” Id. at 493. A 
litigant would need to show, among other 
things, that the intermediary raised the price 
of his product as a result of the illegal 
overcharge; that the higher price charged by 
the intermediary did not affect the 
intermediary’s profits by reducing the 
volume of sales; and that the intermediary 
could not or would not have raised its price 
absent the overcharge. The challenges to 
making such a showing, the Court observed, 
would “normally prove insurmountable.” Id. 
Second, if an antitrust violator were 
permitted to defend against suit by showing 
that the intermediary passed the alleged 
overcharge onto its customers, those 
customers would logically be entitled to 
damages for any portion of the overcharge 
they paid. In many cases, however, there 
would be a large number of customers, each 
of whom would have “only a tiny stake in a 
lawsuit,” and who, in the view of the Court, 
would thus have “little interest in attempting 
a class action.” Id. at 494. As a result, 
according to the Court, antitrust violators 
would “retain the fruits of their illegality 
because no one . . . would bring suit against 
them.” Id. 
 
Nine years after Hanover Shoe, the 
Supreme Court rejected an attempt to use the 
pass-on theory “offensively.” In Illinois 
Brick, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the State of 
Illinois sued a concrete block manufacturer 
for allegedly fixing the price of concrete 
blocks. The manufacturer had sold the blocks 
to masonry contractors who had used the 
blocks to build masonry structures. The 
masonry contractors sold the structures to 
general contractors who put the structures in 
buildings they sold to the State. The State 
alleged that the contractors had passed on the 
manufacturer’s illegal overcharge at both 
stages of the distribution chain, driving up the 
State’s costs by $3 million. 
 
The Supreme Court refused to 
recognize the passed-on overcharges as a 
basis for antitrust standing. As in Hanover 
Shoe, the challenges of tracing the effects of 
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an overcharge at each stage of a distribution 
chain were, in the Court’s view, 
insurmountable. Even if indirect purchasers 
could meet these challenges, sorting out the 
complicated variables would clog the courts 
with protracted and expensive litigation. Id. 
at 732. And even then problems of 
administrability and enforcement would 
remain. Allowing an indirect purchaser to sue 
for whatever portion of an overcharge it was 
assessed would either “create a serious risk of 
multiple liability for defendants,” id. at 730, 
or reduce the effectiveness of antitrust laws 
by diluting the share of damages better-
situated direct purchasers might secure by 
bringing suit. Id. at 731–35.  
 
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
the Hanover Shoe/Illinois Brick rule in a case 
where the practical considerations that gave 
rise to the rule were not nearly as compelling 
as in the two foundation cases. In Kansas v. 
UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990), 
customers of public utilities sued natural gas 
producers for alleged violations of Section 4 
of the Clayton Act. Plaintiffs conceded that 
they were direct purchasers from the public 
utilities and indirect purchasers from the 
producers. But they argued that the direct 
purchasers, because they were regulated 
public utilities, had the incentive and ability 
to build into their pricing structure their entire 
cost of purchasing natural gas. Id. at 205. On 
the other side of the coin, because they were 
public utilities, they had the obligation to 
pass on the entirety of any cost savings 
resulting from a reduced purchasing cost. Id. 
at 212. Therefore, the complications in 
determining the amount of illegal overcharge 
that had been, or could be, passed on that had 
so concerned the Court in Hanover Shoe and 
Illinois Brick were largely absent. The Court 
nonetheless applied the direct/indirect 
purchaser rule, holding that “[i]n the 
distribution chain,” the customers were “not 
the immediate buyers from the alleged 
antitrust violators.” UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 
207. 
 
The transactions in Hanover Shoe and 
Illinois Brick have the same structure. In both 
cases, a monopolizing or price-fixing 
manufacturer sold or leased a product to an 
intermediate manufacturer at a 
supracompetitive price. The intermediate 
manufacturer (in Illinois Brick, two 
intermediate manufacturers) then used that 
product to create another product, which was 
ultimately sold to the consumer. The details 
in UtiliCorp are different, but the basic 
structure is the same. In UtiliCorp, a 
monopolizing producer sold a product to a 
distributor at an allegedly supracompetitive 
price. The distributor then sold the product to 
the consumer. In all three cases, the consumer 
was an indirect purchaser from the 
manufacturer or producer who sold or leased 
the product to the intermediary. The 
consumer was a direct purchaser from the 
intermediate manufacturer (Hanover Shoe 
and Illinois Brick) or from the distributor 
(UtiliCorp). The consumer did not have 
standing to sue the manufacturer or producer, 
but did have standing to sue the intermediary, 
whether the intermediate manufacturer or the 
distributor 
 
2. Plaintiffs Are Direct Purchasers 
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The question before us is whether 
Plaintiffs purchased their iPhone apps 
directly from the app developers, or directly 
from Apple. Stated otherwise, the question is 
whether Apple is a manufacturer or producer, 
or whether it is a distributor. Under Hanover 
Shoe, Illinois Brick, and UtiliCorp, if Apple 
is a manufacturer or producer from whom 
Plaintiffs purchased indirectly, Plaintiffs do 
not have standing. But if Apple is a 
distributor from whom Plaintiffs purchased 
directly, Plaintiffs do have standing. 
 
We do not write on a clean slate in 
this circuit. In Delaware Valley Surgical 
Supply, Inc. v. Johnson &Johnson, 523 F.3d 
1116 (9th Cir. 2008), plaintiff Bamberg 
County Memorial Hospital & Nursing Center 
(“Bamberg”) brought suit against Johnson & 
Johnson (“J & J”) alleging that J & J 
“impermissibly leveraged its monopoly 
power in sutures to create a monopoly” in the 
market for endomechanical products. Id. at 
1118. Bamberg did not purchase medical 
supplies directly from J & J. Instead, a group 
purchasing organization (“GPO”), of which 
Bamberg was a member, negotiated 
purchasing contracts with J & J and a 
distributor, Owens & Minor (“O & M”). J & 
J and O & M, in turn, had a distributorship 
agreement specifying that O & M would pay 
J & J the price negotiated by the GPO. 
Bamberg would purchase from O & M, 
paying O & M this price plus a set percentage 
markup. Pursuant to this agreement, J & J 
supplied products to the distributor, O & M, 
which in turn sold and delivered the products 
to Bamberg, at a price equal to the cost O & 
M paid for the products plus the set markup 
determined by a contract between O & M and 
Bamberg. Id. at 1119. 
 
Applying the “straightforward,” 
“bright line” rule of Illinois Brick, we held in 
Delaware Valley that Bamberg was an 
indirect purchaser from J & J, the 
manufacturer, and a direct purchaser from O 
& M, the distributor. Id. at 1122, 1120. That 
Bamberg and J & J had a contract setting the 
wholesale price of the products, and that the 
price Bamberg paid O & M was “set, in part, 
by an agreement negotiated . . . on behalf of 
Bamberg” with J & J were not determinative. 
Id. at 1122. The determinative fact was that 
O & M was a distributor who sold the 
products directly to Bamberg. Because 
Bamberg bought directly from O & M, the 
distributor, it lacked standing to sue J & J, the 
manufacturer. The necessary corollary of 
Delaware Valley is that Bamberg would have 
had standing to sue O & M, the distributor. 
 
The Eighth Circuit has considered a 
transaction closely resembling the 
transaction in the case before us. In Campos 
v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th 
Cir. 1998), plaintiffs alleged that 
Ticketmaster used its monopolistic control 
over concert ticket distribution services to 
charge supracompetitive fees for those 
services. The majority in Ticketmaster held 
that a party’s status as a “direct” or “indirect” 
purchaser turned on whether “an antecedent 
transaction between the monopolist and 
another, independent purchaser” absorbed or 
passed on all or part of the monopoly 
overcharge. Id. at 1169. Plaintiffs bought 
concert tickets directly from Ticketmaster, 
but the majority nevertheless concluded that 
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plaintiffs were indirect purchasers who 
lacked standing under Illinois Brick. Id. at 
1171. Using an analysis keyed to the 
“antecedent transaction,” the majority 
concluded that the ticket buyers were indirect 
purchasers. 
 
We disagree with the majority’s 
analysis in Ticketmaster. As Judge Morris 
Arnold pointed out in dissent, the majority’s 
“antecedent transaction” analysis has no 
basis in Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1174 
(M. Arnold, J., dissenting). Illinois Brick held 
that where plaintiffs are in a “direct vertical 
chain of transactions” and an intermediary 
“pass[es] on” monopolistic overcharges 
originating further up the chain, subsequent 
buyers lack standing. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In Ticketmaster, “[t]he 
monopoly product at issue . . . is ticket 
distribution services, not tickets.” Id. The 
distributor who “supplies the product directly 
to” plaintiffs, rather than the producer of the 
product, is the appropriate defendant in an 
antitrust suit. Id.  
 
Apple argues that it does not sell apps 
but rather sells “software distribution 
services to developers.” In Apple’s view, 
because it sells distribution services to app 
developers, it cannot simultaneously be a 
distributor of apps to app purchasers. Apple 
analogizes its role to the role of an owner of 
a shopping mall that “leases physical space to 
various stores.” Apple’s analogy is 
unconvincing. In the case before us, third-
party developers of iPhone apps do not have 
their own “stores.” Indeed, part of the anti-
competitive behavior alleged by Plaintiffs is 
that, far from allowing iPhone app developers 
to sell through their own “stores,” Apple 
specifically forbids them to do so, instead 
requiring them to sell iPhone apps only 
through Apple’s App Store.  
 
We do not address the question 
whether Apple sells distribution services to 
app developers within the meaning of Illinois 
Brick. If it did, this would necessarily imply 
that the developers, as direct purchasers of 
those services, could bring an antitrust suit 
against Apple. But whether app developers 
are direct purchasers of distribution services 
from Apple in the sense of Illinois Brick 
makes no difference to our analysis in the 
case now before us. 
 
We do not rest our analysis on the fact 
that Plaintiffs pay the App Store, which then 
forwards the payment to the app developers, 
less Apple’s thirty percent commission. 
Whether a purchase is direct or indirect does 
not turn on the formalities of payment or 
bookkeeping arrangements. See Freeman v. 
San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 
1146 (9th Cir. 2003). If Plaintiffs were direct 
purchasers from Apple solely because Apple 
collected their payments, Apple could escape 
anti-trust liability simply by tinkering with 
the order in which digital banking data zips 
through cyberspace during a sales 
transaction. 
 
Nor do we rest our analysis on the 
form of the payment Apple receives in return 
for distributing iPhone apps. Apple does not 
take ownership of the apps and then sell them 
to buyers after adding a markup of thirty 
percent. Rather, it sells the apps and adds a 
thirty percent commission. But the 
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distinction between a markup and a 
commission is immaterial. The key to the 
analysis is the function Apple serves rather 
than the manner in which it receives 
compensation for performing that function.  
 
 Nor, finally, do we rest our analysis 
on who determines the ultimate price paid by 
the buyer of an iPhone app. In the case before 
us, the price is determined as a practical 
matter by the app developer who sets a price, 
to which Apple’s thirty percent commission 
is added automatically. Our opinion in 
Delaware Valley makes clear that this does 
not make app purchasers direct buyers from 
the app developers. In Delaware Valley, the 
price paid by the distributor, O & M, to the 
manufacturer, J & J, was determined through 
a negotiation between J & J and a GPO of 
which Bamberg was a member. Despite the 
fact that Bamberg, through its GPO, had a say 
in the wholesale price charged by J & J to O 
& M, to which the distributor added its 
predetermined markup, we held that 
Bamberg was a direct purchaser from O & M. 
Here, the case is even stronger in favor of 
Plaintiffs. Unlike Bamberg, Plaintiffs have 
no say whatsoever in determining the price 
set by the app developer to which the 
distributor adds its predetermined 
commission.  
 
Instead, we rest our analysis, as 
compelled by Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, 
UtiliCorp, and Delaware Valley, on the 
fundamental distinction between a 
manufacturer or producer, on the one hand, 
and a distributor, on the other. Apple is a 
distributor of the iPhone apps, selling them 
directly to purchasers through its App Store. 
Because Apple is a distributor, Plaintiffs have 
standing under Illinois Brick to sue Apple for 
allegedly monopolizing and attempting to 
monopolize the sale of iPhone apps. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We conclude that any error, if indeed 
there was error, in the district court’s 
consideration of the merits of Apple’s Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for lack of 
statutory standing was harmless. We 
conclude further that Plaintiffs are direct 
purchasers of iPhone apps from Apple under 
Illinois Brick and that they therefore have 
standing to sue. The district court dismissed 
Plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that they 
lacked statutory standing under Illinois Brick. 
We therefore reverse and remand for further 
proceedings.  
 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
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“Apple Gets U.S. Supreme Court Review on iPhone App Fee Suit” 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Greg Stohr  
June 18, 2018  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear 
Apple Inc.’s bid to kill an antitrust lawsuit 
over the market for iPhone apps in a case that 
could shield e-commerce companies from 
consumer claims over high commissions. 
 
The lawsuit accuses Apple of monopolizing 
the app market so it can charge excessive 
commissions of 30 percent. Apple, backed by 
the Trump administration, says it can’t be 
sued because the commission is levied on the 
app developers, not the purchasers who are 
suing. 
 
A victory for Apple could insulate companies 
that run online marketplaces and interact with 
consumers on behalf of third-party sellers. 
Companies that could be affected include 
Alphabet Inc.’s Google, Amazon.com Inc. 
and Facebook Inc., Apple told the Supreme 
Court in its appeal 
 
"This is a critical question for antitrust law in 
the era of electronic commerce," Apple 
argued. 
 
The suit accuses Apple of thwarting 
competition by approving apps only if the 
developer agrees to let them be distributed 
exclusively through the App Store. 
The suit, filed in federal court in Oakland, 
California, seeks class action status. A lawyer 
pressing the case has said Apple could be on 
the hook for hundreds of millions of dollars. 
 
A federal appeals court let the suit go 
forward. The panel said Apple is serving as a 
distributor, selling directly to consumers 
through its App Store and pocketing part of 
the price of each app. 
 
The Supreme Court said in 1977 that only 
direct purchasers -- and not those who buy a 
product further downstream -- can sue under 
federal antitrust law. The court said that rule 
was necessary to avoid "duplicative 
recoveries." 
 
The lawyers pressing the case say the 
consumers who filed the lawsuit meet that 
test. They "are undoubtedly the first party in 
the distribution chain to buy from the 
monopolist," the group said in court papers. 
 
Apple said it ultimately charges the 
commission to the developers, making 
consumers "indirect purchasers" who are 
precluded under the 1977 ruling from suing. 
The appeals court "expressly opened the door 
to duplicative recoveries by different plaintiff 
groups," Apple argued. 
 
Apple credited the App Store and with 
helping create a "dynamic new industry." In 
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2016 alone, developers earned more than $20 
billion through the App Store, which offers 
more than 2 million apps to consumers, the 
company said. 
The court will hear arguments and rule in the 
nine-month term that starts in October. The 
case is Apple v. Pepper, 17-204. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 295 
“Trump Administration Backs Apple in Supreme Court Antitrust Suit Over Apps” 
 
 
The National Law Journal 
 
Marcia Coyle 
May 9, 2018  
 
The Trump administration’s U.S. 
Department of Justice is urging the U.S. 
Supreme Court to reverse a federal appellate 
court decision that would allow an antitrust 
class action to go forward against Apple Inc., 
exposing the company to treble damages for 
its alleged monopoly of the market for iPhone 
apps. 
U.S. Solicitor General Noel Francisco, in an 
amicus brief, said the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit misapplied a 40-year-
old Supreme Court decision when it held last 
year that Apple was a distributor of iPhone 
apps, selling them directly to purchasers 
through its App Store. The Justice 
Department filed its brief at the invitation of 
the justices for the government’s views in the 
case Apple v. Pepper. 
Francisco warned that how courts view 
Apple’s app business model—an agency or 
consignment sales model—”will 
significantly affect” private enforcement of 
federal antitrust law “because other existing 
and emerging e-commerce platforms use 
similar models.” 
In urging the justices to grant review and 
reverse the Ninth Circuit, the Justice 
Department wrote: 
“The importance of the question 
presented will only grow as 
commerce continues to move online. 
The Ninth Circuit is home to a 
disproportionate share of the nation’s 
e-commerce companies, and its 
erroneous decision creates 
uncertainty and a lack of uniformity 
about the proper application of 
Section 4 to this increasingly 
common business model. This court 
should grant certiorari and correct the 
Ninth Circuit’s error.” 
The high court case stems from an antitrust 
class action brought under the Sherman Act 
on behalf of those who purchased software 
applications from Apple’s online store for 
use of their iPhones from Dec. 29, 2007, to 
the present. The consumer class claims that 
Apple illegally monopolized the distribution 
of iPhone apps, and that the commissions 
charged to app developers inflate the prices 
consumers ultimately pay for apps. 
At the center of the case is Apple’s method of 
connecting app developers to those who 
purchase the apps. 
After the launch of the iPhone, Apple created 
the App Store, an electronic portal through 
which consumers could buy and download 
apps. Apple earns 30 percent of every third-
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party app sold through its store and the app 
developer retains 70 percent. Payment for an 
app goes to the App Store which, in turn, 
credits the developer with the 70 percent 
share. 
In the 1977 case Illinois Brick v. Illinois, the 
Supreme Court ruled that consumer antitrust 
lawsuits could be brought only against the 
party that represents the final point of sale of 
the good or service in question. Plaintiffs 
cannot state a claim for treble damages, 
according to the Supreme Court, by relying 
on a “pass-on theory”—where a defendant 
unlawfully overcharged a third party and the 
third party passed on all or part of the 
overcharge to the plaintiff. 
Purchasers of apps are “indirect” purchasers, 
according to Francisco. “To prove damages, 
respondents would need to establish the 
extent to which Apple’s allegedly unlawful 
practices have caused developers to set 
higher prices for their apps than they 
otherwise would have,” argued Francisco. 
“That is precisely the pass-on inquiry this 
court has disapproved.” 
Latham & Watkins partner Daniel Wall, 
representing Apple, argued the Ninth Circuit 
“has approached this case as if all commerce 
fits the traditional resale distribution model, 
where the party who delivers goods is also the 
party who sets the price the consumer pays. 
But increasingly this is a world of electronic 
commerce based on electronic marketplaces 
that—like Apple’s App Store—are structured 
around an agency or consignment sales 
model where the marketplace sponsor has 
nothing to do with the pricing of the goods it 
sells.” 
Wall cited as examples of agency-based 
electronic marketplaces StubHub, eBay, 
Google Play marketplace, Amazon.com 
Inc.’s “Amazon Marketplace” business and 
Facebook’s “Marketplace.” 
Representing Robert Pepper and the 
consumer class, Mark Rifkin of New York’s 
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, 
wrote in opposition to review that Apple is 
not seeking to correct a misapplication 
of Illinois Brick but to change the law. 
“The price paid by purchasers for an app is 
the amount set by the apps developer, plus 
Apple’s own supra-competitive 30 percent 
markup, both of which are paid directly to 
Apple, the alleged monopolist, every time an 
app is purchased,” Rifkin told the justices. He 
added: “The apps developers do not sell their 
apps to iPhone customers or collect any 
payment from iPhone customers, and iPhone 
customers are the only purchasers in the 
entire chain of distribution. Respondents seek 
damages based solely on the 30 percent 
markup.” 
Apple, Rifkin argued, wants the justices to 
“jettison the straightforward direct purchaser 
requirement of Illinois Brick and replace it 
with a new ‘antecedent transaction’ analysis, 
an approach to antitrust standing that finds no 
support in this court’s precedent, would 
invite the same factual complications and 
speculation on damages that the bright-line 
standing test of Illinois Brick seeks to avoid, 
and would often leave nobody with standing 
to sue a monopolist (as would be the case 
here).” 
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The Washington Legal Foundation and the 
App Association have filed amicus briefs 
supporting Apple’s petition for review. 
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 “The Supreme Court Will Decide If Apple’s App Store Is A Monopoly” 
 
 
Wired 
 
Louise Matsakis 
June 18, 2018 
 
HAS APPLE MONOPOLIZED the 
market for iPhone apps? That's the question 
at the heart of Apple Inc. v. Pepper, a case the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear Monday, 
which could have wide-reaching implications 
for consumers as well as other companies like 
Amazon. The dispute is over whether Apple, 
by charging app developers a 30 percent 
commission fee and only allowing iOS apps 
to be sold through its own store, has inflated 
the price of iPhone apps. Apple, supported by 
the Trump administration, argues that the 
plaintiffs in the case—iPhone consumers—
don't have the right to sue under current 
antitrust laws in the US. 
The case marks a rare instance in which the 
court has agreed not only to hear an antitrust 
case, but also one where no current 
disagreement exists in the circuit courts. The 
outcome could change decades of antitrust 
legal precedent—either strengthening or 
weakening consumer protections against 
monopolistic power. The case also represents 
a huge source of revenue for Apple; the 
company raked in an estimated $11 
billion last year in App Store commissions 
alone. 
The Illinois Brick Doctrine 
At the core of the lawsuit is another Supreme 
Court case from 1977, Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, which established what is known as 
the Illinois Brick Doctrine. That rule says you 
can't sue for antitrust damages if you're not 
the direct purchaser of a good or service. If I 
have a monopoly on bread and the local deli 
sells you a sandwich, you can't sue me. It's 
just too hard to figure out how much of your 
sandwich price was inflated due to my illegal 
activity. 
Here's where things get complicated. Apple 
isn't buying apps from developers and then 
reselling them to consumers. It merely 
charges a 30 percent commission fee, and 
only makes them available in its own App 
Store. Because of that, Apple argues that it's 
protected from antitrust lawsuits lodged by 
consumers because it's not the direct seller, 
the developers are. It views the App Store 
like a mall; it's merely charging developers 
rent to sell in it. 
"Apple is trying to argue that the consumers 
don't have the standing to sue here because 
the app developers set the price," says 
Sandeep Vaheesan, an antitrust lawyer at the 
Open Markets Institute, a nonprofit that 
advocates against monopolistic power. 
"What the consumers are really upset at is 
how the apps are being priced by 
developers." 
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But the plaintiffs in the suit argue that Apple 
monopolized the distribution of the apps, not 
the apps themselves. In a world where app 
stores could actually compete for developers' 
products, the commission rates might be 
lower, resulting in lower-priced apps. This 
plays out on Android already; the majority of 
app downloads go through the Google Play 
Store, but users can also go to the Amazon 
Appstore for occasionally discounted apps, 
or F-Droid for exclusively open source apps. 
By comparison, Apple is less like a mall, and 
more like the only store in town. iOS app 
developers have to abide by Apple's lengthy 
guidelines if they want to sell their products 
to iPhone consumers and the company can 
exclusively decide when it doesn't want 
certain apps on its phones. 
"On the face of it, I certainly think [the 
plaintiffs] have got a strong case. Whether it's 
a winning case, I don't know yet," says John 
Lopatka, an antitrust professor at Penn State 
Law School and the author of Federal 
Antitrust Law and The Microsoft Case: 
Antitrust, High Technology, and Consumer 
Welfare. "If they lose, it's because the court is 
going to want to change to some extent just 
what this Illinois Brick rule is." Apple did not 
return a request for comment. 
What Happens If Apple Wins? 
In 2013, a district court in California initially 
sided with Apple, agreeing that the tech giant 
was shielded by the Illinois Brick Doctrine. 
But the plaintiffs appealed to the 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower 
court's opinion last year. Now, in a somewhat 
surprising decision, the Supreme Court will 
hear the case. 
Typically, the Supreme Court looks for 
disagreement between the lower courts when 
deciding to take up a case, but here none 
currently exists. "It's unusual to take this one 
because there's no pressing and strong circuit 
split on the issue," Lopatka says. 
The case that most closely addresses the same 
issues is from nearly 20 years ago, when the 
8th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a 
lawsuit brought by concertgoers against 
Ticketmaster. The court ruled that 
concertgoers weren't the direct purchaser, the 
venues were. It agreed that Ticketmaster was 
just a ticket marketplace, rather than a 
distribution monopoly. 
This time, though, the highest court could 
rule that Apple is, in fact, a distribution 
monopoly. A ruling in the plaintiffs' favor 
could have serious implications for other tech 
companies with similar business models, like 
Amazon, which sells a wide range of 
products from third-party companies. And it 
could make it harder for them to argue that 
they're merely neutral intermediaries. That 
means the Illinois Brick Doctrine might get 
squashed, or significantly altered. 
The case is "really significant for platforms in 
general," says Vaheesan. "Platforms and 
other intermediators that rely on a 
commission-based model might be able to 
avoid antitrust liability in the form of 
lawsuits" if Apple wins. 
But even if Apple loses, the plaintiffs still 
face a long, uphill battle. A favorable ruling 
from the Supreme Court would allow the suit 
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to go to trial, but it may get settled out of 
court before that even happens. In trial, the 
plaintiffs would have to face a host of other 
issues in order to successfully argue that 
Apple's App Store really constitutes a 
monopoly. For example, consumers can buy 
other kinds of smartphones aside from 
iPhones, which come with access to other app 
stores. 
"Apple created the iPhone, Apple created the 
entity that can use apps, has it monopolized 
anything?" Lopatka says. "Is it fair to say that 
there is a market in Apple apps, when you can 
get a Samsung phone or lots of other phones 
and get different apps? That would be an 
issue." 
If Apple wins, though, consumers would 
continue to have one less avenue to legally 
fight back against increasingly powerful 
technology corporations. 
"This would just be another thumb on the 
scale in favor of corporate defendants and 
against antitrust plaintiffs," Vaheesan says. 
"It would mean that the DOJ and the FTC 
would have to do more to compensate for the 
reduced private enforcement." 
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 “What happens if Apple loses its Supreme Court App Store antitrust appeal?” 
 
 
The Verge 
 
Adi Robertson 
June 20, 2018   
 
Earlier this week, the Supreme Court 
officially picked up the long-running antitrust 
case Apple v. Pepper. The court will decide 
whether iPhone users can sue Apple for 
locking down the iOS ecosystem, something 
the suit’s plaintiffs say is creating an anti-
competitive monopoly. 
Apple v. Pepper could theoretically affect 
how tech companies can build walled 
gardens around their products. The Supreme 
Court isn’t going to make a call on 
that specific issue, but its decision could 
affect people’s relationship with all kinds of 
digital platforms. Here’s what’s at stake 
when the Supreme Court case starts, which 
should happen sometime in the next year. 
WHAT IS APPLE V. PEPPER? 
Apple Inc. v. Robert Pepper is the latest salvo 
in a legal fight over Apple’s iOS App Store. 
A group of iPhone buyers are claiming that 
Apple’s locked-down ecosystem artificially 
inflates the prices of apps because all 
developers must go through a single store that 
takes a cut of their revenue. The buyers argue 
that Apple has established an unlawful 
monopoly over iOS apps, and they’re asking 
the courts to make Apple allow third-party 
iOS apps, in addition to repaying every iOS 
user it’s overcharged in the past. 
HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
Apple v. Pepper began as a broader antitrust 
complaint in 2011. Robert Pepper and three 
other iPhone owners claimed that Apple had 
stifled competition and driven up prices on its 
iPhone — partly by locking out third-party 
apps and partly by signing a five-year 
exclusivity deal with AT&T. A court struck 
the latter claim in 2013. Since then, the class 
action case has focused purely on the App 
Store. 
 In 2014, Apple won a judgment against 
Pepper, and the complaint was dismissed. 
But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed that decision in early 2017, allowing 
the case to move forward. Now, Apple is 
petitioning the Supreme Court to throw it out 
again. 
WHAT’S THE ACTUAL 
ARGUMENT? 
The central dispute is relatively simple: 
Apple only allows iOS users to install apps 
through its App Store. Any third-party stores 
require jailbreaking your phone and voiding 
the warranty. Apple also takes a 30 percent 
commission on apps that are sold through the 
App Store. Pepper’s complaint concludes 
that developers are logically passing that cost 
along to consumers. 
The complaint says that iPhone users have 
paid “hundreds of millions of dollars more” 
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for apps “than they would have paid in a 
competitive market.” That’s a claim that 
could be challenged in court, but there are 
real-world examples of apps passing costs to 
customers. Spotify, for instance, charged 
iTunes subscribers a higher fee before simply 
disabling that payment option. 
Apple denies the claim that its closed 
ecosystem is an unlawful monopoly. It says 
users can buy apps on other platforms, and 
that by definition, opening the App Store in 
2008 created new competitive opportunities. 
But courts haven’t made a call on this 
argument yet. Instead, they’ve focused on 
whether iPhone users can sue Apple at all. 
In 1977, the Supreme Court established 
what’s known as the Illinois Brick doctrine, 
which says that “indirect purchasers” can’t 
sue a company for antitrust damages. 
Pepper’s lawsuit portrays Apple as directly 
selling iOS apps to users at a markup. But 
Apple claims that iOS users are essentially 
buying apps from developers, who are buying 
Apple’s software distribution services, which 
would make developers the only direct 
purchasers with the right to sue Apple. 
If Apple convinces the Supreme Court that 
this is correct, it doesn’t even have to worry 
about the monopoly question. Sure, a 
developer could sue the company later, but 
developers have a strong incentive to stay 
friendly with Apple — and they actually 
benefit from iOS’s locked-down, piracy-
unfriendly system. 
IS APPLE TECHNICALLY 
SELLING APPS TO USERS? 
Yes, according to the 2017 ruling that Apple 
is appealing. The Ninth Circuit appeals court 
disregarded Apple’s arguments — like the 
fact that it’s taking a commission from 
developers rather than adding a fee to user 
transactions — as hair-splitting. It 
determined that regardless of who’s making 
the apps or setting the exact prices, Apple is 
acting as a distributor, which gives it a direct 
relationship with its customers. 
But a lower court didn’t agree with that 
interpretation, and there’s no guarantee the 
Supreme Court will either. 
SO... WHAT DOES HAPPEN IF 
APPLE LOSES? 
Nothing — yet. If a court rules that Apple has 
an unlawful monopoly, it could require Apple 
to pay out hundreds of millions of dollars or 
even change its App Store model. If the 
Supreme Court upholds the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, though, it will just send the case 
back to a lower court, where the fight will 
keep going. 
But the decision will also affect how much 
power consumers have over digital 
platforms. In 1998, a major appeals court 
ruling shot down concertgoers who sued 
Ticketmaster for driving up ticket prices, 
saying that Ticketmaster was actually selling 
distribution services to concert venues. The 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion explicitly says that 
decision was wrong. So a favorable Supreme 
Court ruling wouldn’t just keep this 
particular lawsuit alive. It could make other 
powerful online stores — or, in Reuters’ less-
charitable estimation, “toll-keepers” — more 
accountable toward their users.
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“9th Circuit Apple antitrust ruling splits with 8th, is boon to consumers” 
 
 
Reuters 
 
Alison Frankel 
January 13, 2017 
 
If music fans want to see a show at a major 
concert venue, they have just about no choice 
but to buy tickets through Ticketmaster, 
which has exclusive ticket distribution 
contracts with virtually every concert 
promoter in the country. Similarly, if iPhone 
owners want to purchase an app, they must 
buy through Apple’s App Store. Apple 
doesn’t allow app developers to sell iPhone 
apps through any other platform. 
Ticketmaster and Apple are the toll-keepers 
of their markets. 
 
Consumers don’t much like paying tolls. 
Both Ticketmaster and Apple were sued in 
antitrust class actions accusing them of 
taking advantage of their distribution 
strangleholds, Ticketmaster back in the 
1990s and Apple in 2011. In 1998, the 8th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed 
concertgoers’ antitrust claims in Campos v. 
Ticketmaster. But on Thursday, the 9th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that iPhone 
app buyers can proceed - despite the 8th 
Circuit’s Ticketmaster decision and parallels 
in consumer claims against the two 
companies. 
 
The 9th Circuit split with the 8th on the 
dispositive question of whether consumers 
are direct or indirect purchasers of the 
distribution services Ticketmaster and Apple 
provide. As you probably know, that’s a 
critical difference in antitrust cases. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held - first in 
1968’s Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe and 
then, more famously, in 1977’s Illinois Brick 
v. State of Illinois - that purchasers at the end 
of a tainted supply chain can’t bring antitrust 
claims against a monopolist because it’s too 
hard for courts to figure out what portion of 
the product’s ultimate cost is attributable to 
illegal conduct. Under the court’s so-called 
Illinois Brick precedent, only direct 
purchasers have standing to sue monopolists. 
In the sort of classic manufacturing supply 
chains at issue in Hanover Shoe, which 
involved allegedly inflated lease prices for 
shoemaking equipment, and Illinois Brick, in 
which the state claimed masonry contractors 
passed along inflated charges for concrete 
blocks, it’s easy to discern a bright line 
between direct and indirect purchasers. The 
split between the 8th and 9th Circuits in the 
Ticketmaster and Apple cases shows how the 
line blurs when the alleged monopolist is 
selling a service instead of a tangible product. 
 
The 8th Circuit majority in Ticketmaster 
found concertgoers to be indirect purchasers 
who were forced to use the company’s 
services only because Ticketmaster first 
pushed concert venues into exclusive ticket 
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distribution contracts. “Such derivative 
dealing is the essence of indirect purchaser 
status,” the majority said. “The plaintiffs’ 
inability to obtain ticket delivery services in 
a competitive market is simply the 
consequence of the antecedent inability of 
venues to do so.” 
 
In a dissent, Judge Morris Arnold suggested 
his colleagues weren’t paying attention to 
Ticketmaster’s real product: not tickets but 
ticket distribution services. “Ticketmaster 
supplies the product directly to concert-
goers; it does not supply it first to venue 
operators who in turn supply it to 
concertgoers,” Arnold wrote. “It is 
immaterial that Ticketmaster would not be 
supplying the service but for its antecedent 
agreement with the venues. But it is quite 
relevant that the antecedent agreement was 
not one in which the venues bought some 
product from Ticketmaster in order to resell 
it to concertgoers.” 
 
The 9th Circuit’s Apple opinion, written by 
Judge William Fletcher for a panel that also 
included Judge Wallace Tashima and U.S. 
District Judge Robert Gettleman of Chicago, 
sitting by designation, said the Ticketmaster 
dissent was right. In selling iPhone apps, 
Apple is not an ordinary manufacturer or 
producer, the opinion said. It is a distributor, 
selling apps directly to consumers through 
the App Store. 
 
The 9th Circuit insisted on figuring out the 
essential relationship between Apple and app 
purchasers instead of taking the easy way out 
by basing its ruling on the mere fact that 
consumers pay the App Store for purchases. 
“Whether a purchase is direct or indirect does 
not turn on the formalities of payment or 
bookkeeping arrangements,” the opinion 
said. “The key to the analysis is the function 
Apple serves rather than the manner in which 
it receives compensation for performing that 
function.” 
 
Apple’s lawyers at Latham & Watkins had 
argued that the company is indeed a 
distributor, but that its customers are app 
developers, not the consumers who buy apps. 
It compared itself to a shopping mall owner 
that leases space to stores, but the 9th Circuit 
disputed Apple’s brick-and-mortar analogy. 
“Third-party developers of iPhone apps do 
not have their own ‘stores,’” the opinion said 
“Indeed, part of the anti-competitive 
behavior alleged by plaintiffs is that, far from 
allowing iPhone app developers to sell 
through their own ‘stores,’ Apple specifically 
forbids them to do so, instead requiring them 
to sell iPhone apps only through Apple’s App 
Store.” 
 
It seems to me the 9th Circuit’s reasoning 
could be problematic for other tech 
companies that could be defined as 
distributors. I expect amici to weigh in if 
Apple asks for en banc reconsideration. 
 
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & 
Herz represented plaintiffs in the iPhone 
case. Apple declined a Reuters request for 
comment on the 9th Circuit opinion. 
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Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido  
 
Ruling Below: John Guido; Dennis Rankin v. Mount Lemmon Fire District, 859 F.3d 1168 (9th 
Cir. 2017) 
 
Overview: Mount Lemmon Fire District fired two of their captains who were the oldest 
employees, John Guido and Dennis Rankin, under the guise of budget cuts. Guido and Rankin 
were terminated supposedly not because of their age, rather because they failed to participate in 
volunteer wildland assignments.  
 
Issue: Whether, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the same 20-employee 
minimum that applies to private employers also applies to political subdivisions of a state, as the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th Circuits have held, or whether the ADEA 
applies instead to all state political subdivisions of any size, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
9th Circuit held in this case. 
John Guido; Dennis Rankin, Plaintiffs- Appellants, 
v. 
Mount Lemmon Fire District, Defendant-Appellee  
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on June 19, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
O’Scannlain, Circuit Judge:  
 
We must decide whether the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
applies to a political subdivision of Arizona. 
 
I 
 
John Guido and Dennis Rankin were 
both hired in 2000 byMount Lemmon Fire 
District, a political subdivision of the State of 
Arizona. Guido and Rankin served as full-
time firefighter Captains. They were the two 
oldest full-time employees at the Fire District 
when they were terminated on June 15, 2009, 
Guido at forty-six years of age and Rankin at 
fifty-four.  
 
Guido and Rankin subsequently filed 
charges of age discrimination against the Fire 
District with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which 
issued separate favorable rulings for each, 
finding reasonable cause to believe the Fire 
District violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 
(“ADEA”). They then filed this suit for age 
discrimination against the Fire District in 
April 2013.  
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The district court granted the Fire 
District’s motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that it was not an “employer” 
within the meaning of the ADEA. 
 
Guido and Rankin timely appealed.  
 
II 
 
Guido and Rankin challenge the 
district court’s conclusion that the Fire 
District was not an “employer” within the 
meaning of the ADEA.  
 
A 
 
The ADEA applies only to an 
“employer.” Under 29 U.S.C. § 630(b): 
 
The term “employer” means a person 
engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has twenty or more 
employees for each working day in 
each of twenty or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year . . . . The term also 
means (1) any agent of such a person, 
and (2) a State or political subdivision 
of a State and any agency or 
instrumentality of a State or a 
political subdivision of a State, and 
any interstate agency, but such term 
does not include the United States, or 
a corporation wholly owned by the 
Government of the United States. 
 
Under § 630(a): 
 
The term “person” means one or more 
individuals, partnerships, 
associations, labor organizations, 
corporations, business trusts, legal 
representatives, or any organized 
groups of persons. 
 
The parties agree that the twenty-
employee minimum applies to “a person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce” 
and that the term “person” does not include a 
political subdivision of a State. However, 
they dispute whether the twenty-employee 
minimum also applies to a “political 
subdivision of a State.” § 630(b). 
 
B 
 
Congress passed the ADEA to protect 
older workers from “arbitrary age 
discrimination in employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 
621(b). The statute originally applied only to 
private-sector employers. See Special 
Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, 
Improving the Age Discrimination Law 11 
(1973) (the “Senate Age Discrimination 
Report”). Congress amended the ADEA in 
1974 to extend coverage to States, political 
subdivisions of States, and other State-related 
entities by adding a second sentence to § 
630(b). Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55 
(1974) (the “1974 ADEA Amendment”). 
 
1 
 
Guido and Rankin contend that § 
630(b) is not ambiguous and applies to the 
Fire District. They assert that its plain 
meaning creates distinct categories of 
“employers” and that the Fire District fits 
within one of them. See Young v. Sedgwick 
County, 660 F. Supp. 918, 924 (D. Kan. 
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1987); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 
226, 233 (1983) (“In 1974, Congress 
extended the substantive prohibitions of the 
[ADEA] to employers having at least 20 
workers, and to the Federal and State 
Governments.” (emphasis added)). Section 
630(b), they argue, is deconstructed as 
follows: The term “employer” means [A—
person] and also means (1) [B—agent of 
person] and (2) [C—State-affiliated entities]. 
 
They note that each of the three 
“employer” categories is then further 
defined. For example, the “person” category 
is elaborated upon in § 630(a), which 
provides multiple definitions of the term 
“person” and then narrows the category to 
those persons “engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has twenty or more 
employees for each working day.”  The 
“State-affiliated entities” category lists the 
various types of State-affiliated entities 
covered, such as a “political subdivision of a 
State,” and also contains clarifying language. 
 
a 
 
They argue that the ordinary meaning 
of “also” supports the notion that there are 
three distinct categories. See Crawford v. 
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 
555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009). We agree. The 
word “also” is a term of enhancement; it 
means “in addition; besides” and “likewise; 
too.” E.g., Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary 34 (1973). As used in this context, 
“also” adds another definition to a previous 
definition of a term—it does not clarify the 
previous definition. See Holloway v. Water 
Works & Sewer Bd. of Town of Vernon, 24 
F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1117 (N.D. Ala. 2014) 
(concluding the twenty-employee limitation 
should not be imported into the definition of 
employer covering political subdivisions of a 
state); see also Johnson v. Mayor & City 
Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 356 
(1985) (“[I]n 1974 Congress extended 
coverage to Federal, State, and local 
Governments, and to employers with at least 
20 workers.” (emphasis added)). 
 
For example, imagine someone 
saying: “The password can be an even 
number. The password can also be an odd 
number greater than one hundred.” These are 
two separate definitions of what an 
acceptable password can be, and the 
clarifying language does not apply to both 
definitions. If the sentences are reversed, the 
“greater than one hundred” limiting language 
would still not carry over to the second 
sentence discussing even numbers. See 
Holloway, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1117. This 
becomes more obvious when it would be 
illogical to carry clarifying language over. If 
a statute said “The word bank means ‘the 
rising ground bordering a lake, river, or sea’ 
and the word also means ‘a place where 
something is held available,’” the second 
definition would not be describing a place 
that must border a lake, river, or sea. 
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/ dictionary/bank. The phrase 
“also means” indicates that a second, 
additional definition is being described. See 
§ 630(b) (using the phrase “also means”). 
 
b 
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The EEOC, as amicus curiae, 
expressing its views in support of Guido and 
Rankin, contends that the English language 
provided Congress many ways to apply 
clarifying language across multiple 
definitions of a term, had it wanted to. The 
EEOC cites the 1972 amendment to Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as an example 
(the “1972 Title VII Amendment”). This 
amendment extended Title VII protections to 
States and State-related entities, including 
political subdivisions of a State. Pub. L. 92-
261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e). The EEOC emphasizes that the 
1972 Title VII Amendment used language 
making clear that the twenty-employee 
minimum applied to political subdivisions, 
stating: 
 
(a) The term “person” includes one or 
more individuals, governments, 
governmental agencies, political 
subdivisions, labor unions, 
partnerships, associations, 
corporations, legal representatives, 
mutual companies, joint-stock 
companies, trusts, unincorporated 
organizations, trustees, trustees in 
cases under Title 11, or receivers. 
 
(b) The term “employer” means a 
person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen 
or more employees . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (emphasis added). The 
EEOC argues that Congress knew how to use 
language to ensure that an employee 
minimum applied to political subdivisions 
when it wanted. Congress could have also 
added the limiting language to each 
definition discussed in § 630(b), or at least to 
the definition covering political subdivisions, 
but it chose not to. 
 
2 
 
In the face of such a strong textual 
argument, the Fire District has a powerful 
rebuttal: four other circuits have considered 
this issue and all have declared § 630(b) to be 
ambiguous. Cink v. Grant County, 635 F. 
App’x 470, 474 n.5 (10th Cir. 2015); Palmer 
v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d 
892, 896 (8th Cir. 1998); E.E.O.C. v. 
Monclova Twp., 920 F.2d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 
1990); Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 
F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir. 1986). Cink, Palmer, 
and Monclova Township all rely entirely on 
Kelly’s reasoning regarding the statute’s 
ambiguity. 
 
The Seventh Circuit in Kelly 
concluded the statute was ambiguous. While 
acknowledging that the categorical reading 
was a reasonable one, it concluded the 
plaintiff “weaken[ed] his argument that the 
statute is unambiguous by arguing that we 
should look at ‘common sense’ and 
congressional intent in deciding that the 
statute is unambiguous.” 801 F.2d at 270. It 
is not clear to us why an appeal to “common 
sense” undermines this argument. Further, 
any appeal to congressional intent is a non-
sequitur; it is not a factor that should affect 
the determination of whether a statute’s plain 
meaning is ambiguous. See Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 391 (2012). 
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The Kelly opinion further supports its 
conclusion by stating that the defendant 
presented a reasonable alternative 
construction: 
 
More significantly, the Park District 
enunciates another fair and 
reasonable interpretation of section 
630(b)—that Congress, in amending 
section 630(b), merely intended to 
make it clear that states and their 
political subdivisions are to be 
included in the definition of 
‘employer,’ as opposed to being a 
separate definition of employer. 
 
Id. at 270–71. Since the alternative reading 
was also deemed reasonable, the court 
concluded the statute was ambiguous. Id. at 
270. 
 
A serious problem with the 
alternative interpretation argument, however; 
is that the court in Kelly never explained how 
it is a “fair and reasonable interpretation” of 
the statute’s actual language. A statute must 
be “susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation” to be ambiguous. Alaska 
Wilderness League v. E.P.A., 727 F.3d 934, 
938 (9th Cir. 2013). But, declaring that 
multiple reasonable interpretations exist does 
not make it so. None of the cases cited by the 
Fire District elaborate on how and why this 
alternative interpretation is a reasonable 
one—they simply declare it so. 
 
As a matter of plain meaning, the 
argument that § 630(b) can be reasonably 
interpreted to include its second sentence 
definitions within its first is underwhelming. 
If Congress had wanted to include the second 
sentence definitions of employer in the first 
sentence, it could have used the word 
“include” or utilized one of the other 
alternative constructions described above. 
The word “also” is not used in common 
speech to mean “includes.” Webster’s New 
Collegiate Dictionary 34 (1973). As 
previously described, the use of separate 
sentences and the word “also” combine to 
create distinct categories, in which clarifying 
language for one category does not apply to 
other categories. See United States v. Rentz, 
777 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(“[U]ntil a clue emerges suggesting 
otherwise, it’s not unreasonable to think that 
Congress used the English language 
according to its conventions.”). Even the 
Supreme Court defaults into the categorical 
approach when discussing the statute. E.g., 
Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 233; Johnson, 472 U.S. 
at 356. 
 
3 
 
We are persuaded that the meaning of 
§ 630(b) is not ambiguous. The twenty-
employee minimum does not apply to 
definitions in the second sentence and there 
is no reason to depart from the statute’s plain 
meaning. See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 
534 (2004) (“It is well established that when 
the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not 
absurd—is to enforce it according to its 
terms.”). We are satisfied that our reading 
comports with Lamie and certainly does not 
threaten to destroy the entire statutory 
scheme. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 
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2495 (2015) (preventing the destruction of 
the statutory scheme may justify departing 
from “the most natural reading of the 
pertinent statutory phrase”). Courts should 
rarely depart from a statute’s clear meaning 
because it risks creating a perception that 
they are inserting their own policy 
preferences into a law. See id. at 2495–96 
(citing Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 
83 (1939)). Here, there is no valid 
justification to depart from the plain meaning 
of the language and to adopt another 
interpretation. 
 
C 
 
Even if we agreed with the Fire 
District and concluded that the statute is 
ambiguous—which we do not—the outcome 
would not change. The best reading of the 
statute would be that the twenty-employee 
minimum does not apply to a political 
subdivision of a State. We reject the Fire 
District’s contention that considering the 
legislative history Kelly reviewed should lead 
us to an alternative interpretation. 
 
After concluding that the statute is 
ambiguous, Kelly relied on “the parallel 
[1972] amendment of Title VII” and the 
legislative history around the 1974 
Amendment to conclude “that Congress 
intended section 630(b) to apply the same 
coverage to both public and private 
employees.” 801 F.2d at 271–72. Kelly’s 
focus on divining congressional intent, rather 
than determining the ordinary meaning of the 
text, led it astray. See Meacham v. Knolls 
Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 102 (2008) 
(“We have to read [the ADEA] the way 
Congress wrote it.”); Scalia & Garner, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 391 (critiquing those who think “that 
the purpose of interpretation is to discover 
intent”). We need not read minds to read text. 
 
Both parties argue that the 1972 Title 
VII Amendment supports their position. But, 
critically, Congress used different language 
than it used in the 1974 ADEA Amendment, 
which changes the ADEA’s meaning relative 
to Title VII, and such Congressional choice 
must be respected. See Univ. of Tex. SW Med. 
Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528–29 
(2013). If Congress had wanted the 1974 
ADEA Amendment to achieve the same 
result as the 1972 Title VII Amendment, it 
could have used the same language. 
 
Nor does the legislative history Kelly 
relies on address the specific question before 
us. Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271–72. It references a 
Senate report written a year before the bill 
was passed discussing how the same set of 
rules should apply to the private sector and 
the government. Id. (citing Senate Age 
Discrimination Report at 17). The Senate 
report never states that the twenty-employee 
minimum should apply to political 
subdivisions, but it does “urge that the law be 
extended . . . to include (1) Federal, State, and 
local governmental employees, and (2) 
employers with 20 or more employees.” 
Senate Age Discrimination Report at 18 
(emphasis added). It also cites a House report 
containing the same vague language about 
ensuring the same rules apply and two floor 
statements by Senator Bentsen, one of which 
occurred in 1972, arguing that the 
amendment is needed so that government 
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employees receive the “same protection.” Id. 
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 93- 913 (1974); 118 
Cong. Rec. 15,895 (1972); 120 Cong. Rec. 
8768 (1974)). 
 
Eventually, the Kelly court resorted to 
arguing that given its perception of 
Congressional intent, Congress could not 
have intended what it said. 801 F.2d at 273 
(“We also believe that applying the ADEA to 
government employers with less than twenty 
employees would lead to some anomalous 
results which we do not believe Congress 
would have intended.”). However, there are 
plenty of perfectly valid reasons why 
Congress could have structured the statute 
the way it did.10 In any event, it is not our 
role to choose what we think is the best policy 
outcome and to override the plain meaning of 
a statute, apparent anomalies or not. See 
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. 
Ct. 2024, 2033 (2014). 
 
III 
 
The district court erred in concluding 
that the twentyemployee minimum applies to 
political subdivisions; it does not. Therefore, 
the order granting summary judgment is 
reversed and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
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“US Supreme Court to kick off next session with AZ age-discrimination case”  
 
 
Arizona Capitol Times  
 
Howard Fischer 
Jul 9, 2018   
 
The ability of a tiny Arizona fire district to 
fire its two oldest employees takes center 
stage in Washington as the U.S. Supreme 
Court will hear arguments the first day of its 
new session, possibly with a new justice 
already seated. 
 
In a brief order Monday, the court put the 
case of John Guido and Dennis Rankin and 
their case against the Mount Lemmon Fire 
District on the Oct. 1 agenda. What the 
justices rule will most immediately affect 
whether the pair, the district’s two oldest 
employees before they were let go, have a 
right to sue under federal age discrimination 
law. 
 
But whatever the high court decides clearly 
has broader implications, to the point that an 
alphabet soup of state and local government 
organizations and their allies filed their own 
legal brief telling the justices that they should 
side with the fire district and block the ability 
of the two fired workers to sue. 
 
That argument is getting a fight from Tucson 
attorney Don Awerkamp who hopes to 
convince the justices that his clients’ rights 
were violated and they deserve their day in 
court. 
 
The whole case turns on a single legal point: 
Can government employers be too small to 
have to comply with federal anti-
discrimination laws. 
 
Court records show the pair were hired in 
2000, eventually rising to the rank of full-
time fire captains. 
 
In 2009, with the district facing a financial 
shortfall, it terminated the pair. At the time, 
they were the district’s oldest employees, 
with Guido at 45 and Rankin at 54. 
 
Awerkamp said they were replaced as 
captains with two younger people, one them 
just 28 with only six years of experience as a 
firefighter. 
 
The district argued that the pair were laid off 
because they had not participated in recent 
years in voluntary shifts fighting wildland 
fires. The pair then sued. 
 
A trial judge threw out the claim, concluding 
the federal Age Discrimination Employment 
Act covers public employers only if they 
have 20 or more workers. But a federal 
appeals court reversed, saying while that’s 
true of private companies, it finds no such 
minimum number in statutes governing 
public employers. 
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That brought the case to the Supreme Court 
— and the attention of public employers 
nationwide who want the appellate ruling 
overturned. 
 
“Small public sector employers are 
particularly vulnerable, sometimes operating 
with only a handful of staff,” wrote attorney 
Collin O. Udell. Among the groups he is 
representing are the National Conference of 
State Legislatures, the National Association 
of Counties, the National League of Cities 
and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. 
 
The issue is particularly acute, he said, in 
rural special districts like this one. 
 
“There are fewer alternatives to layoffs and 
terminations when budget cuts must be 
made,” Udell wrote. 
 
“Small, rural special districts may not have 
other positions or locations to which they can 
transfer an employee in lieu of termination or 
layoffs,” he continued. “When resources are 
strained, already-leanly staffed special 
districts encountering employment 
discrimination lawsuits may find it 
impossible to remain financially viable.” 
 
Awerkamp called those arguments “incorrect 
and overblown.” 
 
He said most states have requirements that 
political subdivisions pay monetary damages 
if they discriminate on the basis of age. 
Awerkamp said that even includes rural and 
sparsely-populated places like Alaska and 
Wyoming which grant no exceptions to small 
public employers from their own age-
discrimination laws. 
 
“The fire district identifies no adverse 
consequences on those statutes,” he wrote. 
And Awerkamp said public employers can 
participate in insurance pools that cover the 
cost of discrimination lawsuits, so the burden 
does not fall on any one particular district. 
 
But Awerkamp urged the justices not to be 
swayed by arguments by the district and its 
legal allies of financial hardship. 
 
“It is important not to lose sight of what it 
actually seeks here — a free pass under 
federal law to discriminate on the basis of 
age,” he said. “No matter how blatant or 
unjustified its reliance on age, the first direct 
seeks immunity for inflicting on individual 
workers the economic and psychological 
injury accompanying the loss of opportunity 
to engage in productive and satisfying 
occupations.” 
 
Even if the court hears the case in early 
October, it is likely to be sometime in 2019 
before there is a ruling. 
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“Age Law Shield for State Workers Doesn’t Turn on Unit Size” 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Kevin McGowan 
 
June 19, 2017 
 
A federal statute prohibiting age bias in 
employment applies to an Arizona state fire 
district regardless of whether it had 20 
employees, a federal appeals court ruled 
(Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. , 2017 
BL 208360, 9th Cir., No. 15-15030, 6/19/17 
). 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s June 19 decision creates a split 
among the federal appeals courts by ruling 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s 
20-employee threshold for coverage applies 
only to private employers. 
A petition for U.S. Supreme Court review is 
“likely,” said Jeffrey Matura of Graif Barrett 
& Matura PC in Phoenix, who represented 
the fire district 
 The act’s “plain language” establishes that a 
state’s political subdivisions, such as the 
Mount Lemmon Fire District in Arizona, are 
covered by the ADEA regardless of how 
many workers they employ, the Ninth Circuit 
said. 
Four other federal appeals courts have ruled 
state political subdivisions must employ at 
least 20 workers to fall within the act’s 
purview. The Ninth Circuit is the only federal 
circuit to “interpret the relevant language 
differently,” Matura told Bloomberg BNA 
June 19. 
“It’s the classic circuit split,” Matura said. 
The fire district hasn’t made a final decision, 
but it likely will ask the Supreme Court to 
provide “clarity once and for all” on the 
ADEA coverage issue, he said. 
It’s “been a long road” for John Guido and 
Dennis Rankin, two captains who were 
terminated by the fire district in 2009 at ages 
46 and 54, respectively, said Shannon Giles 
of Awerkamp, Bonilla & Giles PLC in 
Tucson, Ariz., who represented them. 
Discovery in the lower court was completed 
before a district judge summarily ruled for 
Mount Lemmon based on his reading of the 
ADEA employee threshold, Giles told 
Bloomberg BNA June 19.  
Guido and Rankin hope the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision means a trial soon on their bias 
claims, she said. 
ADEA’s Meaning Is Clear, Court Says 
Three other federal appeals courts have 
followed the Seventh Circuit’s lead in Kelly 
v. Wauconda Park District, finding that the 
ADEA is “ambiguous.” Those courts said the 
better reading of the act is that Congress 
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intended the 20-employee threshold to apply 
to all employers, public as well as private.  
The Ninth Circuit, however, said there’s no 
ambiguity. The ADEA’s 1974 amendment 
can only be read as extending the act’s 
protections to all state government workers, 
regardless of the size of the unit in which they 
work, Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain wrote 
in an opinion joined by Judges Ronald M. 
Gould and Milan D. Smith Jr.  
The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, which filed an amicus brief 
supporting the fired firefighters, is “gratified” 
the court agreed with the commission that the 
ADEA covers all political subdivisions, even 
if they don’t have 20 employees, Anne Noel 
Occhialino, an EEOC senior appellate 
attorney, said in an email June 19. 
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“ADEA Applies To Small State Offices, Feds Tell High Court” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Branden Campbell 
July 13, 2018 
 
Federal bias law doesn’t give small state 
subdivisions a free pass to discriminate 
against older workers, the government said 
Thursday in a U.S. Supreme Court case that 
will clarify the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act’s scope. 
 
The government in an amicus brief urged the 
Supreme Court to uphold a Ninth Circuit 
ruling that a section of the ADEA barring 
“state or political subdivision[s]” from 
discriminating against older workers 
describes a different class of covered 
employer than a section limiting enforcement 
to only those private businesses with “twenty 
or more employees." 
 
That Congress in a 1974 amendment to the 
ADEA said the law, which originally covered 
only private businesses of a certain size, 
“also” covers state entities shows the 
categories are separate, the government said. 
 
“Because the ordinary meaning of ‘also’ is 
‘in addition to,’ the second sentence defines 
an additional category of covered 
employers—namely states and political 
subdivisions,” the government said. 
“Congress did not apply any minimum-
employee requirement to that category.” 
 
The ADEA bars “employers” from 
discriminating against workers or job 
applicants age 40 or older. In its current form, 
the law defines “employer” as a “person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce” 
that had “twenty or more employees” during 
much of the preceding calendar year. The law 
says employer “also means” states or 
political subdivisions. 
 
The high court in February agreed to hear a 
challenge by an Arizona firefighting service 
to a Ninth Circuit ruling reviving a suit by 
two fired workers. The Ninth Circuit said a 
district court incorrectly applied the 20-
worker minimum to the Mount Lemmon Fire 
District, a public office that had fewer than 
20 workers when the plaintiffs sued. 
 
The government’s brief argues the 
background of the 1974 amendment makes 
clear that Congress meant the ADEA to apply 
separately to public and private employers. It 
notes the ADEA shares “several key 
features” with the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
which Congress in the same 1974 package 
extended to public agencies regardless of 
their size. 
 
“Because the FLSA does not include a 
minimum-employee requirement, it is 
reasonable to infer that Congress similarly 
extended the ADEA to governmental entities 
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without imposing such a requirement,” the 
government said. 
 
The government also pushed back against 
Mount Lemmon’s argument that small 
government offices would be deluged with 
litigation should the high court rule the 
ADEA’s minimums don’t apply to state 
employers. It notes the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, 
which administers the ADEA, has said for 
decades that the law applies to government 
offices with fewer than 20 workers, and that 
most states have passed separate laws 
forbidding government employers of any size 
from discriminating against older workers. 
 
A coalition of worker groups led by 
the AARP also filed an amicus brief 
Thursday backing the workers and the Ninth 
Circuit. The groups argue the 1974 
amendment plainly applies to state offices of 
any size and distinguish the ADEA from Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act, which only 
applies to government offices if they have 15 
or more workers. The National Employment 
Lawyers Association is also on the brief. 
 
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP attorney 
Joshua Rosenkranz, who represents Mount 
Lemmon, said Friday neither brief 
"persuasively reconciles the result they 
advocate with the language and structure of 
the statute." 
 
"They don’t explain why Congress would 
have opted [in Title VII] to exempt small 
political subdivisions as to all 
antidiscrimination claims—for race, 
ethnicity, gender, etc.—but not for age," he 
said. "And neither grapples with the 
devastating effect the Ninth Circuit’s ruling 
will have on tiny political subdivisions that 
provide crucial government services." 
  
Representatives for the AARP Foundation 
and the U.S. Department of Justice declined 
comment.  
 
The government is represented by James Lee, 
Jennifer Goldstein, Anne Noel Occhialino, 
Noel Francisco, Jeffrey Wall and Morgan 
Goodspeed of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
The AARP is represented by Daniel 
Kohrman, Laurie McCann, Dara Smith and 
William Alvarado Rivera of the AARP 
Foundation. 
 
Mount Lemmon is represented by Jeffrey C. 
Matura and Amanda J. Taylor of 
Graif Barrett & Matura PC and Joshua 
Rosenkranz, Robert Loeb, Thomas Bondy, 
Ned Hirschfeld and Logan Dwyer of Orrick 
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. 
 
The workers are represented by Don 
Awerkamp and Shannon Giles of Awerkamp 
Bonilla & Giles PLC. 
 
The case is Mount Lemmon Fire District v. 
John Guido et al., case number 17-587, in the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
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Frank v. Gaos 
 
Ruling Below: IN RE GOOGLE REFERRER HEADER PRIVACY LITIGATION, 869 F.3d 737 
(9th Cir. 2017) 
 
Overview: The Cy Pres doctrine gives courts the power to interpret a will or a charitable gift to 
implement the giver’s intent when it is impossible to carry out the terms as they are written. The 
Cy Pres doctrine has recently been applied to distribute to charity the proceeds of a class-action 
settlement that have not been claimed by class members, usually because the award to each person 
is relatively small. Some object to the use of the Cy Press doctrine for class actions because 
unaffected entities—like charities and non-profits—would unfairly benefit.  
 
Issue: Whether, or in what circumstances, a cy pres award of class action proceeds that provides 
no direct relief to class members supports class certification and comports with the requirement 
that a settlement binding class members must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 
IN RE GOOGLE REFERRER HEADER PRIVACY LITIGATION, 
Paloma GAOS; Anthony Italiano; Gabriel Priyev, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, Plaintiffs- Appellees 
v. 
Melissa Ann Holyoak; Theodore H. Frank, Objectors–Appellants 
v. 
GOOGLE, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellees 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on August 22, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:  
 
Google’s free Internet search engine 
(“Google Search”) processes more than one 
billion user-generated search requests every 
day. This case arises from class action claims 
that Google violated users’ privacy by 
disclosing their Internet search terms to 
owners of third-party websites. We consider 
whether the district court abused its 
discretion in approving the $8.5 million cy 
pres–only settlement and conclude that it did 
not. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
In these consolidated class actions, 
three Google Search users—Paloma Gaos, 
Anthony Italiano, and Gabriel Priyev 
(collectively “plaintiffs”)—asserted claims 
for violation of the Stored Communications 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.; breach of 
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contract; breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing; breach of implied contract; 
and unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs sought 
statutory and punitive damages and 
declaratory and injunctive relief for the 
alleged privacy violations. 
 
The claimed privacy violations are 
the consequence of the browser architecture. 
Once users submit search terms to Google 
Search, it returns a list of relevant websites in 
a new webpage, the “search results page.” 
Users can then visit any website listed in the 
search results page by clicking on the 
provided link. 
 
When a user visits a website via 
Google Search, that website is allegedly 
privy to the search terms the user originally 
submitted to Google Search. This occurs 
because, for each search results page, Google 
Search generates a unique “Uniform 
Resource Locator” (“URL”) that includes the 
user’s search terms. In turn, every major 
desktop and mobile web browser (including 
Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, and 
Safari) by default reports the URL of the last 
webpage that the user viewed before clicking 
on the link to the current page as part of 
“referrer header” information. See In re 
Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1102 
(9th Cir. 2014) (explaining how “referrer 
headers” operate). 
 
The genesis of the plaintiffs’ 
complaints is the application of the search 
protocol, coupled with Google’s “Web 
History” service, which tracks and stores 
account holders’ browsing activity on 
Google’s servers. Following mediation, the 
parties reached a settlement, which they 
submitted to the district court for preliminary 
approval in July 2013. The settlement 
provided that Google would pay a total of 
$8.5 million and provide information on its 
website disclosing how users’ search terms 
are shared with third parties, in exchange for 
a release of the claims of the approximately 
129 million people who used Google Search 
in the United States between October 25, 
2006 and April 25, 2014 (the date the class 
was given notice of the settlement).  
 
Of the $8.5 million settlement fund, 
approximately $3.2 million was set aside for 
attorneys’ fees, administration costs, and 
incentive payments to the named plaintiffs. 
The remaining $5.3 million or so was 
allocated to six cy pres recipients, each of 
which would receive anywhere from 15 to 
21% of the money, provided that they agreed 
“to devote the funds to promote public 
awareness and education, and/or to support 
research, development, and initiatives, 
related to protecting privacy on the Internet.” 
The six recipients were AARP, Inc.; the 
Berkman Center for Internet and Society at 
Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon 
University; the Illinois Institute of 
Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Center for Information, Society and Policy; 
the Stanford Center for Internet and Society; 
and the World Privacy Forum. Each of the 
recipients submitted a detailed proposal for 
how the funds would be used to promote 
Internet privacy. 
 
After a hearing, the district court 
certified the class for settlement purposes and 
preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice 
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was given to the class on April 25, 2014, via 
a website, toll-free telephone number, paid 
banner ads, and press articles. Thirteen class 
members opted out of the settlement, and five 
class members, including Melissa Ann 
Holyoak and Theodore H. Frank (collectively 
“Objectors”), filed objections.  
 
Following a final settlement approval 
hearing at which the district court heard from 
both the parties and Objectors, the district 
court granted final approval of the settlement 
on March 31, 2015. With respect to the 
objections, the district court found that: (1) a 
cy pres–only settlement was appropriate 
because the settlement fund was 
nondistributable; (2) whether or not the 
settlement was cy pres– only had no bearing 
on whether Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority 
requirement was met; (3) the cy pres 
recipients had a substantial nexus to the 
interests of the class members, and there was 
no evidence that the parties’ preexisting 
relationships with the recipients factored into 
the selection process; and (4) the attorneys’ 
fees were commensurate with the benefit to 
the class. The district court awarded $2.125 
million in fees to class counsel and $15,000 
in incentive awards to the three named 
plaintiffs. Objectors appealed. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The settlement at issue involves a cy 
pres–only distribution of the $5.3 million or 
so that remains in the settlement fund after 
attorneys’ fees, administration costs, and 
incentive awards for the named plaintiffs are 
accounted for. Cy pres, which takes its name 
from the Norman French expression cy pres 
comme possible (or “as near as possible”), is 
an equitable doctrine that originated in trusts 
and estates law as a way to effectuate the 
testator’s intent in making charitable gifts. 
Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 
(9th Cir. 2011). In the class action settlement 
context, the cy pres doctrine permits a court 
to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable 
portions of a class action settlement fund to 
the “next best” class of beneficiaries for the 
indirect benefit of the class. Id. 
 
Here, the cy pres recipients were six 
organizations that have pledged to use the 
settlement funds to promote the protection of 
Internet privacy. We review for abuse of 
discretion the district court’s approval of the 
proposed class action settlement. Id. In 
addition, because the settlement took place 
before formal class certification, settlement 
approval requires a “higher standard of 
fairness.” Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 
811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hanlon v. 
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th 
Cir. 1998)), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. 
Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013). Recognizing that, 
at this early stage of litigation, the district 
court cannot as effectively monitor for 
collusion and other abuses, we scrutinize the 
proceedings to discern whether the court 
sufficiently “account[ed] for the possibility 
that class representatives and their counsel 
have sacrificed the interests of absent class 
members for their own benefit.” Id. 
 
I. Appropriateness of the Cy Pres–Only 
Settlement 
 
As an initial matter, we quickly 
dispose of the argument that the district court 
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erred by approving a cy pres–only settlement. 
Notably, Objectors do not contest the value 
of the settlement nor do they plead monetary 
injury. To be sure, cy pres–only settlements 
are considered the exception, not the rule. See 
Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 
468, 474 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that 
direct distributions to class members are 
preferable because “[t]he settlement-fund 
proceeds, having been generated by the value 
of the class members’ claims,” are “the 
property of the class”); accord William B. 
Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 
12:26 (5th ed. 2017). However, they are 
appropriate where the settlement fund is 
“non-distributable” because “the proof of 
individual claims would be burdensome or 
distribution of damages costly.” Lane, 696 
F.3d at 819 (quoting Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 
1038). We have never imposed a categorical 
ban on a settlement that does not include 
direct payments to class members. 
 
The district court’s finding that the 
settlement fund was non-distributable 
accords with our precedent. In Lane, we 
deemed direct monetary payments 
“infeasible” where each class member’s 
individual recovery would have been “de 
minimis” because the remaining settlement 
fund was approximately $6.5 million and 
there were over 3.6 million class members. 
Id. at 817–18, 820–21. The gap between the 
fund and a miniscule award is even more 
dramatic here. The remaining settlement fund 
was approximately $5.3 million, but there 
were an estimated 129 million class 
members, so each class member was entitled 
to a paltry 4 cents in recovery—a de minimis 
amount if ever there was one. The district 
court found that the cost of verifying and 
“sending out very small payments to millions 
of class members would exceed the total 
monetary benefit obtained by the class.” 
 
To begin, the district court found that 
the amount of the fund was appropriate given 
the shakiness of the plaintiffs’ claims. 
Objectors do not contend that it would have 
been feasible to make a 4-cent distribution to 
every class member. Instead, they ask us to 
impose a mechanism that would permit a 
miniscule portion of the class to receive 
direct payments, eschewing a class 
settlement that benefits members through 
programs on privacy and data protection 
instituted by the cy pres recipients. Objectors 
suggest, for example, that “it is possible to 
compensate an oversized class with a small 
settlement fund by random lottery 
distribution,” or by offering “$5 to $10 per 
claimant” on the assumption that few class 
members will make claims. Our review of the 
district court’s settlement approval is not 
predicated simply on whether there may be 
“possible” alternatives; rather, we benchmark 
whether the district court discharged its 
obligation to assure that the settlement is 
“fair, adequate, and free from collusion.” 
Lane, 696 F.3d at 819 (quoting Hanlon, 150 
F.3d at 1027). If we took their objections at 
face value, Objectors would have us jettison 
the teachings of Lane. Objectors would also 
have us ignore our prior endorsement of cy 
pres awards that go to uses consistent with 
the nature of the underlying action. Nachshin, 
663 F.3d at 1039–40. 
 
Likewise, we easily reject Objectors’ 
argument that if the settlement fund was non-
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distributable, then a class action cannot be the 
superior means of adjudicating this 
controversy under Rule 23(b)(3). “[T]he 
purpose of the superiority requirement is to 
assure that the class action is the most 
efficient and effective means of resolving the 
controversy.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. 
Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 
2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 7AA 
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1779 (3d ed. 2005)). Not 
surprisingly, there is a relationship between 
the superiority requirement and the 
appropriateness of a cy pres–only settlement. 
The two concepts are not mutually exclusive, 
since “[w]here recovery on an individual 
basis would be dwarfed by the cost of 
litigating on an individual basis, this factor 
weighs in favor of class certification.” Id. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding the superiority requirement was met 
because the litigation would otherwise be 
economically infeasible. This finding 
dovetails with the rationale for the cy pres–
only settlement. 
 
II. The Cy Pres Recipients 
 
We now turn to the crux of this 
appeal: whether approval of the settlement 
was an abuse of discretion due to claimed 
relationships between counsel or the parties 
and some of the cy pres recipients. We have 
long recognized that the cy pres doctrine, 
when “unbridled by a driving nexus between 
the plaintiff class and the cy pres 
beneficiaries[,] poses many nascent dangers 
to the fairness of the distribution process,” 
because the selection process may then 
“answer to the whims and self interests of the 
parties, their counsel, or the court.” 
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1038–39; see also 
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 
(9th Cir. 2012); Six (6) Mexican Workers v. 
Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308–
39 (9th Cir. 1990). Due to these dangers, we 
require cy pres awards to meet a “nexus” 
requirement by being tethered to the 
objectives of the underlying statute and the 
interests of the silent class members. 
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1039. 
 
Objectors suggest that the district 
court rubber-stamped the settlement, by 
“simply h[olding] that the Ninth Circuit and 
district courts have approved other all–cy–
pres settlements and class members 
effectively had no right to complain about the 
parties’ choice of compromise.” That 
characterization is unfair and untrue. And 
oddly, despite this claim, Objectors do not 
dispute that the nexus requirement is satisfied 
here. 
 
The district court found that the six cy 
pres recipients are “established 
organizations,” that they were selected 
because they are “independent,” have a 
nationwide reach and “a record of promoting 
privacy protection on the Internet,” and “are 
capable of using the funds to educate the class 
about online privacy risks.” Although the 
district court expressed some disappointment 
that the recipients were the “usual suspects,” 
it recognized that “failure to diversify the list 
of distributees is not a basis to reject the 
settlement . . . when the proposed recipients 
otherwise qualify under the applicable 
standard.” Accordingly, the district court 
appropriately found that the cy pres 
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distribution addressed the objectives of the 
Stored Communications Act and furthered 
the interests of the class members. Previous 
cy pres distributions rest on this same 
understanding of the nexus requirement. See, 
e.g., Dennis, 697 F.3d at 866–67 (no nexus 
between false advertising claims relating to 
the nutritional value of Frosted Mini-
Wheats® and charities providing food for the 
indigent); Lane, 696 F.3d at 817, 820– 22 
(nexus between Facebook privacy claims and 
charity giving grants promoting online 
privacy and security); Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 
1039–41 (no nexus between breach of 
privacy, unjust enrichment, and breach of 
contract claims relating to AOL’s provision 
of commercial e-mail services and the Legal 
Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, the Boys and 
Girls Clubs of Santa Monica and Los 
Angeles, and the Federal Judicial Center 
Foundation); Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 
F.2d at 1307–09 (no nexus between Farm 
Labor Contractor Registration Act claims and 
foundation operating human assistance 
projects in areas where plaintiffs resided). 
 
Nonetheless, Objectors take issue 
with the choice of cy pres recipients because 
Google has in the past donated to at least 
some of the cy pres recipients, three of the cy 
pres recipients previously received Google 
settlement funds, and three of the cy pres 
recipients are organizations housed at class 
counsel’s alma maters. See In re Google Buzz 
Privacy Litig., No. C 10-00672 JW, 2011 WL 
7460099, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 2, 2011). The 
Objectors point to a comment from the 
American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) Principles 
of the Law of Aggregate Litigation which 
suggests that “[a] cy pres remedy should not 
be ordered if the court or any party has any 
significant prior affiliation with the intended 
recipient that would raise substantial 
questions about whether the selection of the 
recipient was made on the merits.” Principles 
of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.07 cmt. b 
(Am. Law Inst. 2010) (emphasis added). 
 
The benchmark for “significant prior 
affiliation” is left undefined. Id. Of course it 
makes sense that the district court should 
examine any claimed relationship between 
the cy pres recipient and the parties or their 
counsel. But a prior relationship or 
connection between the two, without more, is 
not an absolute disqualifier. Rather, a number 
of factors, such as the nature of the 
relationship, the timing and recency of the 
relationship, the significance of dealings 
between the recipient and the party or 
counsel, the circumstances of the selection 
process, and the merits of the recipient play 
into the analysis. The district court explicitly 
or implicitly addressed this range of 
considerations. 
 
We do not need to explore the 
contours of the “significant prior affiliation” 
comment because in the context of this 
settlement, the claimed relationships do not 
“raise substantial questions about whether the 
selection of the recipient was made on the 
merits.” See id. § 3.07 cmt. b. As a starting 
premise, Google’s role as a party in 
reviewing the cy pres recipients does not cast 
doubt on the settlement. In Lane, we 
approved a cy pres–only settlement in which 
the distributor of the settlement fund was a 
newlycreated entity run by a three-member 
board of directors, one of whom was 
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defendant Facebook’s Director of Public 
Policy. 696 F.3d at 817. We rejected the 
claim that this structure created an 
“unacceptable conflict of interest,” 
explaining that “[w]e do not require . . . that 
settling parties select a cy pres recipient that 
the court or class members would find ideal” 
since “such an intrusion into the private 
parties’ negotiations would be improper and 
disruptive to the settlement process.” Id. at 
820–21. Instead, we recognized that, as the 
“‘offspring of compromise,’” settlement 
agreements “necessarily reflect the interests 
of both parties to the settlement.” Id. at 821 
(quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027). Thus, we 
concluded that Facebook’s ability to have “its 
say” in the distribution of cy pres funds was 
“the unremarkable result of the parties’ give-
and-take negotiations” and acceptable so 
long as the nexus requirement was satisfied. 
Id. at 821–22. 
 
Given the burgeoning importance of 
Internet privacy, it is no surprise that Google 
has chosen to support the programs and 
research of recognized academic institutes 
and nonprofit organizations. Google has 
donated to hundreds of third-party 
organizations whose work implicates 
technology and Internet policy issues, 
including university research centers, think 
tanks, advocacy groups, and trade 
organizations. These earlier donations do not 
undermine the selection process employed to 
vet the cy pres recipients in this litigation. 
The district court conducted a “careful[] 
review” of the recipient’s “detailed 
proposals” and found a “substantial nexus” 
between the recipients and the interests of the 
class members. Notably, some of the 
recipient organizations have challenged 
Google’s Internet privacy policies in the past. 
Most importantly, there was transparency in 
this process, with the proposed recipients 
disclosing donations received from Google. 
Each recipient’s cy pres proposal identified 
the scope of Google’s previous contributions 
to that organization, and, unlike in Lane, 
explained how the cy pres funds were distinct 
from Google’s general donations. See 
Dennis, 697 F.3d at 867–68 (casting doubt on 
the value of cy pres funds that a defendant 
“has already obligated itself to donate”). 
Citing Lane, the district court found that 
“[t]he chosen recipients and their respective 
proposals are sufficiently related so as to 
warrant approval; they do not have to be the 
recipients that objectors or the court consider 
ideal.” 
 
The objection that three of the cy pres 
recipients had previously received cy pres 
funds from Google does not impugn the 
settlement without something more, such as 
fraud or collusion. See Rodriguez v. W. 
Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 
2009). That “something more” is missing 
here. Indeed, the proposition that cy pres 
funds should not be awarded to previous 
recipients would be in some tension with our 
nexus requirements. As we have recognized, 
it is often beneficial for a cy pres recipient to 
have a “‘substantial record of service,’” 
because such a record inspires confidence 
that the recipient will use the funds to the 
benefit of class members. See Dennis, 697 
F.3d at 865 (quoting Six (6) Mexican 
Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308); Lane, 696 F.3d 
at 822. But in emerging areas such as Internet 
and data privacy, expertise in the subject 
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matter may limit the universe of qualified 
organizations that can meet the strong nexus 
requirements we impose upon cy pres 
recipients. Given that, over time, major 
players such as Google may be involved in 
more than one cy pres settlement, it is not an 
abuse of discretion for a court to bless a 
strong nexus between the cy pres recipient 
and the interests of the class over a desire to 
diversify the pick via novel beneficiaries that 
are less relevant or less qualified. See 
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1040 (considering 
whether the cy pres distribution “provide[s] 
reasonable certainty that any member will be 
benefitted”). 
 
Finally, we reject the proposition that 
the link between the cy pres recipients and 
class counsel’s alma maters raises a 
significant question about whether the 
recipients were selected on the merits. There 
may be occasions where the nature of the 
alumni connections between the parties and 
the recipients could cast doubt on the 
propriety of the selection process. But here, 
we have nothing more than a barebones 
allegation that class counsel graduated from 
schools that house the Internet research 
centers that will receive funds. 
 
The claim that counsel’s receipt of a 
degree from one of these schools taints the 
settlement can’t be entertained with a straight 
face. Each of these schools graduates 
thousands of students each year. Objectors 
have never disputed that class counsel have 
no ongoing or recent relationships with their 
alma maters and have no affiliations with the 
specific research centers. Nor did the district 
court simply accept this concession or put the 
burden on the Objectors. The district court 
appropriately considered the substance of the 
objections and explained why those 
challenges did not undermine the overall 
fairness of the settlement. See In re Pac. 
Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 
1995). The court affirmatively analyzed the 
issue and was cognizant of the claim of a 
potential conflict. All class counsel swore 
that they have no affiliations with the specific 
research centers. Class counsel repeated that 
attestation at the final settlement approval 
hearing and added that they sit on no boards 
for any of the proposed recipients. As one 
class counsel put it, “I simply got my law 
degree [at Harvard], and that’s simply the end 
of it.” The recipients are well recognized 
centers focusing on the Internet and data 
privacy, and the district court conducted a 
“careful[] review” of the recipients’ “detailed 
proposals” and found a “substantial nexus” 
between the recipients and the interests of the 
class members. No one suggested that any of 
the centers acted with any impropriety, and 
the Objectors provided no alternative 
suggestions for other law schools with more 
qualified centers or institutes. The district 
court found “no indication that counsel’s 
allegiance to a particular alma mater factored 
into the selection process,” particularly since 
the identity of the recipients “was a 
negotiated term included in the Settlement 
Agreement and therefore not chosen solely 
by . . . alumni.” Thus, the district court gave 
a “sufficient[ly] reasoned” response to the 
objections as to the claimed preexisting 
relationships. In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 
47 F.3d at 377. We can hardly say that the 
alumni connections cloud the fairness of the 
settlement. 
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As an overarching matter, nothing in 
this record “raise[s] substantial questions 
about whether the selection of the recipient 
was made on the merits.” See Principles of 
the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.07 cmt. b. 
We do not suggest, however, that a party’s 
prior relationship with a cy pres recipient 
could not be a stumbling block to approval of 
a settlement. Cf. Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 9 
(mem.) (statement of Roberts, C.J., 
respecting the denial of certiorari) 
(recognizing that given the “fundamental 
concerns surrounding” cy pres awards and 
their increasing prevalence, the Court “may 
need to clarify the limits on the use of such 
remedies” in the future). We hold merely 
that, under the circumstances here, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in 
approving the cy pres recipients. 
 
III. Attorneys’ Fees 
 
Turning to the issue of attorneys’ 
fees, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by approving $2.125 million in 
fees and $21,643.16 in costs. As an initial 
matter, there is no support for Objectors’ 
view that the settlement should have been 
valued at a lower amount for the purposes of 
calculating attorneys’ fees simply because it 
was cy pres– only. See generally Lane, 696 
F.3d at 818 (acknowledging a 25% fee award 
that also involved a cy pres–only settlement). 
Rather, the question is whether the amount of 
attorneys’ fees was reasonable. In re 
Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 
F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 
In a settlement that produces a 
common fund for the benefit of the entire 
class, a court has discretion to employ either 
the “percentage-of-recovery” method or the 
“lodestar” method to calculate appropriate 
attorneys’ fees, so long as its discretion is 
exercised so as to achieve a reasonable result. 
See id. at 942. Here, the district court found 
that the requested fees were appropriate 
under either metric. 
 
Under the percentage-of-recovery 
method, the requested fee was equal to 25% 
of the settlement fund. According to the 
district court, this percentage was 
commensurate with the risk posed by the 
action and the time and skill required to 
secure a successful result for the class, given 
that class counsel faced three motions to 
dismiss and participated in extensive 
settlement negotiations. The district court 
also found that this percentage hewed closely 
to that awarded in similar Internet privacy 
actions. See, e.g., In re Netflix Privacy Litig., 
No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL 
1120801, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013); 
see also In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942 
(noting that 25% is our “benchmark” for a 
reasonable fee award). 
 
Although not required to do so, the 
district court took an extra step, cross-
checking this result by using the lodestar 
method. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941–
44 (checking the district court’s percentage-
of-recovery fees calculation against the 
lodestar method, which is “calculated by 
multiplying the number of hours the 
prevailing party reasonably expended on the 
litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate for 
the region and the experience of the lawyer”). 
The district court found that class counsel 
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provided sufficient support for its lodestar 
calculation that fees totaled $2,126,517.25. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
WALLACE, Circuit Judge, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part: 
 
I concur in Sections I and III of the 
majority opinion. I agree that a cy pres-only 
settlement was appropriate in this case and do 
not contend that the district court abused its 
discretion in calculating class counsel’s fees.  
 
I dissent, however, from Section II of 
the opinion, in which the majority blesses the 
district court’s approval of the settlement, 
despite the preexisting relationships between 
class counsel and the cy pres recipients. To 
me, the fact alone that 47% of the settlement 
fund is being donated to the alma maters of 
class counsel raises an issue which, in 
fairness, the district court should have 
pursued further in a case such as this. The 
district court made no serious inquiry to 
alleviate that concern. Accordingly, I would 
vacate the district court’s approval of the 
class settlement, and remand with 
instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing, 
examine class counsel under oath, and 
determine whether class counsel’s prior 
affiliation with the cy pres recipients played 
any role in their selection as beneficiaries. 
 
I. 
 
As the majority opinion outlines, 
plaintiffs in this case alleged that Google 
violated class members’ privacy rights by 
disclosing personal information (such as 
search terms) to unauthorized third parties. 
Google’s practice allegedly violated the 
federal Stored Communications Act, along 
with various state laws. After several rounds 
at the motion to dismiss stage, the parties 
agreed to a class-wide settlement (before 
formal class certification by the district 
court). The parties estimated the size of the 
class to be 129 million people.  
 
The settlement contained the 
following key terms: (1) Google agreed to 
pay $8.5 million into a settlement fund; (2) 
Google would provide notice of the 
settlement on its website; (3) each class 
representative would receive $5,000, claims 
administration costs would be $1 million, and 
attorney’s fees would be $2.125 million (25% 
of the settlement fund); and (4) the remainder 
of the settlement fund (about $5 million) 
would go to six cy pres recipients. The six cy 
pres recipients were to be Carnegie Mellon 
University (21% of the remainder), the World 
Privacy Forum (17%), Chicago-Kent College 
of Law Center for Information, Society and 
Policy (16%), the Stanford Center for 
Internet and Society (16%), the Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 
University (15%), and that the AARP 
Foundation (15%). 
 
II. 
 
We review a district court’s approval 
of a class action settlement for an abuse of 
discretion. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 
F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, however, 
the parties reached the settlement before the 
class certification stage. “Prior to formal 
class certification, there is an even greater 
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potential for a breach of fiduciary duty owed 
the class during settlement. Accordingly, 
such agreements must withstand an even 
higher level of scrutiny for evidence of 
collusion or other conflicts of interest than is 
ordinarily required.” In re Bluetooth Headset 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 
As stated above, three of the cy pres 
distribution payments in our case are to 
Chicago-Kent College of Law (16%), 
Stanford (16%), and Harvard (15%). 
Attorneys for the class attended all three of 
these institutions. We, along with other 
courts and observers, have pointed out the 
unseemly occurrence of cy pres funds being 
doled out to interested parties’ alma maters. 
See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 
1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011); Securities & 
Exchange Comm’n v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 
Inc., 626 F.Supp.2d 402, 414–16 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); Adam Liptak, Doling out Other 
People’s Money, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2007 
(“Lawyers and judges have grown used to 
controlling these pots of money, and they 
enjoy distributing them to favored charities, 
alma maters and the like”). 
 
In response to this all-too-common 
development, the American Law Institute has 
set forth, in its Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation, that “[a] cy pres 
remedy should not be ordered if the court or 
any party has any significant prior affiliation 
with the intended recipient that would raise 
substantial questions about whether the 
selection of the recipient was made on the 
merits.” American Law Institute (ALI), 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation 
§ 3.07 comment b (2010) (emphasis added). 
Although the majority tells us correctly that 
no circuit has adopted the specific “prior 
affiliation” language, circuits have endorsed 
§ 3.07’s guidance regarding scrutinizing cy 
pres disbursements. See, e.g., In re 
BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 
1060, 1064–65 (8th Cir. 2015) (vacating a cy 
pres settlement because “class counsel and 
the district court entirely ignored this now-
published ALI authority”); In re Baby Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting ALI § 3.07, comment a 
(2010)); In re Lupron Marketing and Sales 
Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir. 
2012) (citing to ALI § 3.07 and asserting that 
“[c]ourts have generally agreed with the ALI 
Principles”). 
 
I conclude that our circuit should 
adopt the ALI’s guidance as set forth in § 
3.07. District courts should be required to 
scrutinize cy pres settlements when the 
proffered recipients of the funds have a “prior 
affiliation” with counsel, a party, or even the 
judge, especially when one of those players is 
a loyal alumni of a cy pres recipient. I do not 
mean to suggest that class counsel’s alma 
mater can never be a cy pres beneficiary. 
Rather, I propose that the burden should be 
on class counsel to show through sworn 
testimony, in an on-the-record hearing, that 
the prior affiliation played no role in the 
negotiations, that other institutions were 
sincerely considered, and that the 
participant’s alma mater is the proper cy pres 
recipient. 
 
The majority responds to this line of 
argument by asserting that “here, we have 
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nothing more than a barebones allegation that 
class counsel graduated from schools that 
house the Internet research centers that will 
receive funds.” The majority then salutes the 
district court’s conclusion that there is “no 
indication that counsel’s allegiance to a 
particular alma mater factored into the 
selection process,” and stresses that the cy 
pres recipients were a negotiated term, not 
chosen solely by alumni. In essence, the 
majority holds that despite the nascent 
dangers posed by apportioning cy pres funds 
to the distributing parties’ alma maters, the 
burden is entirely on the objectors to show 
that the settlement might be tainted. 
 
I disagree fundamentally with this 
analysis. Our precedent requires that district 
courts “must be particularly vigilant not only 
for explicit collusion, but also for more subtle 
signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit 
of their own self-interests and that of certain 
class members to infect the negotiations.” In 
re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947. In our case, we 
have a cy pres-only settlement. That alone 
raises a yellow flag. Furthermore, we have a 
class settlement before formal class 
certification. That raises another yellow flag. 
Lastly, we have almost half of the settlement 
fund, several million dollars, being given to 
class counsel’s alma maters. To me, that 
raises a red flag. I am especially dubious of 
the inclusion of the Center for Information, 
Society and Policy at Chicago-Kent Law 
School (a law school attended by class 
counsel), which center appears to have 
inaugurated only a year before the parties 
herein agreed to their settlement. Even with 
these red and yellow flags, under the 
majority’s holding, the burden is still on the 
objectors to prove more, despite the 
objectors’ lack of access to virtually any 
relevant evidence that would do so. 
 
I would hold that the combination of 
a cy pres-only award, a pre-certification 
settlement, and the fact that almost half the cy 
pres fund is going to class counsel’s alma 
maters, is sufficient to shift the burden to the 
proponents of the settlement to show, on a 
sworn record, that nothing in the 
acknowledged relationship was a factor in the 
ultimate choice. Here, the only sworn-to 
items in the record on this issue are boiler 
plate, one-line declarations from class 
counsel stating “I have no affiliation” with 
the subject nstitutions. While the majority 
asserts that the district court conducted a 
“careful review,” these terse declarations are 
the only shred of sworn-to evidence in the 
record. There was essentially nothing for the 
district court to review—carefully or not. 
Although there was some discussion between 
counsel and the district court during the 
hearings on the settlement, this was nothing 
more than unsworn lawyer talk during an oral 
argument. 
 
I still have many questions 
surrounding how these universities were 
chosen, such as: What other institutions were 
considered? Why were the non-alma mater 
institutions rejected? What relationship have 
counsel had with these universities? Have 
counsel donated funds to their alma maters in 
the past? Do counsel serve on any alma mater 
committees or boards? Do counsel’s family 
members? How often do counsel visit their 
alma maters? There are many questions still 
lingering that have not been answered under 
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oath. Here, as we have directed before, “the 
district court should have pressed the parties 
to substantiate their bald assertions with 
corroborating evidence.” Id. at 948. 
 
Although I would vacate the parties’ 
settlement, I express no opinion on the 
definitive fairness of the parties’ agreement. 
It is not the province of appellate judges to 
“substitute our notions of fairness for those of 
the district judge.” Officers for Justice v. Civ. 
Serv. Commission of the City and County of 
San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 
1982) (internal citations omitted). Instead, I 
would remand the case to the district court for 
further fact finding in accordance with the 
concerns I have expressed. 
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“Google Privacy Deal is ‘Clear Abuse,’ High Court Told” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Shayna Possess 
July 10, 2018   
 
Challengers to an $8.5 million settlement 
resolving claims that Google shared user 
search histories urged the U.S. Supreme 
Court to overturn the deal Monday, saying 
the agreement — which provides millions to 
class counsel and the rest to third parties, 
including organizations tied to class counsel 
and the tech giant — is "clear abuse." 
 
The opening brief by Theodore H. Frank and 
Melissa Ann Holyoak of the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute asserted that the Ninth 
Circuit's decision upholding the deal sets a 
dangerous precedent by potentially making 
cy pres settlements, which other circuits have 
been reluctant to endorse, more common. 
 
Cy pres deals involve distributing funds to 
charities and other third parties rather than 
class members and are typically used when 
the sheer number of individuals makes 
distribution impossible or impracticable. But 
Frank and Holyoak asserted that they should 
be used sparingly, contending that in the 
process of approving the deal in this case, the 
appeals court adopted holdings that run the 
risk of encouraging gamesmanship at the 
expense of absent class members and the 
filing of meritless actions that only benefit 
attorneys. 
 
"Because of conflicts of interest inherent in 
the class-action process — especially with 
regard to settlements — careful judicial 
scrutiny is necessary lest class counsel and 
the defendant bargain away the rights of the 
class members on terms that minimize payoff 
by the defendant, maximize benefit to class 
counsel, and leave injured class members out 
in the cold," the challengers said. "Yet the 
Ninth Circuit below took the opposite 
approach, declaring that close scrutiny of the 
terms of a cy pres settlement would be 'an 
intrusion into the private parties' negotiations' 
and therefore 'improper and disruptive to the 
settlement process.'" 
 
The high court granted the 
challengers' petition for a writ of certiorari in 
April over the objections of Google and class 
counsel, who argued the deal is appropriate 
because divvying up the fund among class 
members isn't feasible. 
 
In the underlying case, Google struck a deal 
with users in 2014 to end privacy claims 
accusing it of selling users' search terms 
containing personally identifiable 
information to advertisers, allegedly in 
violation of the Stored Communications Act. 
 
At the time, class counsel had argued that 
without accounting for attorneys' fees and 
costs, the $8.5 million settlement would have 
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had to be divided among 129 million class 
members — yielding just 4 cents per person. 
 
After U.S. District Judge Edward J. 
Davila signed off on the settlement in March 
2015, Frank and Holyoak brought their 
objections before the Ninth Circuit, arguing 
that in an era of massive class actions, 
allowing class counsel to invoke cy pres 
would set a dangerous precedent of 
converting every class action into an "all-cy 
pres settlement." 
 
In October, the Ninth Circuit stood by its split 
decision to leave the settlement undisturbed, 
prompting the objectors to take their 
challenge to the high court. They argued in 
January that cy pres awards demand 
heightened scrutiny since they can "facilitate 
tacit or explicit collusion between 
defendants" eager to settle and class counsel, 
"who are seeking to maximize their fees and 
may be willing to accommodate defendants' 
interests in exchange for a 'clear sailing' 
agreement not to challenge the fee request." 
 
The objectors got support from several amici 
in February, including 16 state attorneys 
general, who argued that these settlements 
hurt consumers and that the Google deal was 
the "ideal vehicle" to address when, if ever, 
such arrangements are permissible. 
 
The justices previously passed up the 
opportunity to tackle the issue in 2013 when 
they refused in Marek v. Lane to review a 
divided Ninth Circuit opinion 
approving Facebook's settlement agreeing to 
terminate its short-lived Beacon feature — 
which allegedly shared data about users' 
activity on third-party sites with their 
Facebook friends without consent — and pay 
$9.5 million to set up an online privacy 
foundation and compensate class counsel. 
 
At the time, Chief Justice John Roberts 
issued a rare statement explaining that while 
the Marek case wasn't the right vehicle, it 
could be time for the court to determine the 
limits of cy pres awards. 
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed to take 
up the Google case, and the objectors lodged 
their opening brief Monday, telling the 
justices it's high time to decide whether, or 
under what circumstances, a cy pres 
settlement with no direct benefit to class 
members meets requirements that a deal be 
"fair, reasonable and adequate." 
 
The challengers asserted that these sorts of 
deals are rare for a reason, saying the high 
court has consistently shot down the use of 
procedural tactics to game class actions like 
cy pres, which they called "one of the most 
notorious devices used to create the 'illusion 
of compensation.''' 
 
Though the Ninth Circuit treated the 
arrangement as equivalent to a settlement 
providing $8.5 million to class members, the 
class members are actually getting nothing, 
while the attorneys are set to receive more 
than $2 million and the rest of the money is 
slated to go to third parties like class 
counsel's alma maters and nonprofits Google 
already contributes to, Frank and Holyoak 
contended. That is neither fair nor 
reasonable, they argued. 
 
 333 
Frank, who will be arguing the case before 
the high court in the fall, said in a Tuesday 
statement that they hope the review will 
result in a standard that aligns class counsel's 
incentives with those of the class. 
 
"The lawyers claim it's too difficult to 
distribute money to such a large class," he 
said. "But we have seen that when courts 
agree that attorneys should only get paid 
when their clients do, lawyers magically 
discover ways to get money to class 
members. Incentives work." 
 
Representatives for Google and the class 
didn't immediately return requests for 
comment Tuesday. 
 
The challengers are represented by Theodore 
H. Frank, Melissa Holyoak and Anna St. 
John of the Competitive Enterprise Institute. 
 
The Google users are represented by Kassra 
P. Nassiri of Nassiri & Jung LLP and 
Michael Aschenbrener of KamberLaw LLC. 
 
Google is represented by Randall W. 
Edwards of O'Melveny & Myers LLP and 
Donald M. Falk, Edward D. Johnson and 
Daniel E. Jones of Mayer Brown LLP. 
 
The case is Frank et al. v. Gaos et al., case 
number 17-961, in the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
 
--Additional reporting by Christopher 
Crosby. Editing by Marygrace Murphy. 
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 “Frank v. Gaos: Cy Pres Gets Its Day at the Supreme Court” 
 
 
Bloomberg Law: Big Law Business 
 
Jonah M. Knobler and Sam A. Yospe 
June 7, 2018 
 
Increasingly, courts presiding over class 
actions employ a controversial practice called 
cy pres (“see-pray”) that diverts damages 
owed to injured class members to non-party 
charitable institutions. The theory behind cy 
pres is that, when getting damage awards to 
class members is difficult, giving that money 
to a relevant charity is the next-best result. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never 
considered whether cy pres is legitimate or 
how it is supposed to work. That may soon 
change: on April 30, the Court granted 
certiorari in Frank v. Gaos (No. 17-961), 
which presents these questions. The decision 
in Frank may have enormous implications for 
class-action practice. At minimum, however, 
it should provide much-needed clarity on this 
contentious subject. 
Origins of Cy Pres  
The term cy pres derives from the French cy 
pres comme possible (“as near as possible”). 
In trust law, it is a doctrine providing that, 
when the proceeds of a charitable trust can no 
longer be paid to the intended beneficiary 
(e.g., because it is defunct), a court may 
designate a new beneficiary “as near as 
possible” to the original one, so that the 
donor’s intent may be substantially 
vindicated. For example, after the 
Emancipation Proclamation, “a 19th-century 
court applied the [cy pres] doctrine to 
repurpose a trust that had been created to 
support the abolition movement to instead 
provide assistance to poor African 
Americans.” Frank v. Gaos, Cert. Pet. at 5. 
This trust-law version of cy pres has existed 
in one form or another since ancient Rome. 
By contrast, the class-action version of cy 
pres is relatively new. In 1966, Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(b)(3) was enacted, and the money-
damages class action was born. A 
fundamental problem with this new form of 
litigation soon became evident. Even when it 
was possible to calculate the aggregate 
damage caused by a defendant, it was often 
difficult or impossible to locate the injured 
class members and notify them of an 
available damage award (and when class 
members were notified, they often failed to 
complete the claims process). Courts faced 
with this scenario were in a bind. They could 
allow the unclaimed portion of the aggregate 
damage award to revert to the defendant-but 
this would permit the defendant to keep the 
fruits of its wrongful conduct. They could 
permit the unclaimed funds to escheat to the 
state-but this would provide no benefit to the 
class. Or they could pay the unclaimed funds 
out as a bonus to those class members who 
had already claimed and received damages-
but this would provide a windfall to those 
class members at the expense of the 
“nonclaiming or unidentified class members” 
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who “have superior equitable interests in the 
remaining fund[s].” Powell v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 843 F. Supp. 491, 496 (W.D. 
Ark. 1994), aff’d 119 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
Class-action cy pres developed in the 1970s 
and 1980s as a purported solution to this 
problem. SeeMiller v. Steinbach, No. 66-cv-
356 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (first recorded 
application of class-action cy pres). As courts 
now apply it, the doctrine provides that, when 
it is impracticable to pay out some or all of 
the damages fund to injured class members-
e.g., because they cannot be located, because 
they do not submit claims, or because the per-
person award is de minimis-that money may 
instead be paid to a charity or nonprofit 
whose mission relates to the subject matter of 
the lawsuit. See Redish, Julian & Zyontz, Cy 
Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the 
Modern Class Action: A Normative and 
Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 618-
20 (2010) (“Redish”). In a consumer-
protection case, for example, a cy pres award 
might go to a consumer advocacy group; in a 
race-discrimination case, a cy pres award 
might go to a civil-rights organization. In this 
way, the theory goes, class members who do 
not receive money damages still derive some 
benefit from the lawsuit-however indirect-
because they will supposedly feel the positive 
impact of the cy pres recipient’s charitable 
work. 
The analogy to trust-law cy pres is somewhat 
strained. SeeMirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 
356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) 
(describing class-action cy pres as 
“something parading under [the] name” of 
trust-law cy pres that is “applied … for a 
reason unrelated to the reason for the trust 
doctrine”). In both of its forms, cy pres 
involves courts picking a “next best” 
recipient for money originally intended for 
someone else. But that is where the similarity 
ends. In the trust context, the donor who 
created a charitable trust obviously intended 
to give his money away to charity; thus, it can 
be safely assumed that he would have wanted 
the trust to benefit a related charitable cause 
rather than having the trust fail and the corpus 
revert to his heirs. In the class-action context, 
by contrast, cy pres does not even arguably 
effectuate the intent of the injured class 
members whose money is being given away. 
If given a choice, they would prefer to be 
made whole for their injuries, rather than 
make a charitable donation that will benefit 
them indirectly at best. Thus, rather than 
substantially vindicating the intent of the 
“donor,” class-action cy pres usually subverts 
it. Nevertheless, the analogy has taken root, 
and cy pres is now widely employed in class-
action practice, especially when classes are 
certified for settlement. SeeFrank v. Gaos, 
Cert. Pet. at 32 (noting that “cy pres 
settlements [are now] at their highest levels 
ever”). 
Criticisms of Cy Pres  
Unlike trust-law cy pres, class-action cy pres 
is controversial. For starters, the legal basis 
for it is unclear. Rule 23, which governs class 
actions in federal court, says nothing about cy 
pres. No statute affirmatively authorizes it. 
The Supreme Court has never said a word 
about it. Rather, it appears that the notion of 
class-action cy pres “can be traced largely to 
a pioneering student comment, published in 
the University of Chicago Law Review in 
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1972.” Redish, supra, at 631. Two years later, 
the first court to employ the doctrine, Miller 
v. Steinbach, No. 66-cv-356 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974), acknowledged that “neither counsel 
nor the Court ha[d] discovered [any] 
precedent for [it]” (aside from the 
questionable analogy to trust law). That is a 
shaky foundation for a practice that 
redistributes many millions of dollars each 
year. 
Some argue that cy pres is affirmatively 
prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act, the 
statute under which the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were promulgated. The Act states 
that those Rules-including Rule 23-“shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.” 28 U.S.C. §2072(b). Thus, the use of 
Rule 23 to aggregate individual claims does 
not permit courts to alter the substantive law 
governing those claims. That includes the 
remedies that are authorized, and not 
authorized, by the underlying substantive 
law. For example, if a given statute permits 
only injunctive relief in an individual action, 
then Rule 23 does not permit a court to award 
money damages in a class suit; that would be 
a prohibited “modif[ication] of … 
substantive right[s].” The same arguably 
goes for cy pres: if a statute does not 
authorize a court to deny compensation to an 
individual plaintiff and order the defendant to 
make a charitable donation instead, then the 
Rules Enabling Act prohibits courts from 
doing so in the class-action context. 
Indeed, some go even further and argue that 
class-action cy pres is unconstitutional. See, 
e.g., Redish, supra, at 641. For example, 
Article III’s “case or controversy” 
requirement may prohibit federal courts from 
ordering monetary awards to non-parties that 
are strangers to an adversarial proceeding and 
lack an injury-in-fact traceable to the 
defendant. The Due Process Clause may 
prohibit courts from appropriating funds 
rightfully belonging to absent class members 
and transferring them to someone else. And 
when cy pres awards are made to groups that 
engage in expressive or political activity, as 
is often the case, this may infringe on class 
members’ First Amendment right not to 
subsidize “speech” with which they disagree. 
Cf. Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty., and 
Mun. Empls., Council 31, No. 16-1466 
(argued Feb. 26, 2018) (case challenging 
mandatory union “agency fees” under First 
Amendment on grounds that such fees fund 
advocacy with which some employees 
disagree). 
Even if it is not unlawful, however, cy pres 
can be deeply problematic. For starters, the 
notion at the heart of cy pres that charitable 
awards provide a meaningful benefit to 
unidentified or non-claiming class members 
is often a fiction. SeePearson v. NBTY Inc., 
772 F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) 
(“The $1.13 million cy pres award to [an] 
orthopedic foundation [in a consumer class 
action involving joint-health supplements] 
did not benefit the class, except insofar as 
armed with this additional money the 
foundation may contribute to the discovery of 
new treatments for joint problems-a 
hopelessly speculative proposition.”). In 
addition, cy pres can create an appearance of 
impropriety-if not outright corruption-by 
permitting judges and lawyers to direct 
millions of dollars to institutions they are 
personally connected to, such as their own 
alma maters. Frank v. Gaos, Cert. Pet. at 26. 
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Cy pres can also permit defendants to reduce 
or even eliminate their effective liability by 
selecting a recipient charity that they were 
already planning to sponsor independently of 
the litigation. Id. at 28. Moreover, cy pres 
creates an inherent conflict of interest 
between class counsel and the class members 
they ostensibly represent. Id. at 25-26. 
Specifically, class counsel’s fee award is 
usually based on the size of the total recovery 
obtained, and cy pres “recovery” is usually 
considered part of that total-no different from 
money paid to class members. Class counsel, 
therefore, have no incentive to fight for a 
settlement that maximizes their clients’ 
recovery. To the contrary, since locating 
class members and providing notice is 
expensive and time-consuming, and writing a 
check to a charity is quick and easy, class 
counsel are incentivized to prefer a cy pres 
award that minimizes, or even eliminates, 
their own clients’ recovery-in Judge Posner’s 
words, to “s[ell] [their clients] down the 
river.” Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 785. Finally, 
because cy pres allows attorneys to reap large 
fee awards in cases that might not otherwise 
be certified for class treatment, its existence 
may motivate lawyers to file many suits that 
they would not otherwise file-and, some 
would argue, ought not be filed. See Redish, 
supra, at 653-56 (discussing cy pres’ 
enablement of “‘faux’ class actions”). 
Frank v. Gaos  
In Frank v. Gaos, many of these concerns are 
prominently on display. The case began as a 
consolidated class action brought against 
Google. In the underlying case, web users 
allege that Google violated the Stored 
Communications Act and committed various 
privacy torts by disclosing their search 
queries to the websites that they access 
through Google searches. See In re Google 
Referrer Header Privacy Litig., No. 5:10-cv-
04809 (N.D. Cal.). 
Google reached an early settlement with class 
counsel. It agreed to pay $8.5 million in 
exchange for a release of all the privacy 
claims of the approximately 129 million 
Americans who used its search engine 
between 2006 and 2014. However, none of 
that $8.5 million would go to the allegedly 
wronged web searchers giving up their 
claims. Instead, $3.2 million of the fund 
would go toward the fees and costs of 
plaintiffs’ counsel, and the remainder would 
be paid as a cy pres award to institutions that 
research or advocate for Internet privacy. 
Together, class counsel and Google selected 
six awardees, which included the alma maters 
of the parties’ lawyers; institutions with 
which Google had a preexisting donor 
relationship; and a nonprofit (AARP) that 
lobbies on controversial legislative and 
policy issues. 
Ted Frank, a class member (who is also the 
Director of the Center for Class Action 
Fairness), objected to the proposed 
settlement. He argued that a cy pres-only 
settlement, under which every class 
member’s right to sue is extinguished without 
any corresponding compensation, is by 
definition not “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate” as Rule 23(e)(2) requires of any 
class settlement. The district court approved 
the settlement over Frank’s objection, In re 
Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 87 F. 
Supp. 3d 1122 (N.D. Ca. 2015), and Frank 
appealed. 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In re Google 
Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737, 
742 (9th Cir. 2017). It relied on circuit 
precedent holding that cy pres-only 
settlements “are appropriate where the 
settlement fund is ‘non-distributable'” 
because “proof of individual claims would be 
burdensome or distribution of damages 
costly.” Id. at 741. Here, the court observed, 
the funds remaining after accounting for 
attorney’s fees amounted to just “a paltry four 
cents” per class member-“a de minimis 
amount if ever there was one.” Id. at 742. The 
cost of sending out 129 million four-cent 
checks would exceed the value of the 
settlement. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, 
therefore, cy pres was the only option. It 
dismissed out of hand Frank’s argument that 
this quandary indicated that the case should 
never have been certified for class treatment 
in the first place. As for the particular cy pres 
awardees, the court concluded that they were 
sufficiently related to “the objectives of the 
Stored Communications Act” and found no 
problem with their connections with Google 
or counsel. Id at 743-46. 
Frank petitioned for certiorari, supported by 
a coalition of amici-most notably, a 
bipartisan group of 16 state attorneys general. 
Google and the class plaintiffs opposed. On 
April 30, 2018, the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear the case in its upcoming Term. This was 
no great surprise: In 2013, when the Court 
denied certiorari in a class action against 
Facebook, Chief Justice John Roberts 
observed that cy pres awards are a “growing 
feature of class action settlements” and that 
there are “fundamental concerns surrounding 
the use of such remedies in class action 
litigation” that merited examination in an 
appropriate case. Marek v. Lane, 571 U.S. 
1003, 1006 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring 
in denial of certiorari). These concerns 
included: 
when, if ever, such relief should be 
considered; how to assess its fairness as a 
general matter; … how [recipients] should be 
selected; what the respective roles of the 
judge and parties are in shaping a cy pres 
remedy; [and] how closely the goals of any 
enlisted organization must correspond to the 
interests of the class. 
Id. 
What To Expect  
The Supreme Court may use Frank as a 
vehicle to resolve some or all of the concerns 
that Chief Justice Roberts posed in Marek. 
Notably, the very first question in that list-
“when, if ever, such relief may be 
considered” (emphasis added)-suggests that 
the Court could potentially deem class-action 
cy pres illegitimate across the board, perhaps 
citing the statutory and constitutional 
concerns described above. If the Court issues 
such a ruling, class-action practice could be 
completely transformed: again, if cy pres 
were categorically unavailable, many class 
actions that now make sense for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to pursue would no longer be 
economically viable and might not be filed at 
all. SeeFrank v. Gaos, Reply in Support of 
Cert. at 13 (“After all, without a cy pres 
award to inflate the settlement fund, it would 
have been impossible to justify paying class 
counsel over $2 million in fees, and so the 
case may never have been filed.”). Class-
action filings could drop sharply in situations 
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where class members are difficult to locate or 
notify or where each class member’s damage 
award would be de minimis. 
On the other hand, the Court may eschew any 
sweeping pronouncements and confine its 
ruling to cy pres-only settlements, like the 
one in Frank itself. Class-action cy pres was 
originally conceived, and is most often used, 
as a fallback method to dispose of funds 
remaining after reasonable efforts to make all 
of the injured class members whole. The 
situation in Frank is quite different: there, the 
district court certified the class and approved 
the proposed settlement with the express 
understanding that no attempt would even be 
made to pay any portion of the settlement 
fund to the class. If the Court finds this 
unorthodox use of cy pres improper, it may 
leave for another day whether and how cy 
pres may be used to distribute residual 
settlement funds after an initial attempt has 
been made to compensate class members. 
Because cy pres-only settlements like the one 
in Frank represent a modest percentage of all 
cy pres awards-perhaps as low as 3 percent 
(see Google Br. in Opp. to Cert at 21)-a ruling 
cabined to such settlements would be 
important, though perhaps not earth-shaking. 
It is difficult to guess at what the Court will 
do. The odds may be that the Court will rule 
for Frank and reverse the Ninth Circuit-if 
only because the Supreme Court most often 
grants certiorari in cases that it believes were 
wrongly decided. What is certain, however, 
is that the class-action bar (and the charities 
who rely on cy pres awards for funding) will 
be watching closely. 
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 “Ninth Circuit Confirms that a Cy Pres Only Settlement Can Work In Privacy 
Class Action” 
 
 
Lexology 
 
Jay Ramsey 
September 7, 2017  
 
The internet continues to expand into every 
aspect of our lives. With it, many companies 
have collected, tracked, and used an 
enormous amount of data. All of this has 
given rise to class action lawsuits challenging 
the privacy practices of these companies. 
But, these lawsuits often challenge practices 
that do not cause any actual damage, which 
can make it difficult to reach a settlement, 
particularly of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. So, how 
can parties wanting to settle proceed? 
In a recent opinion, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
a district court’s approval of a class action 
settlement in a privacy litigation where the 
class received no damages, and the settlement 
funds went to cy pres recipients instead. In In 
re Google Referrer Header Privacy 
Litigation, No. 15-15858 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 
2017), the plaintiffs challenged Google’s 
practice of providing websites with the 
search terms that individuals used in 
Google’s search engine to reach the website. 
The plaintiffs claimed this violated their 
privacy. 
The parties reached a settlement with an $8.5 
million fund. Of that, $3.2 million was set 
aside for attorneys’ fees, administration 
costs, and incentive payments, the remaining 
$5.3 million was allocated to six cy 
pres recipients, and class members received 
nothing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s approval of the settlement, 
holding that a cy pres only settlement was 
appropriate where the settlement fund was 
“non-distributable.” In the case, there were 
129 million class members. If the $5.3 
million settlement had been distributed, each 
class member would have received “a paltry 
4 cents.” The court held that, because each 
class member’s recovery would have been de 
minimis, a cy pres only settlement was 
appropriate. 
The Ninth Circuit went on to hold that the cy 
pres recipients were appropriate. The 
recipients included organizations to which 
Google had previously donated, 
organizations that had previously received 
settlement funds from Google, and 
organizations housed at plaintiffs’ 
counsel alma maters. The Ninth Circuit held 
that these connections did not raise any 
conflicts. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
stated: “Given the burgeoning importance of 
Internet privacy, it is no surprise that Google 
has chosen to support the programs and 
research of recognized academic institutes 
and nonprofit organizations. Google has 
donated to hundreds of third-party 
organizations whose work implicates 
technology and Internet policy issues, 
including university research centers, think 
 341 
tanks, advocacy groups, and trade 
organizations. These earlier donations do not 
undermine the selection process employed to 
vet the cy pres recipients in this litigation.” 
Going forward, we might see more cy 
pres only settlements in cases alleging 
violations of privacy, particularly where the 
alleged violations cause no actual (or very 
little actual) damage to the class. 
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Jam v. International Finance Corp.  
 
Ruling Below: Budha Ismail Jam, et al. v. International Finance Corporation, 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) 
 
Overview: The Plaintiffs in the case are farmers and fishermen who live near a power plant in 
India—that they contend, ruined local water supplies, decimated fish populations, and 
contaminated the air around the plant—that was financed through loans from the IFC. Plaintiff’s 
filed a lawsuit in a federal district court in Washington, D.C., but the district court dismissed the 
case because it concluded that the IFC was immune from suit. IFC was held to be immune from 
suit because of the International Organizations Immunities Act, which gives international 
organizations the “same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by 
foreign governments.”  
 
Issue: Whether the International Organizations Immunities Act—which affords international 
organizations the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments have, 22 U.S.C. § 
288a(b)—confers the same immunity on such organizations as foreign governments have under 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11. 
BUDHA ISMAIL JAM, ET AL., Appellant 
v. 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, Appellee 
 
 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
 
Decided on June 23, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
Before: PILLARD, Circuit Judge, and 
EDWARDS and SILBERMAN, Senior 
Circuit Judges.  
 
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit 
Judge SILBERMAN.  
 
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge 
PILLARD. 
 
SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants, a group of Indian 
nationals, challenge a district court decision 
dismissing their complaint against the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) on 
grounds that the IFC is immune from their 
suit. The IFC provided loans needed for 
construction of the Tata Mundra Power Plant 
in Gujarat, India. Appellants who live near 
the plant alleged—which the IFC does not 
deny—that contrary to provisions of the loan 
agreement, the plant caused damage to the 
surrounding communities. They wish to hold 
the IFC financially responsible for their 
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injuries, but we agree with the well-reasoned 
district court opinion that the IFC is immune 
to this suit under the International 
Organizations Immunities Act, and did not 
waive immunity for this suit in its Articles of 
Agreement. 
 
I. 
 
Appellants are fishermen, farmers, a 
local government entity, and a trade union of 
fishworkers. They assert that their way of life 
has been devastated by the power plant. 
 
The IFC, headquartered in 
Washington, is an international organization 
founded in 1956 with over 180 member 
countries. It provides loans in the developing 
world to projects that cannot command 
private capital. IFC Articles, art. III §3(i), 
Dec. 5, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 
117. The IFC loaned $450 million to Coastal 
Gujarat Power Limited, a subsidiary of Tata 
Power, an Indian company, for construction 
and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant. The 
loan agreement, in accordance with IFC’s 
policy to prevent social and environmental 
damage, included an Environmental and 
Social Action Plan designed to protect the 
surrounding communities. The loan’s 
recipient was responsible for complying with 
the agreement, but the IFC retained 
supervisory authority and could revoke 
financial support for the project.  
 
Unfortunately, according to the IFC’s 
own internal audit conducted by its 
ombudsman, the plant’s construction and 
operation did not comply with the Plan. And 
the IFC was criticized by the ombudsman for 
inadequate supervision of the project. Yet the 
IFC did not take any steps to force the loan 
recipients into compliance with the Plan.  
 
The appellants’ claims are almost 
entirely based on tort: negligence, negligent 
nuisance, and trespass. They do, however, 
raise a related claim as alleged third party 
contract beneficiaries of the social and 
environmental terms of the contract. 
According to appellants, the IFC is not 
immune to these claims, and, even if it was 
statutorily entitled to immunity, it has waived 
immunity.  
 
II. 
 
Appellants are swimming upriver; 
both of their arguments run counter to our 
long-held precedent concerning the scope of 
international organization immunity and 
charter-document immunity waivers.  
 
The IFC relies on the International 
Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), which 
provides that international organizations 
“shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . 
as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except 
to the extent that such organizations may 
expressly waive their immunity for the 
purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of 
any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The 
President determines whether an 
organization is entitled to such immunity. 22 
U.S.C. § 288. The IFC has been designated 
an international organization entitled to the 
“privileges, exemptions, and immunities” 
conferred by the statute. Exec. Order No. 
10,680, 21 Fed. Reg. 7,647 (Oct. 5, 1956). 
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In response to the IFC’s claim of 
statutory entitlement under the IOIA, 
appellants rather boldly assert that Atkinson 
v. InterAm. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998), our leading case on the immunity 
of international organizations under that 
statute, should not be followed. Atkinson held 
that foreign organizations receive the 
immunity that foreign governments enjoyed 
at the time the IOIA was passed, which was 
“virtually absolute immunity.” Id. at 1340 
(quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)). And that 
immunity is not diminished even if the 
immunity of foreign governments has been 
subsequently modified, particularly by the 
widespread acceptance and codification of a 
“commercial activities exception” to 
sovereign immunity. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 
1605(a)(2).  
 
Attacking Atkinson, appellants make 
two related contentions. First, Atkinson was 
wrong to conclude that when Congress tied 
the immunity of international organizations 
to foreign sovereigns, it meant the immunity 
foreign sovereigns enjoyed in 1945. Instead, 
according to appellants, who echo the 
arguments pressed in Atkinson itself, 
lawmakers intended the immunity of the 
organizations to rise or fall—like two boats 
tied together—with the scope of the 
sovereigns’ immunity. In other words, even 
assuming foreign sovereigns enjoyed 
absolute immunity in 1945, if that immunity 
diminished, as it has with the codification of 
the commercial activity exception, Congress 
intended that international organizations fare 
no better. 
 
The problem with this argument—
even if we thought it meritorious, which we 
do not—is that it runs counter to Atkinson’s 
holding, which explicitly rejected such an 
evolving notion of international organization 
immunity. See 156 F.3d at 1341. We noted 
that Congress anticipated the possibility of a 
change to immunity of international 
organizations, but explicitly delegated the 
responsibility to the President to effect that 
change—not the judiciary. Id. Morever, 
when considering the legislation, Congress 
rejected a commercial activities exception—
which is exactly the evolutionary step 
appellants wish to have us adopt. Id. As the 
district court recognized, we recently 
reaffirmed Atkinson, saying that the case 
“remains vigorous as Circuit law.” Nyambal 
v. Int’l Monetary Fund, 772 F.3d 277, 281 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 
Recognizing that a frontal attack on 
Atkinson’s holding would require an en banc 
decision, appellants next argued that we can, 
and should, bypass its precedential impact 
because the Supreme Court has undermined 
its premise—that in 1945 the immunity of 
foreign sovereigns was absolute (or virtually 
absolute).  
 
To be sure, the Court has said in dicta 
that in 1945, courts “‘consistently . . . 
deferred to the decisions of the political 
branches—in particular, those of the 
Executive Branch—on whether to take 
jurisdiction’ over particular actions against 
foreign sovereigns . . . .” Republic of Austria 
v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004) 
(quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486). But as 
a matter of practice, at that time, whenever a 
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foreign sovereign was sued, the State 
Department did request sovereign immunity. 
Id. The only arguable exception involved a 
lawsuit in rem against a ship owned but not 
possessed by Mexico; it was not a suit against 
Mexico. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 
324 U.S. 30 (1945). And, even if appellants 
are correct that the executive branch played 
an important role in immunity determinations 
in 1945, that does not diminish the absolute 
nature of the immunity those sovereigns 
enjoyed; although Supreme Court dicta refers 
to the mechanism for conferring immunity on 
foreign sovereigns in 1945, Executive 
Branch intervention does not speak to the 
scope of that immunity. 
 
In any event, the holding of 
Atkinson—regardless how one characterizes 
the immunity of foreign sovereigns in 
1945—was that international organizations 
were given complete immunity by the IOIA 
unless it was waived or the President 
intervened. And as we noted, that holding 
was reaffirmed in Nyambal after the Supreme 
Court dicta on which appellants primarily 
rely. Therefore, we conclude our precedent 
stands as an impassable barrier to appellants’ 
first argument. 
 
III. 
 
That brings us to the waiver 
argument. There is no question that the IFC 
has waived immunity for some claims. 
Indeed, its charter, read literally, would seem 
to include a categorical waiver. But our key 
case interpreting identical waiver language in 
the World Bank charter, Mendaro v. World 
Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983), read 
that language narrowly to allow only the type 
of suit by the type of plaintiff that “would 
benefit the organization over the long term,” 
Osseiran v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 552 F.3d 836, 
840 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Atkinson, 156 
F.3d at 1338 and Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 618). 
 
To be sure, it is a bit strange that it is 
the judiciary that determines when a claim 
“benefits” the international organization; 
after all, the cases come to us when the 
organizations deny the claim, and one would 
think that the organization would be a better 
judge as to what claims benefit it than the 
judiciary. Perhaps that is why Osseiran, 
when applying Mendaro, refers to long-term 
goals, rather than immediate litigating tactics.  
 
But whether or not the Mendaro test 
would be better described using a term 
different than “benefit,” it is the Mendaro 
criteria we are obliged to apply. Ironically, 
the line of cases applying Mendaro ended up 
tying waiver to commercial transactions, so 
there is a superficial similarity to the 
commercial activities test that appellants 
would urge us to accept. But whatever the 
scope of the commercial activities exception 
to sovereign immunity, that standard is 
necessarily broader than the Mendaro test; if 
that exception applied to the IFC, the 
organization would never retain immunity 
since its operations are solely “commercial,” 
i.e., the IFC does not undertake any 
“sovereign” activities.  
 
The Mendaro test instead focused on 
identifying those transactions where the other 
party would not enter into negotiations or 
contract with the organization absent waiver. 
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See 717 F.2d at 617 (inferring waiver only 
insofar as “necessary to enable the 
[organization] to fulfill its functions”). 
Mendaro provided examples: suits by 
debtors, creditors, bondholders, and “those 
other potential plaintiffs to whom the 
[organization] would have to subject itself to 
suit in order to achieve its chartered 
objectives.” Id. at 615.  
 
We have stretched that concept to 
include a claim of promissory estoppel, see 
Osseiran, 552 F.3d at 840-41, and a quasi-
contract claim of unjust enrichment, see Vila 
v. Inter-Am. Invest. Corp., 570 F.3d 274, 278-
80 (D.C. Cir. 2009). But all the claims we 
have accepted have grown out of business 
relations with outside companies (or an 
outside individual engaged directly in 
negotiations with the organization).4 
Compare Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. 
Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 382 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 
1967) (finding waiver in debtors’ suit to 
enforce loan agreement) with Mendaro, 717 
F.2d at 611 (rejecting employee sexual 
harassment and discrimination claim); 
Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1336 (rejecting 
garnishment proceeding against organization 
employee). 
 
Appellants attempt to define 
“benefit” more broadly. They argue that 
holding the IFC to the very environmental 
and social conditions it put in the contract, 
conditions which the IFC itself formulated, 
would benefit the IFC’s goals. Even though 
appellants had no commercial relationship 
with the IFC (other than, allegedly, as third 
party beneficiaries of the loan agreement’s 
requirements), they contend that the IFC will 
benefit from their lawsuit because they are 
attempting to hold the IFC to its stated 
mission and to its own compliance processes. 
They argue that obtaining “community 
support” is a required part of any IFC project, 
and suggest that communities will be 
unlikely to support IFC projects if the IFC is 
not amenable to suit. Appellants’ ability to 
enforce the requirement that the IFC protect 
surrounding communities is as central to the 
IFC’s mission as a commercial partner’s 
ability to enforce the requirement that the IFC 
pay its electricity bill.  
 
But Mendaro drew another 
distinction between claims that survive and 
those that don’t. Those claims that implicate 
internal operations of an international 
organization are especially suspect because 
claims arising out of core operations, not 
ancillary business transactions, would 
threaten the policy discretion of the 
organization. Accord Vila, 570 F.3d at 286-
89 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 
That notion applies here. Should 
appellants’ suit be permitted, every loan the 
IFC makes to fund projects in developing 
countries could be the subject of a suit in 
Washington. Appellee’s suggestion that the 
floodgates would be open does not seem an 
exaggeration. Finally, if the IFC’s internal 
compliance report were to be used to buttress 
a claim against the IFC, we would create a 
strong disincentive to international 
organizations using an internal review 
process. So even though appellants convince 
us that the term “benefit” is something of a 
misnomer—its claim in some sense can be 
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thought of as a “benefit”—it fails the 
Mendaro test.  
 
Accordingly, the district court 
decision is affirmed. 
 
 So ordered. 
 
PILLARD, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I agree that Atkinson and Mendaro, 
which remain binding law in this circuit, 
control this case. I write separately to note 
that those decisions have left the law of 
international organizations’ immunity in a 
perplexing state. I believe both cases were 
wrongly decided, and our circuit may wish to 
revisit them.  
 
1. The International Organizations 
Immunities Act (IOIA), Pub L. No. 79-291, 
59 Stat. 669 (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 
288 et seq.), grants international 
organizations the same immunity “as is 
enjoyed by foreign governments.” Id. § 2(b). 
When Congress enacted the IOIA in 1945, 
foreign states enjoyed “virtually absolute 
immunity,” so long as the State Department 
requested immunity on their behalf. 
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 
461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). President 
Eisenhower designated the IFC as entitled to 
immunity under the IOIA in 1956. See Exec. 
Order No. 10,680, 21 Fed. Reg. 7,647 (Oct. 
5, 1956). Congress and the courts have since 
recognized that foreign governments’ 
immunity is more limited, as described by the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1604-05; see Republic of 
Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
We took a wrong turn in Atkinson when we 
read the IOIA to grant international 
organizations a static, absolute immunity that 
is, by now, not at all the same “as is enjoyed 
by foreign governments,” but substantially 
broader.  
 
When a statute incorporates existing 
law by reference, the incorporation is 
generally treated as dynamic, not static: As 
the incorporated law develops, its role in the 
referring statute keeps up. Atkinson itself 
correctly acknowledged that a “statute [that] 
refers to a subject generally adopts the law on 
the subject,” including “all the amendments 
and modifications of the law subsequent to 
the time the reference statute was enacted.” 
Atkinson v. Inter-American Development 
Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(emphasis omitted); see El Encanto, Inc. v. 
Hatch Chile Co., 825 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th 
Cir. 2016). 
 
The IOIA references foreign 
sovereign immunity, but in Atkinson we did 
not apply the familiar rule of dynamic 
incorporation because we thought another 
IOIA provision showed that Congress 
intended that reference to be static. Section 1 
of the IOIA authorizes the President to 
“withhold or withdraw from any such 
[international] organization or its officers or 
employees any of the privileges, exemptions, 
and immunities provided for” by the IOIA. 
IOIA § 1. We read that language to mean that 
Congress intended the President alone to 
have the ability, going forward, to adjust 
international organizations’ immunity from 
where it stood as of the IOIA’s enactment in 
1945. Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1341. That 
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presidential power was, we thought, 
exclusive of any shift in international 
organizations’ immunity that might be 
wrought by developments in the law of 
foreign sovereign immunity to which the 
IOIA refers.  
 
Correctly read, however, section 1 
merely empowers the President to make 
organization- and function-specific 
exemptions from otherwise-applicable 
immunity rules. It says that the President may 
“withhold or withdraw from any such 
organization”—note the singular—“or its 
officers or employees any of the privileges, 
exemptions, and immunities” otherwise 
provided for by the IOIA. IOIA § 1 (emphasis 
added). Section 1 thus empowers the 
President to roll back an international 
organization’s immunity on an 
organizationspecific basis. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth R. Wilcox, Digest of United States 
Practice in International Law 405 (2009) 
(describing President Reagan’s 1983 exercise 
of section 1 authority to withhold immunity 
from INTERPOL, followed by President 
Obama’s 2009 restoration of the immunity 
after INTERPOL opened a liaison office in 
New York). Nothing about section 1 suggests 
that Congress framed or intended it to be the 
exclusive means by which an international 
organization’s immunity might be 
determined to be less than absolute.  
 
The inference we drew from section 1 
in Atkinson seems particularly strained 
because it assumes that Congress chose an 
indirect and obscure route to freezing 
international organizations’ immunity over a 
direct and obvious one. If Congress intended 
to grant international organizations an 
unchanging absolute immunity (subject only 
to presidential power to recognize 
organization-specific exceptions) it could 
have simply said so. It might have expressly 
tied international organizations’ immunity to 
that enjoyed by foreign governments as of the 
date of enactment. Or, even better, it might 
have avoided cross-reference altogether by 
stating that international organizations’ 
immunity is absolute. As it happens, the 
original House version of the IOIA did just 
that, providing international organizations 
“immunity from suit and every form of 
judicial process.” H.R. 4489, 79th Cong. (as 
introduced, Oct. 24, 1945; referred to H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means), but the Senate 
rejected that as “a little too broad,” 91 Cong. 
Rec. 12,531 (1945), even as it retained the 
absolute immunity language in provisions 
granting the property of international 
organizations immunity from search, 
confiscation and taxation. See IOIA §§ 2(c), 
6. In lieu of the House version’s broad 
language, the Senate adopted the current 
formulation of section 2(b), which provides 
international organizations the “same 
immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments.” H.R. 4489, 79th Cong. (as 
reported by S. Comm. on Finance, Dec. 18, 
1945).  
 
 The considered view of the 
Department of State, harking back to before 
Atkinson, is that the immunity of 
international organizations under the IOIA 
was not frozen as of 1945, but follows 
developments in the law of foreign sovereign 
immunity under the FSIA. In a 1980 letter, 
then-Legal Adviser Roberts Owen opined 
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that, by “virtue of the FSIA, . . . international 
organizations are now subject to the 
jurisdiction of our courts in respect of their 
commercial activities.” Letter from Roberts 
B. Owen, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of 
State, to Leroy D. Clark, General Counsel, 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (June 24, 1980), reprinted in 
Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of 
the United States Relating to International 
Law, 74 Am. J. Int’l L. 917, 917-18 (1980). 
Although the State Department’s 
interpretation of the IOIA is not binding on 
the court, the Department’s involvement in 
the drafting of the IOIA lends its view extra 
weight. See H.R. Rep. No. 79-1203, at 7 
(1945) (referring to the draft bill as “prepared 
by the State Department”); see also Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 
(2004) (citing a letter of the State 
Department’s Legal Adviser and 
encouraging courts to “give serious weight to 
the Executive Branch’s view” in cases that 
may affect foreign policy).  
 
Reading the IOIA to dynamically link 
organizations’ immunity to that of their 
member states makes sense. The contrary 
view we adopted in Atkinson appears to allow 
states, subject to suit under the commercial 
activity exception of the FSIA, to carry on 
commercial activities with immunity through 
international organizations. Thus, the 
Canadian government is subject to suit in 
United States courts for disputes arising from 
its commercial activities here, but the Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission—of which the 
United States and Canada are the sole 
members—is immune from suit under 
Atkinson. See Exec. Order No. 11,059, 27 
Fed. Reg. 10,405 (Oct. 23, 1962); see also 
Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, Can.-
U.S., Sept. 10, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 2836. Neither 
the IOIA nor our cases interpreting it explain 
why nations that collectively breach contracts 
or otherwise act unlawfully through 
organizations should enjoy immunity in our 
courts when the same conduct would not be 
immunized if directly committed by a nation 
acting on its own.  
 
Were I not bound by Atkinson, I 
would hold that international organizations’ 
immunity under the IOIA is the same as the 
immunity enjoyed by foreign states. Accord 
OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space 
Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 762- 64 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(declining to follow Atkinson and holding 
that restricted immunity as codified in the 
FSIA, including its commercial activity 
exception, applies to international 
organizations under the IOIA).  
 
2. Atkinson’s error is compounded in 
certain suits involving waiver under the 
Mendaro doctrine. In Mendaro v. World 
Bank, we decided that courts should pare 
back an international organization’s apparent 
waiver of immunity from suit whenever we 
believe the waiver would yield no 
“corresponding benefit” to the organization. 
717 F.2d 610, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see 
Osserian v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 552 F.3d 836, 
840 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding organization’s 
facially broad waiver of immunity effective 
only as to types of plaintiffs and claims that 
“would benefit the organization over the long 
term”). That doctrine lacks a sound legal 
foundation and is awkward to apply; were I 
not bound by precedent, I would reject it.  
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It is undisputed that IOIA immunity 
may be waived, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b), and the 
majority recognizes that the IFC’s charter 
“would seem to include a categorical 
waiver.” Maj. Op. 6-7 & n.2; see IFC Articles 
of Agreement art. 6, § 3, May 25, 1955, 7 
U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 118. Half a 
century ago, we read the Agreement 
establishing the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) to effectuate a 
broad waiver of the Bank’s immunity. See 
Lutcher S. A. Celulose e Papel v. 
InterAmerican Development Bank, 382 F.2d 
454, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.). The 
IFC’s Articles of Agreement, which use the 
same waiver language as did the IADB in 
Lutcher, would appear to waive the IFC’s 
immunity here. Under the reasoning of 
Lutcher, the IFC, like the IADB in that case, 
may be sued in United States court.  
 
But Lutcher was not our last word. As 
just noted, we decided in Mendaro to honor 
an international organization’s “facially 
broad waiver of immunity” only insofar as 
doing so provided a “corresponding benefit” 
to the organization. 717 F.2d at 613, 617. We 
thought it appropriate to look to the 
“interrelationship between the functions” of 
the international organization and “the 
underlying purposes of international 
immunities” to cabin a charter document’s 
immunity waiver. Id. at 615. The member 
states, we opined in Mendaro, “could only 
have intended to waive the Bank’s immunity 
from suits by its debtors, creditors, 
bondholders, and those other potential 
plaintiffs to whom the Bank would have to 
subject itself to suit in order to achieve its 
chartered objectives.” Id. We decided the 
waiver did not apply to the claim of Mendaro, 
a former Bank employee challenging her 
termination, because recognizing 
employment claims had no “corresponding 
benefit” for the Bank. Id. at 612-14.  
 
We saw Mendaro as distinguishable 
from Lutcher. Allowing the debtor’s claims 
in Lutcher “would directly aid the Bank in 
attracting responsible borrowers,” whereas 
complying with the law governing the Bank’s 
“internal operations” in Mendaro would not 
“appreciably advance the Bank’s ability to 
perform its functions.” Id. at 618-20 
(emphasis omitted). In other words, Mendaro 
assumes that business counterparties will be 
unwilling to transact with an international 
organization if they lack judicial recourse 
against it, but that making employees’ legal 
rights unenforceable against such an 
organization will not affect their willingness 
to work there. We thus held that a facially 
broad waiver of an organization’s immunity 
should be read not to allow employee claims.  
 
The “corresponding benefit” doctrine 
calls on courts to second-guess international 
organizations’ own waiver decisions and to 
treat a waiver as inapplicable unless it would 
bring the organization a “corresponding 
benefit”—presumably one offsetting the 
burden of amenability to suit. The majority 
acknowledges that “it is a bit strange” that 
Mendaro calls on the judiciary to re-
determine an international organization’s 
own waiver calculus. Slip Op. at 8. I agree 
that the organization itself is in a better 
position than we are to know what is in its 
institutional interests. But, whereas my 
colleagues point to the fact that “the cases 
 351 
come to us when the organizations deny the 
claim,” id., I would be inclined to think that 
organizations’ assessments of their own long-
term goals are more reliably reflected in their 
charters and policies—here, in the broad 
waiver included in IFC’s Articles of 
Agreement— than in their litigation positions 
defending against pending claims.  
 
It is not entirely clear why we have 
drawn the particular line we have pursuant to 
Mendaro. Why are suits by a consultant, a 
potential investor, and a corporate borrower 
in an international organization’s interest, but 
suits by employees and their dependents not? 
Compare, e.g., Vila v. InterAmerican 
Investment, Corp., 570 F.3d 274, 276, 279-82 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (permitting suit by a 
consultant); Osseiran, 552 F.3d at 840-41 
(permitting suit by a potential investor); 
Lutcher, 382 F.2d at 459-60 (permitting suit 
by a corporate borrower), with, e.g., 
Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1338-39 (barring suit 
by a former wife seeking garnishment of 
former husband’s wages); Mendaro, 717 
F.2d at 618-19 (barring suit by a terminated 
employee asserting a sex harassment and 
discrimination claim).  
 
Our cases seem to construe charter-
document immunity waivers to allow suits 
only by commercial parties likely to be repeat 
players, or by parties with substantial 
bargaining power. But the opposite would 
make more sense: Entities doing regular 
business with international organizations can 
write waivers of immunity into their 
contracts with the organizations. See, e.g., 
OSS Nokalva, 617 F.3d at 759 (contract 
clause authorizing software developer to sue 
European Space Agency in state and federal 
courts in New Jersey). Sophisticated 
commercial actors that fail to bargain for 
such terms are surely less entitled to benefit 
from broad immunity waivers than victims of 
torts or takings who lacked any bargaining 
opportunity, or unsophisticated parties 
unlikely to anticipate and bargain around an 
immunity bar.  
 
The IFC successfully argued here that 
it would enjoy no “corresponding benefit” 
from immunity waiver. The local entities and 
residents that brought this suit contend that 
giving effect here to the IFC’s waiver would 
advance the Corporation’s organizational 
goals. The “IFC requires ‘broad community 
support’ before funding projects” like the 
Tata Mundra power plant, and “local 
communities may hesitate to host a high-risk 
project,” the appellants contend, “if they 
know that the IFC can ignore its own 
promises and standards and they will have no 
recourse.” Appellants Br. at 48-49. Without 
directly addressing the benefits of legal 
accountability to the communities it seeks to 
serve, the IFC contends that treating the 
waiver in its Articles of Agreement as 
effective here would open a floodgate of 
litigation in United States courts. That 
argument has it backwards: The IFC 
persuaded the majority to stem a litigation 
flood it anticipates only because the 
immunity waiver in the IFC’s own Articles of 
Agreement opened the gate.  
 
The perceived need for Mendaro’s 
odd approach would not have arisen if we 
had, back in Atkinson, read the IOIA to confer 
on international organizations the same 
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immunity as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments—i.e. restrictive immunity that, 
today, would be governed by the FSIA. As 
the majority observes, Slip Op. at 8, the cases 
in which we have applied Mendaro to hold 
that claims are not immunity-barred look 
remarkably like cases that would be allowed 
to proceed under the FSIA’s commercial 
activity exception. The activities we held to 
be non-immunized—such as suits by 
“debtors, creditors, [and] bondholders,” 
Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 615, “suits based on 
commercial transactions with the outside 
world” affecting an organization’s “ability to 
operate in the marketplace,” Osseiran, 552 
F.3d at 840, and unjust enrichment claims by 
commercial lending specialists, Vila, 570 
F.3d at 276, 279-82—seem like just the kinds 
of claims that would be permitted under the 
commercial activity exception. We should 
have achieved that result, not via Mendaro’s 
“corresponding benefit” test, but by 
recognizing that the IOIA hitched the scope 
of international organizations’ immunity to 
that of foreign governments under the FSIA. 
There is a time-tested body of law under the 
FSIA that delineates its contours—including 
its commercial activity exception. The 
pattern of decisions applying Mendaro may 
approximate some of the results that would 
have occurred had international 
organizations been subject to the FSIA, but 
Mendaro begs other important questions that 
assimilation of IOIA immunity to the FSIA 
would resolve. 
 
Our efforts to chart a separate course 
under the IOIA were misguided from the 
start, and the doctrinal tangle has only 
deepened in light of the amorphous waiver-
curbing doctrine that has developed under 
Mendaro. I believe that the full court should 
revisit both Atkinson and Mendaro in an 
appropriate case. But because those decisions 
remain binding precedent in our circuit, I 
concur. 
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“Justices to Review Scope of Immunity For Int’s Orgs” 
 
Law360 
 
Jimmy Hoover 
May 21, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to 
review a D.C. Circuit decision holding that 
international organizations enjoy even more 
immunity from lawsuits than do foreign 
governments, taking up a case Monday from 
a group of Indian nationals suing 
the International Finance Corp. over a power 
plant project they say has wreaked havoc on 
the surrounding environment. 
 
In Jam v. International Finance Corp., the 
high court will decide the scope of immunity 
for international organizations such as the 
IFC — which is headquartered in 
Washington, D.C. — under the International 
Organizations Immunities Act. As is its 
custom, the court granted certiorari in the 
case without explanation, adding it to its 
October 2018 term. 
 
The petitioners are farmers, fishermen and a 
local government entity claiming to have 
experienced devastating environmental 
damage from the Tata Mundra Power Plant in 
Gujarat, India, which was financed through 
$450 million in loans from the IFC. They say 
the international organization neglected its 
obligation to supervise the project and did not 
comply with the funding agreement and its 
own internal policies to protect the 
surrounding environment, and that as a result 
the water is contaminated and thermal 
pollution is killing off marine life. 
 
A D.C. federal court granted the 
organization’s bid for immunity and threw 
out the lawsuit, a decision upheld by a D.C. 
Circuit panel and left untouched by the full 
circuit bench. The Supreme Court’s order 
granting certiorari has breathed hope into the 
group’s effort to revive the power plant 
lawsuit. 
 
“We’re gratified that the court has taken up 
the case and look forward to the next stage,” 
said Stanford University law professor 
Jeffrey Fisher, an attorney for the group of 
Indian nationals that petitioned the high 
court’s review. 
 
At issue is a provision of the IOIA stating that 
international organizations “shall enjoy the 
same immunity from suit ... as is enjoyed by 
foreign governments.” Relying on its 
precedent, the D.C. Circuit held in June 2017 
that the provision refers to the “virtually 
absolute” status of sovereign immunity that 
existed when the IOIA was enacted in 1945, 
before the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
codified a crucial exception for when 
countries engage in commercial activity. 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision created an 
“entrenched circuit split” with the Third 
Circuit’s holding that the provision 
incorporates developments in the area of 
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sovereign immunity, such as the FSIA’s 
commercial exception, the farmers and 
fishermen wrote in a January petition asking 
the court to resolve the disagreement. The 
petitioners received a supporting brief from a 
group of international legal scholars from 
various law schools. 
 
The IFC said in an opposition brief filed in 
late March that the IOIA conferred near-
complete immunity that could only be 
waived by the organization itself or the 
president. “The immunity conferred in the 
IOIA was not altered, decades later, by the 
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act — a different statute, covering different 
entities, with different motivating 
principles,” it said. 
 
In any event, the IFC said, the D.C. Circuit’s 
disagreement with the Third Circuit created 
only a “shallow circuit split” that does not 
warrant review given the infrequency with 
which people bring lawsuits against 
international organizations, let alone those 
without founding treaties conferring such 
immunity such as the United Nations and 
the International Monetary Fund. 
 
The case was first distributed for the justices’ 
regular conference on May 10, but relisted for 
the Thursday conference before the court 
decided to take the case Monday. The 
Supreme Court has not yet set a date for oral 
arguments in the case. 
 
The IFC declined to comment on Monday. 
 
The petitioners are represented by Richard L. 
Herz, Marco B. Simons and Michelle C. 
Harrison of EarthRights International, and 
Jeffrey L. Fisher, David T. Goldberg and 
Pamela S. Karlan of Stanford Law School. 
 
The International Finance Corp. is 
represented by Francis A. Vasquez Jr., Dana 
E. Foster and Maxwell J. Kalmann of White 
& Case LLP. 
 
The case is Jam v. International Finance 
Corp., case number 17-1011, in the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
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 “Supreme Court Grants Cert in Jam v. International Finance Corporation” 
 
 
Lawfare 
 
Elliot Kim 
June 12, 2018  
 
On May 21, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Jam v. International Finance 
Corporation to determine whether 
international organizations are afforded the 
same immunity from lawsuits under 
the International Organizations Immunities 
Act(IOIA) that foreign governments are 
conferred under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act. Since the IOIA was enacted 
in 1945, foreign sovereign immunity has 
been curtailed by the development and 
codification of the “commercial activities 
exception” doctrine. Under this doctrine, 
foreign governments cannot enjoy sovereign 
immunity when the lawsuit is based on those 
governments’ commercial activities. 
Jam will determine whether such 
developments in foreign sovereign immunity 
apply in turn to international organization 
immunity. The case involves a power plant in 
India that was financed by the International 
Financial Corporation (IFC), the private-
sector investment arm of the World Bank. By 
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court has a 
chance to bring much needed clarity to what 
Circuit Judge T.L. Pillard has described as 
the “perplexing state” of the law on 
international-organization immunity, at a 
time when these organizations are 
increasingly being sued in U.S. courts. The 
following is a summary of the factual and 
procedural background of this case and the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
The IFC is an international organization 
based in Washington D.C. comprised of over 
180 member countries. The purpose of the 
IFC is “to further economic development by 
encouraging the growth of productive private 
enterprise in member countries.” The IFC 
focuses on funding private sector projects in 
developing countries that would otherwise 
have difficulty attracting capital. 
This case arose from the IFC’s 2008 decision 
to lend $450 million to an Indian power 
company developing the Tata Mundra Power 
Plant in Gujarat, India. The plaintiffs—
farmers and fisherman who lived near the 
plant, the government of village located near 
the plant, and a local trade union of 
fishworkers—claimed that the IFC failed to 
comply with its internal policies and with the 
specific environmental action plan that was 
part of the funding agreement for the plant. 
As a result, the plaintiffs claim the area 
surrounding the plant suffered disastrous 
environmental and social harm, including 
contamination of drinkable groundwater, 
degradation in local air quality, and 
displacement of local fisherman and farmers. 
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In 2015, the plaintiffs brought suit against the 
IFC in the U.S. District Court of the District 
of Columbia claiming negligence, negligent 
supervision, public nuisance, private 
nuisance, trespass and breach of contract. 
Judge John D. Bates dismissed the complaint 
on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the 
IFC was immune from the lawsuit under the 
IOIA. The IOIA provides that: 
International organizations, their property 
and their assets, wherever located, and by 
whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same 
immunity from suit and every form of 
judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments, except to the extent that such 
organizations may expressly waive their 
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings 
or by the terms of any contract. 
In interpreting the IOIA, Bates cited a 1998 
D.C. Circuit case Atkinson v. Inter-American 
Development Bank, which held that 
international organizations receive the same 
foreign immunity as foreign governments at 
the time the IOIA was enacted in 1945. This 
interpretation excluded the developed 
commercial activities exception, so the 
plaintiffs urged Judge Bates to instead follow 
the Third Circuit’s decision in OSS Nokalva, 
Inc. v. European Space Agency, which held 
that the IOIA incorporates subsequent 
changes in foreign sovereign immunity, 
including the commercial activities 
exception. Noting that the District Court’s 
“role is to apply [D.C.] Circuit law,” Bates 
concluded that the IFC is entitled to “virtually 
absolute immunity” under Atkinson. 
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ 
alternative argument that the IFC waived its 
immunity in its Articles of Agreement. 
Specifically the plaintiffs referred to Article 
VI, Section 3 of the those articles, which 
states: 
Actions may be brought against the [IFC] 
only in a court of competent jurisdiction in 
the territories of a member in which the [IFC] 
has an office, has appointed an agent for the 
purpose of accepting service of process, or 
has issued or guaranteed securities. No 
actions shall, however, be brought by 
members or persons acting for or deriving 
claims from members. The property and 
assets of the [IFC] shall, wheresoever located 
and by whomsoever held, be immune from 
all forms of seizure, attachment or execution 
before the delivery of final judgment against 
the [IFC]. 
Judge Bates rejected this claim by citing to 
the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Osseiran v. 
International Financial Corporation and 
in Vila v. Inter-American Investment 
Corporation. In those cases, the D.C. Circuit 
rejected the argument that international 
organizations with “nearly identical 
language” in their founding documents had 
waived their immunity. The plaintiffs 
subsequently appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 
D.C. Circuit Judgment 
Judge Lawrence H. Silberman wrote 
the majority opinion, which Judge Harry T. 
Edwards joined and Judge Pillard joined in 
part. Judge Pillard wrote a separate 
concurrence. 
Majority Opinion 
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The majority agreed with the District Court’s 
“well-reasoned” decision on both scope of 
immunity under the IOIA and the absence of 
waiver of immunity in a succinct, ten page 
opinion. Though majority acknowledged the 
“dismal picture” painted by the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, the court found the plaintiffs’ 
arguments foreclosed by its own prior case 
law. 
The plaintiffs first argument was that IOIA 
intended to incorporate of changes to the law 
of foreign sovereign immunity, rather than 
preserving the prevailing understanding of 
foreign sovereign immunity from 1945. Thus 
according to the plaintiffs, the Atkinson court 
misinterpreted Congress’s intent to keep 
immunity for foreign governments and 
international organizations connected. In 
response, the majority reiterated the 
rationales of Atkinson, starting with the 
argument that the statute explicitly delegated 
the responsibility of changing the amount of 
immunity granted to international 
organizations to the president, not to the 
courts. In addition, the majority reiterated the 
point made in Atkinson that the Congress that 
passed the IOIA in 1945 considered—yet 
ultimately rejected—inclusion of a 
commercial activities exception to 
international organization immunity. Finally, 
the majority rejected the plaintiffs argument 
by reminding the them that the D.C. Circuit 
“recently reaffirmed Atkinson” in its 2014 
decision, Nyambal v. International Monetary 
Fund. 
The plaintiffs further contended 
that Atkinson should be ignored because the 
Supreme Court has in recent years 
undermined the premise of Atkinson that 
foreign sovereign enjoyed absolute immunity 
in 1945 when IOIA was enacted. Instead, the 
plaintiffs asserted that immunity was granted 
based on the deference to the judgment of 
political branches, specifically through 
express request by the State Department. 
However, the majority dismissed the 
relevance of the Supreme Court dicta cited by 
the plaintiffs. According to the majority, 
those cases’ references to State Department 
intervention refer to the mechanism for 
conferring immunity on foreign sovereigns in 
1945, not the scope of that immunity. To 
support its position, the court again invoked 
its decision Nyambal, which came after the 
Supreme Court cited by the plaintiffs. 
As in the lower court proceedings, the 
plaintiffs raised an alternative argument that 
the IFC waived its immunity. According to 
the plaintiffs, their position was consistent 
with Osseiran, Vila, and Mendaro v. World 
Bank, in which the D.C. Circuit first adopted 
the “corresponding benefits” test for 
determining whether an international 
organization waived its immunity. Under this 
test, courts determine ex post whether 
waiving immunity for certain plaintiffs and 
claims would have “benefitted” the 
international organization. An international 
organization is considered to have received a 
“corresponding benefit” for waiving its 
immunity if that waiver would have been 
“necessary to enable the [international 
organization] to fulfill its functions.” Thus 
according to Silberman, creditors or 
bondholders are types of plaintiffs for whom 
international organizations probably waived 
their immunity because the organizations 
would not have been able to borrow money 
without agreeing to waive their immunity. 
 358 
The majority rejects the notion that the IFC 
would receive a corresponding benefit to 
waiving its immunity for the plaintiffs’ suit 
for two reasons. First, Silberman emphasized 
that prior case law has generally accepted 
waiver arguments only when the “claims 
have grown out of business relationships” 
between the plaintiffs and the international 
organizations. By contrast, the IFC has no 
direct commercial or contractual relationship 
with the plaintiffs. Silberman highlighted 
another fatal issue for the plaintiffs: their case 
“threaten the policy discretion of the 
organization” because the claims arise from 
“core operations [of the IFC], not ancillary 
business transactions.” As such, the court 
determined that the consequences of waiving 
immunity in this type of case would 
determined outweigh any benefit to the IFC. 
Accordingly, the majority affirmed the 
district court’s opinion. 
Pillard’s Concurrence 
Pillard agreed with the majority that the 
outcome of the case is decided by D.C. 
Circuit precedent. However, she wrote 
separately to urge her colleagues on the D.C. 
Circuit to reconsider Atkinson and Mendaro, 
two cases which she believes were “wrongly 
decided.” 
Pillard began by looking at Section 1 of the 
IOIA, which reads in relevant part: 
The President shall be authorized, in the light 
of the functions performed by any such 
international organization, by appropriate 
Executive order to withhold or withdraw 
from any such organization or its officers or 
employees any of the privileges, exemptions, 
and immunities provided for in this 
subchapter ... 
According to Pillard, the mistake 
in Atkinson was the court’s incorrect 
interpretation of Section 1 of IOIA as 
authorizing “the President alone to have the 
ability, going forward to adjust international 
organizations’ immunity from where it stood 
as of the IOIA’s enactment in 1945.” Instead, 
Pillard noted that the use of the singular terms 
such as “any such organization” and “its 
officers or employees” in Section 1 suggests 
that Congress intended to authorize the 
President to limit immunity for organization 
on a case-by-case basis. In fact, no part of 
Section 1 of IOIA suggests that “Congress 
framed or intended [that section] to be the 
exclusive means by which an international 
organization’s immunity might be 
determined to be less than absolute.” 
Pillard offered several additional arguments 
to support her reading of the IOIA. First, she 
contended that the interpretation 
in Atkinson rested on the flawed assumption 
that Congress chose “an indirect and obscure 
route to freezing international organizations’ 
immunity over a direct and obvious one.” 
Congress could have simply stated its 
intention to grant unchangeable, absolute 
immunity to international organizations; 
instead, Congress chose to set the level of 
international organization immunity by 
reference to the immunity of foreign 
governments.  
Furthermore, Pillard compared the IOIA text 
to the unambiguous language of the original 
House version of the IOIA, which granted 
international organizations “immunity from 
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suit and every form of judicial process.” The 
fact that this draft language, untethered to the 
level of immunity enjoyed by foreign 
governments, was not included in the final 
version of the bill implied to Pillard that 
Congress intended the two levels of 
immunity to be dynamically linked. 
In addition, Pillard cited to the State 
Department’s support for the dynamic view 
of international organizational immunity, 
noting that additional weight should be given 
to the State Department view given its 
involvement in drafting in the IOIA. Finally, 
Pillard highlighted the illogical consequences 
of Atkinson. Granting broader immunity to 
international organizations than to foreign 
governments would immunize “nations that 
collectively breach contracts or otherwise act 
unlawfully through organizations,” even if 
that same conduct would be subject to 
judicial process if a nation were acting on its 
own. Thus, according to Judge Pillard, the 
D.C. Circuit “took a wrong turn 
in Atkinson when [it] read the IOIA to grant 
international organizations a static, absolute 
immunity.” 
Pillard added that the D.C. Circuit has 
“compounded” its errors in Atkinson by 
adopting the “corresponding benefits” test for 
waiver of immunity in Mendaro. Pillard 
dismissed the process of asking “the judiciary 
to re-determine an international 
organization’s waiver calculus” based on 
“amorphous” concepts of long-term benefit. 
Instead of using a test that “lacks a strong 
legal foundation,” Pillard suggested that an 
international organization’s intent to waive 
immunity should be determined either by 
referring directly to the language in an 
organization’s charter using the already well-
developed case law under the FSIA for 
determining whether a sovereign nation has 
waived its immunity.   
Pillard advised that the full D.C. Circuit 
“revisit” Atkinson and Mendaro. However, 
three months after its opinion, the D.C. 
Circuit denied a petition for an en banc 
rehearing on Jam v. IFC. In January 2018, the 
plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorariwith the 
Supreme Court. 
Supreme Court Review 
Jam is the first case before the Supreme 
Court considering the scope of immunity for 
international organizations under IOIA. The 
court’s decision to grant cert in Jam may 
have come as a surprise because it recently 
declined to resolve a circuit split on the scope 
of immunity under the IOIA after the D.C. 
Circuit’s 2014 decision 
in Nyambal conflicted with the Third 
Circuit’s 2010 decision in OSS Nokalva. One 
reason the court may have now decided to 
resolve this issue is that international 
organizations are increasingly finding 
themselves in U.S. courts, facing serious 
allegations such as aiding and abetting 
violations of human rights. As noted by the 
plaintiffs in their cert-stage reply brief, 
international organizations are deeply 
involved in a range of matters from 
“international business to natural resource 
management to human health and safety.” As 
the portfolios of international organizations 
have expanded, the number of lawsuits 
against these organizations brought in U.S. 
courts has also increased in recent years. A 
decision on the merits that weakens the 
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immunity granted to international 
organizations could therefore have a chilling 
effect, especially on organizations like the 
IFC, which according to D.C. Circuit opinion 
primarily engages in “commercial activities.” 
Such a decision would also provide third 
parties who are being harmed by 
international organizations’ activities an 
important avenue of redress. 
Although it agreed to address the scope of 
IOIA immunity, the Supreme Court declined 
to consider the second question raised 
by Jam: what are the rules governing 
immunity for international organizations? 
Thus, this case will leave unresolved several 
important questions on international 
organization immunity raised during the 
lower court proceedings. One such question 
raised by the plaintiffs is whether the 
executive branch intervention is necessary 
for an international organization to have 
immunity. The other issue is how courts can 
determine whether an international 
organization has waived its immunity. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs in their petition for 
cert claimed that the D.C. Circuit’s 
“corresponding benefits” test as a distorting 
the statutory language of the IOIA. Just as the 
court in recent terms has reconsidered the 
scope of foreign sovereign 
immunity, Jam could signal the beginning of 
a string of Supreme Court cases providing 
greater clarity on the status of international 
organizations within our legal system. 
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“Indian fisherman hail U.S Supreme Court decision to hear World Bank suit” 
 
 
Reuters 
 
Rina Chandran 
May 22, 2018 
 
Farmers and fishermen in western India have 
welcomed a U.S. Supreme Court decision to 
hear their lawsuit against a World Bank 
agency, which financed a power plant they 
blame for damaging the environment and 
their livelihoods. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to hear an appeal by the villagers of a lower 
court ruling that the International Finance 
Corp (IFC) was immune from such lawsuits 
under federal law. 
 
The court must now consider for the first time 
whether international organizations are 
immune from such suits under federal law, 
according to the advocacy group EarthRights 
International (ERI), which is representing the 
plaintiffs. 
 
“This is a big victory for us,” said Bharat 
Patel, a plaintiff and general secretary of the 
fishermen’s group Machimar Adhikar 
Sangharsh Sangatha. 
 
“We fought for so many years to be heard. 
This decision gives us hope,” he told the 
Thomson Reuters Foundation. 
 
The case revolves around the IFC’s decision 
in 2008 to provide $450 million in loans for a 
coal-fired plant operated by a Tata Power unit 
near Mundra, in Gujarat state. 
 
Loans from the IFC include provisions 
requiring that certain environmental 
standards will be met. 
 
But the 4,000 megawatt plant - billed as key 
to providing cheap energy and creating jobs - 
has had a “devastating and irreversible 
impact” on the coastal ecosystem, according 
to the submission by villagers who live near 
the plant. 
 
Coal ash damages crops, water for drinking 
and irrigation have been contaminated, while 
discharges from the plant’s cooling system 
have reduced fish stocks, they said. 
 
Lead plaintiff Budha Ismail Jam and others 
sued in federal court in Washington in 2015, 
saying the IFC had failed to meet its 
obligations. 
 
Representatives for Tata Power and the 
World Bank in India did not respond to e-
mails seeking comment. 
 
A district court in 2016 and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
in 2017 ruled that the lawsuit was barred 
 362 
because the IFC is immune from such 
litigation under a 1945 law. 
 
The question before the Supreme Court now 
is whether there are limits to immunity for 
entities like the IFC under the 1945 
International Organizations Immunity Act. 
 
That law gives international organizations 
“the same immunity” from suit “as is enjoyed 
by foreign governments”. 
 
However, governments “are not entitled to 
immunity from suits arising out of their 
commercial activities” under the 1976 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
according to ERI. 
 
“Since a foreign government would not be 
immune from this suit, the IFC, which is 
made up of foreign states, should not be 
immune either,” it said. 
 
The court will hear arguments and decide the 
case in its next term, which begins in 
October. 
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“Can You Sue International Organizations? The Supreme Court Decides to Weigh 
In” 
 
 
Just Security 
 
Kristina Daugirdas 
June 1, 2018 
 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
might sound like an ordinary private 
business, but it’s not. It’s an international 
organization that’s part of the World Bank. 
The IFC has all of the standard accoutrements 
of an international organization. It was 
created by treaty; it has member 
countries, 184 of them; and it has grand 
ambitions to improve the world “by 
encouraging the growth of productive private 
enterprise in member countries.” 
 
The IFC, like other international 
organizations, is also very difficult to sue in 
U.S. courts because it has comprehensive 
immunities from suit. But that may change: 
last week, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in a case, Jam v. IFC, that may pare 
back those immunities. The implications 
would be significant—not just for the IFC, 
but for international organizations across the 
board. 
 
The statutory question 
 
The plaintiffs in Jam include farmers and 
fishermen whose lives and livelihoods were 
harmed by the construction of the coal-fired 
Tata Mundra Power Plant in Gujarat, India. 
According to their complaint, salt 
contaminated the local groundwater during 
construction, rendering the water useless for 
irrigation. The plant’s cooling system 
discharges thermal pollution into the sea, 
killing off marine life. And the open-air 
conveyor system that transports coal to feed 
the plant disperses coal dust and ash into the 
air along its route. 
 
Although the power plant is the immediate 
source of the problem, the plaintiffs sued the 
IFC in federal district court in Washington, 
D.C, where the IFC is headquartered. The 
IFC had loaned $450 million for the 
construction and operation of the plant—
roughly 10 percent of its total cost. 
Consistent with IFC policy, the loan 
agreement had incorporated an 
Environmental and Social Action Plan that 
should have prevented the harms the 
plaintiffs endured. But the IFC didn’t take 
any steps to ensure compliance with that 
plan. Indeed, the IFC’s own ombudsperson 
criticized the deficient supervision of the 
project. So the plaintiffs filed a suit against 
the IFC for negligence and other torts. 
 
The question raised by the case is whether the 
IFC’s immunities preclude the lawsuit from 
going forward. In the United States, 
international organizations’ immunities stem 
from two sources: treaties and the 
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International Organizations Immunities Act 
(IOIA), a statute enacted in 1945. Once the 
president designates particular individual 
organizations by executive order, they enjoy 
the immunities set out in the IOIA. The key 
text on immunity provides: 
International organizations . . . shall enjoy the 
same immunity from suit and every form of 
judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments, except to the extent that such 
organizations may expressly waive their 
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings 
or by the terms of any contract. 
 
Thus, the IOIA itself doesn’t directly specify 
the scope of organizations’ immunities. It 
instead cross-references the immunities of 
foreign governments. But that presents a 
puzzle. Do international organizations get the 
immunity that foreign states had in 1945 
when the IOIA was adopted? Or, instead, do 
they enjoy the immunity that foreign states 
receive today, which is more limited and 
governed by the 1976 Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA)? 
 
The D.C. Circuit has taken the former 
position; the Third Circuit has taken the 
latter, creating a genuine circuit split. The 
difference matters: in 1945 foreign states 
generally had absolute immunity from suit. 
Under the FSIA, however, foreign states are 
(as a rough cut) immune for their sovereign 
or governmental acts, but not immune with 
respect to their commercial activities. 
 
Set aside for now whether the D.C. Circuit or 
the Third Circuit has the better claim on the 
merits. In this post, I’d like to get a handle on 
what’s at stake in the lawsuit. As a first cut, 
deciding that the IOIA measures immunity 
with reference to the FSIA could create real 
problems for international organizations 
operating in the United States. But no matter 
how the case is resolved, it’s unlikely to spur 
international organizations to make the kinds 
of changes that are genuinely needed—
developing robust alternative mechanisms 
for resolving claims by individuals who are 
adversely affected by what international 
organizations do. 
 
When do international organizations engage 
in commercial activities? 
 
If the Supreme Court interprets the IOIA to 
confer absolute immunity, then the suit 
against the IFC can proceed only if the IFC 
has waived its immunity. If the Supreme 
Court goes the other way, then determining 
whether the IFC (and other international 
organizations) can be sued becomes quite 
complicated. The answer turns in part on the 
question of what counts as a commercial 
activity of an international organization. In a 
throwaway line in its opinion in Jam, the 
D.C. Circuit wrote that if the commercial 
activities exception applied to the IFC, “the 
organization would never retain immunity 
since its operations are solely ‘commercial,’ 
i.e., the IFC does not undertake any 
‘sovereign’ activities.” But it’s not so clear 
that the IFC’s immunity could be wiped away 
so quickly. 
 
The Supreme Court has said that to determine 
whether an act is commercial for purposes of 
the FSIA, the key question is “whether the 
particular actions that the foreign state 
performs (whatever the motive behind them) 
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are the type of actions by which a private 
party engages in ‘trade or traffic or 
commerce.’” At first blush, the IFC’s work 
indeed looks commercial—its main activity 
is lending to private actors, and a slew of 
banks in the private sector do exactly that. 
 
But a lot depends on the level of generality at 
which a particular activity is described. 
Repaying a bank loan sounds like a “garden 
variety” commercial act, but the Second 
Circuit has held that repaying a loan from the 
International Monetary Fund is a sovereign 
act because of the particular way that the IMF 
and its loans are structured. Only states can 
be members of the IMF and borrow from it; 
the IMF’s lending is “part of a larger 
regulatory enterprise intended to preserve 
stability in the international monetary system 
and foster orderly economic growth.” If 
repaying an IMF loan isn’t a commercial 
activity, neither is making such a loan. The 
analogy to the IFC’s activities is obvious. 
 
Likewise, hiring an employee might initially 
appear to be an obviously commercial act, 
but the executive branch has long taken the 
position that employing international civil 
servants is not a commercial activity, and a 
number of court decisions have adopted this 
reasoning. The bottom line is that there’s a lot 
of room to debate what’s commercial and 
what’s sovereign—and a conclusion that 
international organizations lack immunity for 
their commercial acts is only an interim step 
in the analysis. 
 
What about treaties? 
 
Even if the IOIA does not confer immunity 
for commercial activities, an international 
organization’s treaty might. But figuring out 
the effect that a treat might have on 
immunities is more complicated than it might 
at first appear. Even apart from interpreting 
the treaty language about immunity, courts 
will have to decide whether that language is 
self-executing; whether the treaty language 
overrides conflicting statutory provisions 
pursuant to the last-in-time rule; and whether 
the treaty should influence the interpretation 
of the IOIA pursuant to the Charming 
Betsy rule, which instructs courts to interpret 
statutes to avoid conflicts with international 
law. 
 
It’s difficult to generalize about how this 
analysis would come out because the content 
of treaty provisions that address the 
immunities of international organizations 
vary considerably. The treaty that governs 
the immunity of the United Nations is quite 
sweeping: It provides that the United Nations 
“shall enjoy immunity from every form of 
legal process except insofar as in any 
particular case it has expressly waived its 
immunity.” The Charter of the Organization 
of American States, like that of a number of 
other organizations, is somewhat narrower. It 
says that each organization “shall enjoy in the 
territory of each Member such legal capacity, 
privileges, and immunities as are necessary 
for the exercise of its functions and the 
accomplishment of its purposes,” but it 
doesn’t specify exactly how much immunity 
is “necessary.” Still other charters are silent 
on immunity, like the one governing World 
Organization for Animal Health. 
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The upshot is that some organizations, like 
the United Nations, can make a treaty-based 
claim that their immunity remains absolute 
regardless of how the IOIA is interpreted. 
Other organizations can’t. An adverse 
decision from the Supreme Court will be 
especially consequential for this latter group. 
 
Consider again the World Organization for 
Animal Health, which is known by its 
historical French acronym OIE. Its work 
focuses on preventing animal diseases—and 
thereby facilitating international trade in 
animals and animal products. President 
Barack Obama designated OIE pursuant to 
the IOIA right at the end of his term. Six 
months later, the OIE announced that it 
would establish a liaison office in College 
Station, Texas. The extension of immunity 
and the establishment of the office appear 
closely connected. Indeed, the OIE’s press 
release regarding the Texas office opens with 
a reference to the executive order in its very 
first sentence. 
 
If the Supreme Court interprets the IOIA as 
conferring limited immunities, what will the 
OIE do? At a minimum, it will face 
considerable legal uncertainty. OIE might 
find itself on the receiving end of a lawsuit by 
a disgruntled employee, but unsure whether 
courts will find the commercial-activities 
exception to apply or not. The OIE might 
maintain the office in College Station, that 
risk notwithstanding. It could try to bolster its 
immunity through a new international 
agreement or a new statutory provision (good 
luck with that). Or it could decide that the 
legal risk is too great and shut down the 
office. 
Alternative mechanisms for resolving 
disputes 
 
Stepping back, there are two main rationales 
for providing immunity to international 
organizations. First, immunity shields the 
organization from member states that seek to 
undermine or influence the organization by 
subjecting it or its officials to lawsuits. This 
risk is real. The International Court of Justice, 
for example, affirmed the immunity of a UN 
Special Rapporteur on judicial independence 
after that rapporteur was sued for libel by 
individuals and companies who were 
incensed by comments the rapporteur made 
to the press. Second, immunity from 
employment-related lawsuits helps assure 
that international organizations can be 
genuinely international—and can develop 
employment policies that are suitable for an 
international workforce. 
 
Although there are good reasons for 
according immunity to international 
organizations, that immunity often comes at 
a heavy price: it can leave individuals who 
are harmed by an international organization 
without recourse. The plaintiffs in the case 
against the IFC are alleging serious harm. 
Another recent high-profile example 
involves the United Nations. UN 
peacekeepers in Haiti unintentionally 
introduced cholera to the country in the wake 
of the 2010 earthquake. The cholera epidemic 
there has killed more than 9,000 individuals 
and sickened hundreds of thousands. The 
United Nations denied a claim for 
compensation and an apology that the victims 
submitted directly to the organization, and 
successfully invoked immunity to shut down 
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a lawsuit filed in U.S. courts. In December 
2016, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon issued a long-delayed apology and 
announced the establishment of a new $400 
million program to benefit Haitian victims. 
But a year and a half later, the program has 
not delivered much, largely because UN 
member states have supplied only $7.5 
million, a tiny fraction of what Ban had 
promised. 
 
The plaintiffs in the case against the IFC do 
have some recourse. In 1999, IFC established 
an Office of the Compliance 
Officer/Ombudsman (CAO) and empowered 
it to hear complaints by people affected by 
projects financed by IFC “in a manner that is 
fair, constructive, and objective.” In 2011, 
the Association for the Struggle for 
Fishworkers’ Rights filed a complaint with 
the CAO about the Tata Mundra plant, 
arguing that that the IFC had violated its own 
economic and social policies in connection 
with that project. CAO proceeded with a 
formal investigation. After CAO 
produced reports that substantiated a number 
of the Association’s claims, CAO produced 
an Action Plan that contemplated a number 
of environmental, economic, and health 
studies, and indicated that “appropriate 
mitigation measures will be developed” in 
consultation with certain experts if those 
studies indicated an “adverse impact.” Since 
then, CAO has continued to monitor 
implementation of this action plan and 
subsequent developments. CAO’s most 
recent monitoring report, dated February 
2017, described progress on completing 
some of these studies, but emphasized “an 
outstanding need for a rapid, participatory 
and expressly remedial approach to assessing 
and addressing project impacts raised by the 
complainants.” The case remains open, and 
CAO is continuing to monitor IFC’s response 
to its findings. 
 
There are other examples of such alternative 
mechanisms that allow individuals who have 
been harmed by international organizations 
to challenge at least certain kinds of actions 
by the organizations. The UN Security 
Council created an Office of the 
Ombudsperson that allows individuals and 
entities subject to the ISIL and al-Qaeda 
sanctions regime to challenge their listings. 
The Human Rights Advisory Panel was 
established to hear human rights claims 
against the UN Administration in Kosovo. 
 
One solution might be to make the immunity 
of international organizations contingent on 
the development of such mechanisms. (The 
European Court of Human Rights did that 
in Waite and Kennedy v. Germany.) But 
crafting an effective rule is very difficult. 
If any alternative mechanism suffices to 
assure immunity from suit, international 
organizations might be tempted to develop 
minimalist procedures that offer nothing 
meaningful to injured individuals. If, on the 
other hand, national courts recognized 
immunity only when they deem the 
alternative mechanism adequate, there’s a 
risk of recreating the problems that justify 
immunity in the first place: Courts might 
issue decisions that evaluate alternatives 
based on parochial standards, yielding 
inconsistent decisions from one jurisdiction 
to the next, and potentially subjecting 
organizations to undue influence of 
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individual member states outside of the 
organization’s formal governance 
mechanisms. 
 
Suppose the IFC’s immunity from suits like 
the current one depended on the availability 
of a good-enough alternative mechanism. 
Would—and should—the CAO qualify? 
Reasonable minds could disagree. The 
plaintiffs presumably aren’t satisfied by the 
CAO process. At the same time, the oversight 
process can’t be dismissed as pure window 
dressing. The CAO seems to be taking the 
Association’s complaints seriously, and 
appears willing to publicly criticize the IFC 
and to maintain pressure over time. 
 
Returning to the statutory question in Jam v. 
IFC, then, there are two take-away points. 
First, interpreting the IOIA to confer 
immunities only for governmental acts would 
create considerable legal uncertainty for 
international organizations across the board. 
Second, neither interpretation of the IOIA 
that’s on offer would do much to 
systematically advance the development of 
serious alternative dispute settlement 
mechanisms. The presence or absence of 
such mechanisms is irrelevant if the IOIA 
confers absolute immunity—and is likewise 
irrelevant if the IOIA confers immunity only 
for sovereign or governmental acts. The push 
to develop—and to improve—such 
alternative mechanisms will have to come 
from elsewhere
